A'in-i Akbarī - The Ain-i-Akbarī, Volume 3

In his XXI Chap. of the Indica, Albirúni refers to several of his publications in which the method of finding the distances has been worked out. These are not repeated but he gives the calculation of the deśântara i. e, difference between the places according to the Hindu method as reported by Alfazári, in his Canon, viz., “Add together the squares of the sines of the latitudes of the two places and take the root of the sum. This root is the portio. Further square the difference of these two sines and add it to the portio. Multiply the sum by 8 and divide the product by 377. The quotient is the distance between the two places according to a rough calculation. On this Albiruni remarks, “This method is found in the astronomical books of the Hindus, in conformity with the account of Alfazári save in one particulars. The here-mentioned portio is the root of the difference between the squares of the sines of the two latitudes not the sum of their squares.” I do not find the calculation mentioned by Abul Fazl, of this astronomer.

Muḥammad Ibn Zakaríyyá ar Rázi is known in the Schools of Medicine of the middle ages as Rasis, Rhazes or Rhazis, and accused of having become a Pyrrhonian from misunderstanding the teaching of Aristotle. D'Herbelot says that he had the reputation of a great philosopher and being as distinguished in Chemistry and Astronomy as in Medicine, but the wit of the envious asserted that he was an indifferent chemist since he could not cure his own blindness, and a worthless astronomer since he could not foresee the misfortunes that befell him. He is the reputed author of many works in Chemistry and Medicine, and of a commentary on Aristotle. The catalogue is noticed by Sachau, II, 342, Albirúni, Indica. He died under the reign of Al Muḳtadir in A. H. 310. The works of Rasis translated into Latin or French were accounted among the treasures of the library belonging to the faculty of Medicine in Paris in the fifteenth century. In 1471 Louis the eleventh of France borrowed them from that learned body and deposited in pledge a quantity of valuable plate and was moreover, compelled to procure a nobleman to join with him as surety in a deed by which he bound himself to return them under great forfeiture; v. Robertson's Hist. Charles V. Notes to Sec. I. But this fictitious value was due to the extreme rarity and therefore high price of books in general and not to the merit of the author. His name occurs also among the books which Chaucer's Doctor of Physicke is said to have studied.

It is here that eastern fable locates the fountain of the water of life, which the as mythical prophet, saint, or bard al Khidr is said to have discovered and tasted, and received his immortality. He is alluded to in the 18th Chapter of the Koran in the adventure with Moses from which may be traced the story of Parnell's Hermit.

The inhabitants of Zanguebar, including the “Zingis” of Ptolemy near the entrance of the Red Sea and a large portion of inner Africa, v. Lane. Lex.

According to the Vishnu Dharma, the orbit of the Great Bear lies under the pole: under it the orbit of Saturn: then that of Jupiter: next, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and the Moon. They rotate towards the east like a mill in a uniform motion peculiar to each star, some moving rapidly, others slowly. Albirúni criticises this statement with his usual intelligence. See Indica. Cap. XXVII, Sachau, p. 288.

The Hermetic books are said by Fabricius to be the forgeries of a Jew or of a semi-Platonic semi-Christian writer of about the 2nd century after Christ. Hermes Trismegistus himself is a flction of the Neo Platonists and was the offspring of the Oriental and Hellenic philosophies. He was the supposed mystic author of all knowledge and the author, on the authority of Manetho, of 36,525 books. As this number corresponds with the total number of years of Egyption Chronology in the “Ancient Chronicle,” obtained by multiplying the 1461 years of the Canicular Cycle by 25, the coincidence is suggestive that the computation of the books was of late date. Bochart understands by books, lines, and Hornius, pages of papyrus. Galen regarded the Hermetical books of astrological botany as the work of an impostor. See Sir G Lewis. Astron. of the Anc. His principal works published under this name are given in the class Dict. of Dr. W. Smith.

This tripartite division into Europe Asia and Libya was unknown to Homer, and the earliest allusions to it are found in the writers of the 1st half of the 5th century B. C., viz. Aeschylus and Pindar and the logographers Hecatæus and Pherecydes; v. Art Asia, Smith C. D. Herodotus discusses it in Melpomene (42) with some wonder at the character of the division.

This partition into A. Major and A. Minor was not made, according to a writer in the Cl. Dic. till the 4th century of our era. Asia Major (A. ) was part of the continent E. of the Tanais, the Euxine, an imaginary line drawn from the Euxine at Trebizond to the Gulf of Issus and the Mediterranean. It included Sarmatia Asiatica, with all the Scythian tribes to the E., Colchis, Iberia, Albania, Armenia, Syria, Arabia, Babylonia, Mesopotamia, Assyria, Media, Susiana, Persis, Ariana, Hyrcanía, Margiana, Bactriana, Sogdiana, India, China. Asia Minor (A. , Anatolia) was the peninsula on the extreme W. of Asia, bounded by the Euxine, Ægean and Mediterranean.

He has omitted the S. E. The diagram will be found in Albirúni's Indica Ch. XXXIX, 262, Sachau, with the authorities. Abul Fazl's ill-digested knowledge is heaped up indiscriminately without order or method and without heed or consciousness of the worthlessness of so much of it.

Read the 16th Chapter of Albirúni's India in connection with this reckoning. He says some maintain a 19th order called Bhúri. According to others the limit of reckoning is koṭi and starting from koṭi the succession would be koṭi, tens, hundreds, thousands, &c. Sachan has inadvertently reversed this order. Albírúni adds that Dasá sahasra, and Dasá laksha are used for the 5th and 7th orders respectively, as the terms Ayuta and Prayuta are rarely employed.

10,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000. Twenty-nine places from the units.

Hind. from , Sansk. .

Indra is the Indian Jupiter; in Sansk. Dyausb-pitar, or that one among the many Jupiters which personified the firmament and whose epithets, in Sanskrit, are according to Sir W. Jones, the same with those of the Jove of Ennius as expressed in the line.

Aspice hoc sublime candens quem invocant omnes Jovem.

Agni is the god of fire, and one of the most ancient objects of Hindu worship who answers to the Vulcan of Egypt. Yama in the Vedas is the god of the dead with whom the departed spirits dwell. The S. W. regent is a demon or Rákshasa. Varuna is one of the oldest vedic deities, and like its derivative a personification of the all-encompassing sky. The name also designates one of the lunar mansions. The god of the air, the Hindu Eolus is represented by Vayu and is associated in the Vedas with Indra, riding in the same car. Kuvera, as living in the shades and being the god of wealth, unites the characteristics of Pluto and Plutus. Iśána is a name of Siva or of one of his manifestations. The serpent worshipping Nagas may boast of their connection with or descent from this regent of the nether world. I shall not pursue the legend of their origin and refer the reader for the more particular history of the above names, among numerous sources of information, to Sir W. Jones' Essay on the Gods of India and Greece, to Dowson's Dict. of Hindu Mythology, and to Lassen, Indisch Alterthum.

The term in its primitive meaning signifies ‘colour, the Aryans from the north priding themselves on their fair complexion, in contradistinction to the ‘black skin’ typical of the indigenous races. The term subsequently was applied to caste. The various theories oritioal and legendary of the origin of castes are carefully stated by Muir (Sansk. Texts, Vol. I.) who may be compared with Lassen, I. 794.

The granter of desires,’ said to have been produced at the churning of the ocean, belonging to the sage Vasishtha. Called also Káma-duh, Savalá and Surabhi. Dowson.

See these duties in the Institutes of Manu, I, 88, and ff., p. 12, Barnell.

The text has Antaṭ. The term I have employed is taken from the ordinances of Manu and is found in the texts of Sir W. Jones and of Burnell These names and many other variations of the progeny of inter-marriages will be found in the tenth chapter of the Institutes of Manu. The management of horses and driving wagons, is therein said to be the occupation of Sútas; the practice of medicine that of Ambaṣṭhas; attendance on women, that of Vaidehakas; trade that of Mágadhas; killing fish that of Nishádas; carpentry of Ayogavas. Catching and killing animals that live in holes, is the occupation of Kṣattaṛs, Ugras, and Pukkasas.

According to Burnell, (X. 306) the term is Kṣattar, Sir W. Jones writes Csh??ttri. Muir (Sans. Texts, I. 174), Kshattṛi.

According to Albirúni, Vyása divided the Veda into the four parts named below, and to each of his four pupils, he taught a separate Veda to be learnt by heart. They are enumerated in the same order as the four parts of the Veda: Paila, Vaiśampáyana, Jaimini, Sumantu.

This oblation consists in casting clarified butter, &c., into the sacred fire as an offering to the gods, with invocations and prayers according to the object of sacrifice.

The three castes of the Brahman, Kshatriya and Vaiśya, were called, dvi-ja, twice-born, from their title to investiture with the sacred thread which literally constitutes the second birth, but the term is particularly applied to the Brahmans, who maintain that their caste alone remains, the other three having been lost or degraded and it is generally accepted that the pure Kshatriya or Vaiśya does not now exist. The intercourse and inter-marriage of various castes have produced the mixed castes called Varna-Sankara, see Dowson, 336.

The Biḍálaka, from Sansk a cat.

The Paśu from Sansk. a quadruped.

Abul Fazl's names and transliterations are incorrect. I substitute the true readings of the names as far as I am able to discover them.

Notices of these three legendary princes will be found in Dowson. After Raghu the line practically loses its original name of the Súrajbanśí and is known as Raghubanśí or Raghu-banśa from whom Ráma Chandra descended and whose epic the Raghu-vanśa in 19 cantos was sung by Kálidása. Sagara was a king of Ayodhyá and his wife Sumati was delivered of a gourd containing 60,000 seeds which became embryos and grew. The anxious father placed them on milk but afterwards provided each with a nurse and at ten months' old they were all able to run about.

See Vol. I, p. 372, note for the term Aimák, applied to the Ráṭhor Cavalry and Vol. II, p. n. for its true signification.

Sherriug gives the names of twenty-four branches, I, Chap, V. The deeds of many of these famous clans are preserved by Tod in his Rájasthán.

Similar performances are described by Ibn Baṭúṭah who witnessed them at an entertainmeut of the Viceroy of Khansa (Kinsay of Polo). Another witness to similar feats is Edward Melton, an Anglo-Dutch traveller who was present at a like scene in Batavia in 1670, where the limbs that fell successively were caught up and cast into a basket. The last fragment was the head and no sooner had it touched the ground than the man who had gathered up the limbs into the basket, turned them all out topsy turvy. Melton continues as follows: “Then straightway we saw with these eyes, all those limbs creep tegether again, and in short, form a whole man who at once could stand and go just as before without showing the least damage. Never in my life was I so astonished as when I beheld this wonderful performance and I doubted now no longer that these misguided men did it by the help of the Devil.” The Memoirs of the Emperor Jahángír furnish further testimony of similar performances by seven jugglers from Bengal. In one feat, a man is severed limb from limb and decapitated and reproduced from under a sheet. In the other the Emperor says, ‘They produced a chain 50 cubits in length and threw one end of it towards the sky where it remained as if fastened to some thing in the air. A dog was brought forward and being placed at the lower extremity of the chain, immediately ran up and disappeared in the air. In the same manner, a hog, a panther, a lion and a tiger were successively sent up and all equally disappeared. At last they took down the chain and put it into a bag, no one discovering in what way the different animals were made to vanish. Yule's Marco Polo. Ed. 71, p. 281.

See Vol. II, pp. 228-30, notes. By the Telingánah is meant Telegu, which was called by the Sanskrit writers Andhra, the ancient name applied at one time to the whole country of Telingána. Most of the languages enumerated are but dialects of Hindi. As Mr. Beames states in his introduction to the comparative Grammar of the modern Aryan Languages, Gujaráti is a dialect of the Sauraseni Prákrit, the parent of Hindi. Panjabi is but an old Hindi dialect. Bengali, perhaps the most modern of the Indian vernaculars, three centuries ago closely resembled the Hindi still spoken in eastern Behár. Oriya is in some respects more like Hindi than Bengali. Sindhi is fundamentally distinct, but with unmistakeable traces of kinship which are far more pronounced in Marathi. I refer the student to this able synopsis of the languages and literature of Hindustan. The place of Sanskrit and the Prakrits in the history of the Indian vernaculars is briefly outlined for the general reader in Sir W. Hunter's India, (I. G. IV) with his usual crispness of touch and treatment.

Lions are mentioned, according to Lassen, in the oldest Indian writings. They have now nearly disappeared, as they have from Persia, Syria, Asia Minor and Macedonia. Alexander found them in the Eastern Panjab. Lassen supposes the tiger to have advanced as the lion disappeared. The Indian hounds were famous and a Babylonian satrap had so many that four viilages were specially taxed for their maintenance. They were considered worthy to be presented to Alexander the Great by king Sopeithes. See Lassen's note on this.

The winged cat is probably the flying squirrel which Mr. Routledge informs me is called by the natives uṛti billi.

Sardól in Sanskrit signifies a tiger, but here is perhaps meant some species of wild dog which in packs of 6 or 7 will hunt down the fiercest game.

See Vol. II, p. 172, n. 2, Vuller distinctly (Lexicon) names the Gáo Ḳutás as the Yák Tibetanas or Bos grunniens.

In Sansk. Shárika, Hind. Shárik, Sárik or Sárak. In Bengal the word is written and pronounced Sálik and applied to the common Mynah, the Acridotheres tristis, which is occasionally a fine talker.

Eulabes intermedia. Jerdon. The Nepal Hill Mynah, found also in Assam, and about the Chittagong tracts, more or less with these characteristics. There are various species not easily distinguished by the inexpert.

Eudynamys Orientalis, Jerdon. The Cuculus according to Linnæus. It is well-known throughout India. Its name is from its cry of koil-koil which increases in volume of sound as it goes on. The female lays its eggs in the nest of the common crow, generally only one and sometimes destroys the eggs of the crow at the time of depositing her own. The crows appear to be aware of the fact when too late and often pursue these cuckoos with great fury.

Coccystes Melanoleucos, Jerdon. The piedcrested cuckoo. It is found all over India, and is above of a uniform black with a greenish gloss. Jerdon unromantically describes it as very noisy with a high pitched metallic note, which would appear highly calculated to re-open any old wounds or cause a fresh one. It is best known in Hindu poetry under the name of Cháṭak.

Also Hariyál, the Crocopus Phœnicopterus, or Bengal Green Pigeon, (Jerdon). The text is evidently in error, omitting the negative before the word ‘settles,’ which stultifies the sense of what follows. Gladwin confirms me in this opinion, but whether the fact is so or not, is another point. Jerdon does not allude to it. It is incorrect to say that it is smaller than the ordinary pigeon; the reverse is the case, with regard to this particular species though some kinds, of which there are many, may be and are smaller.

Ploceus baya or common weaverbird. Its long retort-shaped nest is a familiar sight in India. Jerdon says that it can be taught to pick up rings or such like articles dropped down a well or carry a note on a given signal. Mr. Blyth has seen it fire off a miniature cannon and apply the match five or six times before the powder ignited, which it finally did with a report loud enough to frighten all the crows in the neighbourhood, while the little bird remained perched on the gun without moving. In their breeding plumage, the old males have the crown of the head yellow, the rest of the upper plumage with the wings and tail, dull brown, edged with pale fulvous brown; the breast is bright yellow, but in the younger, pale rusty; while the females and the males in winter dress totally want the yellow head, the crown being brown with dark streaks.

See Vol. I, p. 16, n. and p. 36, for some of these measures and the weights that follow. The 15th Chapter of Albirúni deals with the metrology of the Hindus and may be compared with these measures. I append a very valuable note by Dr. Prain, Curator of the Herbarium, Royal Botanical Gardens, Calcutta, on the distinction between the kinds of mustard called ‘Khardal’ and ‘Sarshaf’ in the text and which remarkably confirms by actual experiment the accuracy of the weights. To Dr. King, the distinguished Superintendent of the Gardens, to whom I have already expressed my many obligations in the 2nd Vol. of the work, I am again indebted for the learned co-operation of Dr. Prain.

“Khardal” and “Sarshaf” are both names that are applied to BLACK-MUSTARD (BRASSICA NIGRA).

The former name is, Watt says, (in Dict. Econ. Prod. I, 521) applied, with a qualification, to WHITE MUSTARD; the latter apparently is not.

There is little doubt that by the lower unit of the two (KHARDAL) the seed of Black or true mustard is meant.

The question is as to the identity of the other unit.

Had “Sarshaf” been applied to both and “Khardal” restricted to black mustard, one would have felt inclined to say that white mustard (Sinapis alba) was intended. But it must be remembered that white mustard is an uncommon plant in Asia; and that Boissier only speaks of it as a plant of waste places and groves in Greece, Palestine and Taurus, (not even admitting it as a Persian species) and that its seeds, though much larger than those of B. nigra, do not suit the conditions required better than those of another species to be mentioned immediately. This is Brassica juncea—the well-known Indian mustard or Rái which is cultivated in Persia, as it is in India, for its oil. The vernacular names given by Watt do not include “Khardal” alone or qualified, but apparently the “Sarshaf” appears (e. g., in the Bengali name “Rái Sarisha”) and this, therefore, seems to be the species that best suits the conditions; for Abul Fazl would be most probably referring to a well-known and common plant by his second word.

As regards the physical conditions, Rai seeds seem to suit very well, so far as the Calcutta Herbarium material goes. For in weighing 3 ripe seeds of Brassica nigra from Madeira against one ripe seed of India Brassica juncea, the scale shows very close approximation in weight; and 8 ripe seeds of Brassica juncea from India exactly balance a ripe grain of barley from Afghanistan, though a ripe barley-corn from Europe outweighs them.

Attached are notes of synonyms of the two species:—

(a) BRASSICA NIGRA Koch, Deutsch. Fl. iv, 713. Boiss. Fl. Orient. I, 390. Hooker fil. and Thoms., Jour. Linn Soc. v, 170. Hooker fil. and T. Anders., Flor. Brit. Ind. I, 156. Watt, Dict. Econ. Prod. Ind. I, 530.

BRASSICA (melanosinapis) nigra; the “true” mustard, or “black” mustard; the “Khardal” of the Arabs, but also the “Sarshaf” of Indian medical practice.

SYNONYMS. Sinapis nigra Linnæus, Sp. Pl, 933. Wall. Cat. 4790. S. erysimoides Roxb., Fl. Ind. iii, 123.

This is cultivated in Europe generally; in Northern Africa, from Madeira to Egypt and Abyssinia; in the Orient., Arabia, Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan; in Turkestan and Tibet; and (locally) in India.

Three seeds of this = one seed of Rai,

(b) BRASSICA JUNCEA Hook. f. and Thoms., Jour. Linn. Soc. v, 170. Hook. f. and T. Anders., Flor. Brit. Ind. I, 157. Watt, Dict. Econ. Prod. Ind. I, 528.

BRASSICA (Ceratosinapis) juncea; the “Indian” mustard; the “Rái” of Indian cultivators.

SYNONYMS, Brassica Willdenovii Boiss., Ann. Sc. Nat., (1842), 88. Sinapis juncea Linnæus, Sp. Pl., 934. Boiss., Fl. Orient. I 394, S. integrifolia Willd., Hort. Berol., t. 14. S ramosa Roxb., Fl. Ind. iii, S. rugosa Roxb., Fl. Ind. iii, S. cuneifolia Roxb., Fl. Ind. iii.

This is cultivated (“Colitur olei causa” Boiss. Fl. Orient., l. c.), in Egypt; Arabia; Persia (sparingly); Afghanistan; India (generally).

One seed of this = three seeds of Black-mustard. Eight seeds of this = one barley-corn.

See Vol. II, p. 351.

This term is translated by Colebrooke indifferently as category or predicament, and by Dr. Röer as Category. Davies in his Hindu Philosophy, uses predicaments and categories as synonymous (p. 127) in his rendering of padártha. I have distinguished these sixteen subjects as predicaments to avoid confusing the numbers with the subordinate categories given by Abul Fazl under the heading of artha, the 4th classification of the second predicament, prameya. Of these sixteen, says Mr. Davies, the first two are the chief, the others being only subsidiary, as indicating the course which a discussion may take, from the setting forth of a doubt, to the final confutation of the doubter.

The distinctíon between the sensitive material organ manas and the rational conscious soul jivátman, is the and of Pythagoras, one perishing with the body, the other immortal, v. Colebrooke, Essays, I, 442.

It may be instructive to transcribe the account of the elements taken from the Kashsháf i Iṣṭiláhátu'l Funún, and to compare it with Abul Fazl's description of the elemental spheres at p. 38 of this volume.

An element is defined as being a simple body with the quality of directness of tendency. By simple, is understood that which is not composed of bodies of really distinct natures, while a directness of tendency is the tendency of a body towards the centre or circumference. This is to exclude the heavenly bodies. The later philosophers affirm that the elements are four in number: 1, absolute tenuity, i. e., fire; 2, relative tenuity, i. e., air; 3, absolute density, earth; 4, relative density, water. Absolute density is that quality which necessitates the movement of a body to a point where its centre of gravity impinges on the centre of the universe, such as earth. Relative density is that quality which necessitates the movement of a body towards the centre throughout most of the distance between the centre and the circumference, but without reaching the centre. Absolute tenuity is that quality which necessitates the movement of a body to where its surface compactly underlies the surface of the concave side of the moon's sphere, such as fire. Relative tenuity is that quality which necessitates the motion of a body towards the circumference throughout most of the distance between the centre and the circumference but without reaching the latter, such as air. Some maintain that there is but one element, but differ as to the one, and the following are the five opinions on the subject: 1st, That it is fire because of its absolute simpleness, and because heat is the nourishing principle of the universe, while the others are produced by condensation. 2nd, That it is air because of its humidity and its subjection to external influences, fire being produced by the heat of rarefied air, and the other two by its condensing cold 3rd, Water, as its capability of being rarefied and condensed is evident. 4th, Earth, because the others are generated by subtilization. 5th, Vapour, because it is a mean between these four in tenuity and density, for when condensed in excess, it becomes earth and water, and if highly rarefied, fire and air. Others maintain that there cannot be but one, because a compound involves the plurality of its components. Hence they make the elements two in number, and three different opinions are entertained thereon. 1st, Fire, since it is the extreme of tenuity and heat, and Earth because it is the extreme of density and cold. Air, according to this theory is but fire inert, while water is earth in fluidity. 2nd, Water and Earth, because created things have need of humidity to be acted upon and to take form, and of dryness to retain the shapes assumed. 3rd, Earth and Air for the same reasons. Another opinion is that the elements are three: Earth and Water for the reasons above given, and (3) fire through its fostering heat. It is also asserted that the elements of complex bodies are not four or even fewer but that they are solid, indivisible and infinite. Others again suppose that the elements of compounds are surfaces, since composition is the effect of junction and contact, and this first appears in plane surfaces. All the elements are spherical because the natural form of a simple body is circular. Water would spontaneously have encompassed the earth, but as hills and valleys were produced in parts of the globe, by reason of the celestial movements and conjunctions, the water flowed into the depressions and the high places appeared to view, water and earth becoming, as it were, one sphere through the wisdom of God and His mercy that it might be a growing-place for plants and a habitation for animals. The four elements are capable of undergoing generation and decay so that each may be converted into the other. Some of them undergo this change without external interference, because each element shares the quality of another in some particular while it differs in another. Thus earth may become water and vice versa, for alchemists profess to convert stones into liquid, while occasionally water is convertible into stone. So, too, water is changed into vapour by heat, and vapour into water by refrigeration, and air can become fire as instanced in the blacksmith's forge, and vice versa, as in a flame of fire, otherwise the flame would rise to the sky and consume whatever might be above it, which is not the case. Other elements undergo change by external agency; this happens when two elements differ in their several qualities as water and fire, and air and earth, for water does not become fire directly, but first is changed into vapour and then fire and so on. Philosophers think that the four elements are the components of all matter. The elements are seven in number. The highest is that of pure fire: its convex is impacted with the concave of the moon's sphere: below this is a stratum compounded of pure fire with heated particles of air. Here the ascending vapours are dissipated, and comets and Zodiacal lights are formed. Next succeeds the region of intense heat. This is simple air cooled by its proximity to the earth and to water which the solar rays do not touch. It is, however, generally supposed that clouds, thunder, lightning and thunderbolts are generated in this zone, so that it cannot be air pure and simple. Next follows the belt of vapour which is that of air permeated by fluid, succeeded by an earthy stratum of earth and air, followed by that of clay, which consists of earth and water, and lastly the earth itself which surrounds the centre of the globe. It is of earth pure and simple and is colourless. Another account more widely received, makes the elements nine. 1, Pure fire. 2, Fire and heated air. In this, the ascending vapours disperse, and stars and the like are formed, such as comets, Zodiacal lights and luminous streams. 3, Air mostly predominates and here meteors are formed. 4. The region of intense cold. 5. Earth mixed with air. 6. Dense air approximating to the region of earth and water. 7. Water, i. e., the seas, save where a portion of this belt rises above the surface of the earth. 8. Earth mixed with other matter, the region of mountain, mineral, and vegetable and animal life. 9. The stratum of earth pure and simple which surrounds the centre of the globe. See Art. .

The fifth element is Ether. See p. 12 of this volume.

These are: the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the skin; the five organs of action being the voice, the hands, the feet, the arms and the organs of generation. Manas or mind, is the organ of the bodily senses. By union with the external senses it produces knowledge of exterior objects. Its office is to separate the sensations and to present them singly to the soul; since the soul does not receive more than one perception at the same instant. The Manas is minutely small as an atom: for otherwise it might come into connection with many things or sensations at one time. It is eternal and distinct both from soul and body. Davies, Hind. Phil. pp. 21. 122.

This first category dravya (substance) is subdivided by Davies into nine divisions. 1 Earth (prithiví). 2 water (ápas); 3 light (tejas); 4 air (váyu); 5 Ether (ákáśa); 6 time (kála); 7 space (diś); 8 Soul (átman); 9 mind (manas). p. 128.

Substance is defined by Kaṇáda to be the substrate of qualities and actions and possessing intimate causality. This is explained in the commentary of the Bháshá Parichcheda to be the substrate of qualities either in the relation of intimate union (Samaváya Sambandha) or in the relation of antecedent negation (Prágabháva) that is, of future existence. The latter definition is to obviate an objection which may be raised from the condition of substances at the time of their production. When substances are produced, they have, according to the Nyáya, no qualities. If they have no qualities, they are no substances according to the definition that substances are the substrate of qualities. By the second definition that they are substrates of qualities either in the relation of intimate union, or of future existences, this objection is removed. Categories of the Nyáya Philosophy. Dr. E. Röer. p. 3.

Time is inferred from the relation of priority and subsequence other than that of place. It is marked by association of objects with the sun's revolutions. Space is inferred from the relation of priority and subsequence other than that of time. It is deduced from the notion of here and there. Davies, p. 130.

Davies' definition is that it expresses only existence in its highest degree, and is the source of our notion of genus. It denotes also species as indicating a class, these genera and species having a real objective existence. The Bauddhas deny this, affirming that individuals only have existence, and that abstractions are false conceptions, a revival of the Realist and Nominalist controversy of the schoolmen. p. 131. This is differently explained in the Tarka Sangraha. “Community (Sámánya) is eternal, one, belonging to more than one, residing in substance, quality and action. It is of two kinds, the highest, and what is lower. The highest is existence (Sattwa), the lower is genus (játi, family or race) such as have the nature of substance and the rest.” Ibid. p. 26.

The difference between this and the following term is explained as follows by Prof. Cowell, “Particularity is the individuality which characterises simple substances,—it is ‘their ultimate, and not further explicable difference.’ All compound substances from jars down to the combination of two atoms, are mutually separated by the difference of their component parts, but particularity is the only mutual difference of atoms. This difference is differenced through itself only.” Siddh-Muktav. Colebrooke. I. n. p. 308. Individuality is of two sorts, one of a pair, or manifold, as individuality of a triad. It is eternal in respect of eternal things, transient in regard to such as are transitory. In a pair or triad it is transitory, resulting from comparison as a duad or a triad does. Colebrooke I. 302.

The difference between this and the following term is explained as follows by Prof. Cowell, “Particularity is the individuality which characterises simple substances,—it is ‘their ultimate, and not further explicable difference.’ All compound substances from jars down to the combination of two atoms, are mutually separated by the difference of their component parts, but particularity is the only mutual difference of atoms. This difference is differenced through itself only.” Siddh-Muktav. Colebrooke. I. n. p. 308. Individuality is of two sorts, one of a pair, or manifold, as individuality of a triad. It is eternal in respect of eternal things, transient in regard to such as are transitory. In a pair or triad it is transitory, resulting from comparison as a duad or a triad does. Colebrooke I. 302.

Numerically it is one, and then it is the same Samaváya that connects a jar, and its colour in India, and another jar &c., in Europe, and that connected A´dam's soul with its qualities, and that of the reader's with its own. They affirm that substance may want qualities altogether as the latter are not produced till after the production of the substances themselves, so that a jar, when first produced, may be devoid of colour, smell, taste and tangibility, and in the next moment become endowed with them. A whole has no qualities, whereas its parts have, by the relation called Samaváya. Smoke is said to reside in a place by relation of Saṃyoga and in its parts by Samaváya. Therefore by asserting that whenever there is smoke there is fire, they contradict it by this distinction, for smoke, besides residing in a given place by Saṃyoga, resides by Samaváya, in its own parts, where fire is not. V. Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall, p. 94–5.

The illustrations of the three species are thus given by Davis: (1), antecedent; a present negation of what will be at some future time, as in yarn before the production of cloth; (2), emergent, which is destruction or cessation of an effect, as a broken jar; (3), absolute, implying that which never existed, as fire in a lake. Mutual privation is an esential difference, a reciprocal negation of identity, as in cloth and a jar, p. 131.

Quality is closely united with substance; not, however, as an intimate cause of it, nor consisting in motion, but common: not a genus, yet appertaining to one. It is independent of conjunction and disjunction, not the cause of them, nor itself endued with qualities. Colebrooke, Essays, I. 296.

This word in Sanskrit signifies, less, little, small, short, and in grammar a short vowel. Dvy-aṇuka, is transliterated by Abul Fazl, dinuka. Dírgha signifies the quantity of a long vowel.

“Velocity abides only in bodies and is two-fold, produced by action or velocity.” Categories of the Nyáya. Röer, p 78. The commentator observes on this that velocity in an arrow arises from action produced by conjunction without noise, and hence from the destruction of a former action, arises a second and so on. Without velocity, since one action is an obstacle to auother, the destruction of a former action and the production of a subsequent one would be impossible. The translation of sanskára is not satisfactorily settled, Rajendralála Mitra in his translation of the Yogas of Pátaṇjali thus expresses himself:—“The most important word in the aphorism is Sañskára which has unfortunately not been explained in the commentary of Bhoja or in the Pátaṇjala Bháshya. In ordinary Sanskrit it has many meanings. In the Nyáya it occurs in three different senses, velocity (vega) thinking (bhávaná) and elasticity (sthitisthápaka). Adverting to the second meaning the Bháshá Parichcheda says: “Sañskára, called thinking (bhávaná) resides in sentient beings and is imperceptible to the senses. Certainty which has no inattention in its constituent, is its cause. It is also described to be the cause of memory and recognition.” Thus it is not memory as rendered by Dr. Röer. It is not sensation nor impression, for it is not transient but lasting. It is not perception, because that applies to the acceptance by the sensorium of something existing without, and does not serve as the cause of memory. It is not idea, for it is the result of former experience, and not spontaneous as an idea may be nor eternal, as the Greeks supposed ideas to be. Dr. Ballantyne renders it ‘self-reproduction of thought’ but there ??s nothing like self-reproduction in it, for it is said to be revived by external stimuli and not by its own effort. It is something, then, that perception, whether conscious or unconscious, leaves behind in the intellect to be revived afterwards under particular circumstances, and it is more or less connected with all intellectual acts as cause or effect. In the language of Dr. Morell (Mental Philosophy, p 95.) “When a given mental impression is produced, it remains for a time before the consciousness, and then gives way to others. We know, however, that it is not absolutely lost, for if proper conditions occur, the impression is renewed. The conclusion is, that there must be something deposited within us which subsists permanently whether it be at any moment, the immediate object of our consciousness or not. This something we term a residuum using the expression without implying any theory whatever.” The Sanskrit counterpart of this residuum is Sañskára.”

The special qualities of ether and the soul are a state which does not pervade, and a state which has only momentary duration. A thing is defined to have momentary duration if in the third moment after its production it is destroyed. The special quality of ether is sound which does not pervade, for it is only locally produced, and it is destroyed in the third moment after it has commenced to exist, because the respective special qualities of pervading substances are destroyed by the same qualities which are afterwards produced; therefore the first sound is destroyed by the second. The same is the case with knowledge, for it is produced in the soul, a pervading substance, within the limited space of the body, and absent in any other part of space, and similarly, it is of momentary duration. Röer, p. 12.

The commentators, who are generally under a Vedantic influence, explain virtue, dharma, as including humanity benevolence, acts of restraint (yama) and of obligation (niyama). Acts of restraint, according to Ganḍapáda, are restraint of cruelty, falsehood, dishonesty, incontinence and avarice! Acts of obligation are purification, contentment, religious austerities, sacred study and divine worship. Davies, p. 57.

There are eight, of which five are qualities of time and place, namely, number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, and disjunction. These five with intellect desire and volition (or effort) are sited in the deity; the same five with priority, posteriority and velocity in the mind. Röer, p. 13. Quantity is the special cause of the use and perception of measure. It is a universal quality and common to all substances. Colebrooke.

Vide note 1, p. 136. This passage is marked as corrupt or doubtful in the text. The initial alif in the two words and should be prolated.

In the system of Kapila, buddhi is the faculty or organ, by which outward objects are presented to the view of the soul in their proper and definite form, and he assigus to lt every quality or state that is connected with the active life, as its primary seat and the first emanation of Nature (Prakṛiti). Davies p. 57.

These are pratyaksha (perception) anumána (inference), upámána (analogy) and śabda (verbal testimony. To these four kinds of proof of the Nyáya or logical school, the Vedantic adds arthápatti (presumption) an informal kind of inference; as, “Devadatta does not eat by day and yet is fat, it is presumed therefore that he eats by night;” and abháva (non-existence), a method of proof from an impossibility, or a ‘reductio ad absurdum’ as, “there can be no flowers in the sky.” Davies, p. 24.

Smṛiti signifies also tradition, the institutes of law as opposed to śruti, the Veda or revelation. The laws of the Hindus, civil and religious, are believed by them to be founded on revelation, of which the Vedas are preserved in the very words. Another portion has been preserved by inspired writers who having revelations present to their memory, have recorded holy precepts for which divine sanction is presume. The latter is smṛiti, recollection, (remembered law), in contradistinction to śruti, audition, revealed law. Colebrooke.

Is the first of the internal organs receiving the impression made upon the senses. Primordial matter, the of the Greeks, produced buddhi or intellect, from which proceeded Ahankára or egotism, and from this latter proceed the five organs of sense (indriya) and the five organs of action, and lastly Manas, the receptive or discriminating faculty. The tongue is classed as an organ of action, and the faculty of speech is as much sensation as touching or walking. The Manas has the nature of both classes, being formative or plastic and a sense organ. In the Sánkhya system of Kapila, it is not to be confounded with mind or the rational faculty of the soul, but is regarded as a form of matter. I refer the reader to Davies' work whence I have taken in scattered notices the substance of the above, and to Colebrooke. This dismal philosophy is curious as an intellectual product, the precursor of the ghastly metaphysics of Hartmann and Schopenhauer. The Hindu has the merit of originality and a better excuse.

Pravartaná-lakshaṇá dosháḥ (Got. Sút. i. 18.) “The wise man, according to Gotama, is he who avoids the three mistakes of having a liking for a thing and acting accordingly: or of having a dislike for a thing and acting accordingly: or of being stupidly indifferent, and thereupon acting: instead of being intelligently indifferent and not acting at all” Ballantyne. V. Colebrooke, I. 311, note by Prof. Cowell.

In every form of earthly life, the soul is united to its own peculiar vehicle or body, but is not blended with it but enveloped by it. By this is meant, not the gross material body which perishes at each migration, but the liṇga, the subtle umbra or sheath formed from the sub stance of the three internal organs, and the finer elements of matter (tanmátra).

The liṅnga enters the womb and forms the inner frame over which the bodily form derived from the matter is wrought. The liṇga survives the body until the soul, by knowledge, becomes prepared for a separate life, and then it is absorbed into the universal Nature from which it sprung. The theory of the liṅnga, as Mr. Davies says (p., 11,) deserves more consideration than it has received from the expounders of Sanskrit Philosophy. It plays an important part in the moral element of the system. Kapila attributes to the soul only a passive state and to the liṅnga is assigned the congeries of states and affections which form the individuality of each separate being, He calls it the acting soul or in the language of M. St. Hilaire, its “annexe,” the seat of those qualities by which an individual is formed and thinks and feels according to his nature. In being compounded of buddhi and other substances, it shows what Professor Jowett has called “the interpenetration of the intellectual and moral faculties.” (Plato i. p. 464). I have borrowed throughout the language of Mr. Davies taken from various parts of his able commentary, pp. 51. 52, 111 et seq.

Mithya-jṅnána is used to signify that special misapprehension which estops release from the world. This term with ajṅnána, avidya, &c., technically denote something positive and not negative. Fitz Edward Hall. Hindu. Phil. systems, p. 11. It is to be remembered that ignorance is the chief obstacle to emancipation.

The only real evil is pain which can be destroyed only by an eternal separation of the soul from matter, which is obtained by knowledge, and not by the acquisition of merit through a virtuous life.

In Kapila's system, the soul is solitary and perfectly distinct from matter and therefore from the modifications the modes of Nature produce. It beholds as an eye-witness, for insight and cognition are not properties of matter. It is neutral (Madhyastha, lit. standing between) “as a wandering ascetic is lonely and unconcerned, while the villagers are being engaged in agriculture,” It is perceptive, which differs from the second quality in this, that as a witness it observes only, but by seeing that which is presented to it by the intellect, it perceives and understands the phenomena of the material world. It is still, however, passive and inert.’ All action is inferior to the contemplative state and the soul in its regal grandeur, has no part in the inferior life of action. It directs as a sovereign but does not work. Davies.

In the Vedántasara, translated by Major Jacob, the three conditions are thus explained; “(a) hearing, is the ascertainment of all the Vedantic writings regarding the secondless Reality by the use of the sixfold means of knowledge; (b) consideration, is unceasing reflection on the secondless Reality which has been heard of, in conjunction with arguments in support of the Vedánta: (c) profound contemplation, is the continuance of ideas consistent with the secondless Reality, to the exclusion of the notion of body and such like things which are inconsistent with Him.” It adds a fourth condition, Samádhi or meditation, p. 100, et. seq.

This subject is touched upon in the fourth chapter of the Yoga aphorisms of Patanjali. “When a Yogí, who has a mastery over the cardinal principles, with a view to enjoy at once the fruits of his actions, from the perception of his own superior transcendental powers, wishes to assume many bodies at the same time, whence does he derive many thinking principles” (to vitalize these bodies)? In reply the author says; “the created thinking principles (proceed) solely from egoism.” That is, that his own consciousness or rather his abolute Ego, (for Fitchte distinguishes between the two) by force of will evolves the power, as fire emits sparks. To the question how numerous thinking principles, having diversity of objects, are one in effect, the reply is, that in the diverse tendency of the many thinking principles the thinking principle of the Yogí is the impelliug force, because it is the ruler and therefore there is no difference of object. Thus he simultaneously operates through many bodies working out his emancipation by their joint acts.” Vide Rájendralála Mitra's translation p. 171-72.

A variant, the reading of one MS., has a negative, According to the Sánkhya (and Mimáṃsa) systems, acquiring knowledge and thus gaining deliverance from contact with matter is the privilege of the few rather than a duty manifest on all. See Davies p. 114.

The commentary of the Bháshá Parichchheda instances this in the following case; if the notion of sound which is not the notion under which eternal and non-eternal is comprehended, is conceived as sound, the doubt arises whether it is eternal or non-eternal. Non-general is thus a predicate not found in the subject of the two extremes. Röer.

The usual order is the intimate, non-intimate and instrumental. An instance for the first, is thread from which cloth is made; for the second the conjunction of the threads; for the third, the loom. Intimate causality belongs to substances, non-intimate causality to qualities and actions. Röer p. 10. Or again, in desire, the soul is the direct or intimate cause: the mediate or indirect is the conjunction of the soul and its internal organ, the manas; the instrumental is knowledge. Davies. p. 121.

The members are these:—

1. This hill is fiery.

2. For it smokes.

3. Whatever smokes is fiery.

4. This hill is smoking.

5. Therefore it is fiery.

1. Sound is non-eternal.

2. Because it is produced.

3. Whatever is produced is non-eternal.

4. Sound is produced.

5. Therefore it is non-eternal.

Some confine the syllogism to three members, either the first three or the last. In the latter form it is the syllogism of Aristotle. Accordíng to Röer, the Nyáya knows only the two first figures of syllogism, and of these only the two moods Barbara and Camestres. A complete syllogism is properly termed nyáya, the five members or component parts are called avayava.

That, where the existence of the property to be proved is doubtful, is called the subject of the conclnsion (paksha) as “(fire in the) mountain” when the fact of its smoking is the reason (or Hetu). That, where the existence of the property to be proved is undoubted, is called the subject on the same side or Sapaksha, as the culinary hearth in the same argument. That which is undoubtedly possessed of the negation of the property to be proved, is called the subject in opposition or vipaksha; as a great lake, in the same argument. Tarka Sangraha. Vidyaságara's translation.

These and the following terms are thus rendered in Dr. Richard Garbe's translation of Aniruddha's commentary on the Sánkhya Sútras. “By means of a syllogism construed in this manner we discern (1). that the invariably concommitated (vyápya) is an attribute of the subject of the conclusion (paksha-dharmatva), (2). that the vyápya exists in those things in which the invariable concomitant (vyápaka) undoubtedly exists (sapaksha-sattva), (3). that the vyápya is excluded from those things from which the vyápaka is also excluded (vipakshádvyávṛittiḥ), (4). that no equally strong reason can be adduced against the reason which proves the proposition (asatpratipakshatva), (5). that the vyápya is not such that its object does not exist in the subject of the conclusion (abádhita-vishayatva).

The opposite of this is called bádhita, or the fallacy of absurdity, “where the negation of what is to be proved is established by another proof as ‘fire is cold because it is a substance. ’ Here the predicate of the conclusion, what is to be proved, is coldness, the negation of which, warmth, is apprehended by the organ of touch by one's own self. Hence the argument is called absurd” Tarka Sangraha.

The opposite is called Satpratipaksha or the fallacy of equalisation, when the reason is counterbalanced by another proving the negation of what is to be proved. As for example. “Sound is eternal because it is cognizable by the organ of hearing,” as the generic property of sound is acknowledged by both parties —it might be said on the other side with equal force, sound is non-eternal because it is a creation as a jar is.

The text relegates the reading to a note; it should properly be in the text between the words and . The words of the Tarka Sangraha on the definition are

which is thus translated by Vidyá Ságara,” Reductio ad absurdum or Tarka is that which consists in founding the pervader (vyápya) (here supposed to be denied) through the allegation of the pervaded (vyápaka here supposed to be taken for granted). As for instance: If there were not fire (which you do not grant), there would not be smoke (which you admit there is).

I would read for . It is not wisdom nor ingenuity that is rare, but courtesy and good temper.

Earth according to the Nyáya, is eternal in its atoms, non-eternal in its parts. An atom is defined thus: “an atom is; what exists has no cause and is without beginning and end: an atom is contrary to what has a measure.” Röer, p. 14. Colour, taste and the like are said to be eternal, or otherwise according to the substances in which they exist, these two being eternal in the atoms of water and light but in other substances have a cause. The atomic nature of the mind is inferred from the fact that several objects of knowledge are not perceived by it at once.

I believe vibhága is here meant, and the suffix has been omitted by the error of a copyist. This is undoubtedly the sense of the passage.

Vol. II, p. 15. The aggregate of the four ages, Krita, Treta, Dwápara and Kali multiplied by a thousand, constitute a day of Brahmá; his night is of equal duration, and of such days and nights is the year of Brahmá composed. One hundred such years constitute his whole life. A great Kalpa, as distinguished from a minor Kalpa, is properly not a day but a life of Brahmá. Vishnu Puráṇa, Wilson, pp. 23, 25, 6

The following are the four kinds of dissolution as given by the Vishnu Puráṇa. 1. Naimittika, occasional; Prákṛitika, elemental; A´tyantika, absolute; Nitya, perpetual. The first, also termed the Brahmá dissolution, occurs when the sovereign of the world reclines in sleep. In the second, the mundane egg resolves into the primary element from whence it was derived. Absolute non-existence of the world, is the absorption of the sage through knowledge into supreme spirit. Perpetual destruction is the constant disappearance, day and night, of all that are born. Vishnu Puráṇa, 56. The first three kinds are very powerfully described in the 6th book, the fourth chapter of which represents the elemental dissolntion in very striking language. The third kind, involving the final liberation from existence, is the subject of the 5th Chapter, where the sufferings of mfancy, manhood and old age are pourtrayed in a manner not surpassed in power by any description in literature. With no hope beyond the grave, with hell for the wicked and no cessation from pain even in heaven, whose inhabitants are tormented with the prospect of descending again to earth, no wonder that exemption from birth was the desire of the wise, and annihilation the last hope of those who were doomed to the sorrows of conception, birth and decay.

The first elements of a compound substance must consist of three atoms to be visible. Röer, pp. 15–56. Davies describes these atoms according to the Vaiśeshikas, as round, extremely minute, invisible, incapable of division, eternal in themselves but not in their aggregate form. They have individually a specific difference (viśesha), light, for example, being formed of luminous atoms. These atoms combine by twos and threes forming aggregates which come within range of sight as a mote in a sunbeam. They also combine by fours, are innmerable in extent, perpetually united, disintegrated, and redintegrated by an unseen peculiar force (aḍrishṭa). The disciples of Kanáḍa, influenced by the Gotama teaching, explain this unseen force to be the Supreme Spirit.

“Then ether, air, light, water, earth, severally united with the properties of sound and the rest, existed as distinguishable according to their qualities, but possessing various energies they could not without combination create living beings. Having combined therefore, they assumed the character of entire unity and from the direction of spirit with the acquiescence of the indiscrete Principle, Intellect and the rest, to the gross elements inclusive, formed an egg. This vast egg was the abode of Vishnu in the form of Brahmá.” Vishnu Puráṇa, p. 18. For the mundane egg, see p. 11 of this volume.

“Ether becoming productive, engendered the rudiment of touch, whence originated strong wind, the property of which is touch. Then wind becoming productive, produced the rudiment of form (colour) whence light (or fire) proceeded of which form (colour) is the attribute; and the rudiment of touch enveloped the wind with the rudiment of colour. Light becoming productive, produced the rudiment of taste; whence proceed all juices in which flavour resides, and the rudiment of colour invested the juices with the rudiment of taste. The waters becoming productive, engendered the rudiment of smell, whence an aggregate (earth) originates of which smell is the property.” Vishnu Puráṇa, p. 16. The order of Empedocles was ether, water, fire, air, earth. Váyu is the regent of the N. W. quarter, god of the wind and often associated with Indra in the Vedas. The wind-born spirits are doubtless the swift moving deities called Márutas formed from the unborn child of Diti, divided by Indra with his thunderbolt into 49 pieces, which became the same number of divinities. The world of the Márutas is the appointed heaven of the Vaiśyas. Ibid pp. 48. 152.

These are (1) práṇa, breath, the ordinary inspiration and expiration.

(2.) Apána, downward breath, the air or vital force acting in the lower parts of the body.

(3). Samána, collective breath, so named from conducting equally the food, &c., through the body.

(4). Udána, separate breath, the vital force that causes the pulsations of the arteries in the upper portions of the body from the navel to the head.

(5.) Vyána, separate breath, by which internal division and diffusion through the body are effected.

These airs are not the elemental air, but subtle inward forces necessary to vitality and the efficacy of the organic functions of the human frame. Davies, pp. 66, 67.

A name of the sun; hls car is presided over by a troop of seven celestial beings who in turn, occupy his orb during several months of the year. Their names are given in the Vishnu Puráṇa (p. 234.) They are the agents in the distribution of cold, heat and rain at their respective seasons. Their number was subsequently increased to twelve, representing the months of the year.

See p. 113. Varuṇa a name which corresponds with , was appointed to the sovereignty of the waters, according to the Vishnu Puráṇa (p. 153) and was likewise an A´ditya, but his functions reached far beyond this sphere and he was considered anciently as sovereign ruler of the three worlds. The planets, the winds, the waters were equally in his power, and his attributes raised him to a height of moral grandeur above that of any of the Vedic deities.

Dr. Dowson who quotes Muir.

The creation of the creator in his abstraction was the fivefold immovable world without intellect or reflection, and void of perception and sensation, and destitute of motion. Since immovable things were first created, this is called the first creation. Vish. Pur. 34. These, Wilson observes, are final productions, or the forms in which the previously created elements and faculties are more or less perfectly aggregated. By immovable things are meant the mineral and vegetable kingdoms.

According to the Nyáya, as in a drum, and articulate, as ka and other letters by the contact of the throat with the palate. “Every sound is produced in the ether, but it is perceived when it is produced in the ear. Some say ??s production takes place like a succession of waves.” Röer's Categories, p. 80.

The Vaiśeshika school as represented by Kaṇáda, the reputed author of the Vaiśehika Sútra of whom little is known, but that he was probably a contemporary of Gotama the author of the Nyáya, is commonly classed with this latter system. Colebrooke is of opinion that they are both branches from the same stock, mainly in agreement on the subjects which they discnss, but directed in the former case to the explanation of the material and in the latter of logical forms. The Vaiśeshika system is one of physical science; the Nyáya deals with elementary, metaphysical notions, and the forms of the syllogism, and is the standard work in logic among the Hindus. I refer the reader for a critical account of the system to the introduction to the categories by Dr. E. Röer, Colebrooke (Miscellaneous essays), to the Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy by Dr. K. M. Banerjea and Dr. Fitz Edward Hall's Refutation of Hindu Philosophy. Little is known of Gotama the Aristotle of India. He is said, according, to Davies, to have been born at the beginning of the Treta Yuga, and to have married Ahalyá, the daughter of Brahmá; which may mean that he was a Brahman of noble descent.

A curious story is by Dr. Hall quoted of the foremost of the Naiyáyika writers after Gotama, Udayana A´chárya, who was reputed to be inspired. It is said that after the toil of a pilgrimage to the temple of Jagannáth at Púri, finding the door shut on his arrival, he launched the following slokas against the exclusive divinity:—

“Thou art drunk with the inebriation of majesty, me thou scornest. But let the Bauddhas show themselves and upon me will depend thy very existence.” A deity that lives on the breath of his devotee can scarcely be worth defending.

The text has átman, a copyist's error for anumána, which it would closely resemble even to the diacritical points. The Vaiśeshika system differs from the Nyáya in this very point, admitting only two kinds of proof, perception and inference.

“The change produced by cooking takes place according to the Vaiśeshikas in the single atoms” So the Bhásha Parichchheda. The commentator observes on this, that as long as the parts are retained in the compound, no change by cooking is possible, but when by the union of fire, the compound substances have been destroyed, change occurs in the atoms which become independent units. Again by the junction of atoms changed by process of cooking, a production is effected from the compound of two, three &c., atoms, again to a compound of many parts, for by the extraordinary velocity of heat, the transition from the destruction of one compound to the formation of another is sudden. The Naiyáyika view is that compound substances have pores and the minute parts of fire enter them and therefore the change by the process of cooking is possible, although the parts be retained in the compound. The Vaiśeshika Sútra on conjunction and disjunction is quoted by Röer (p. 56) with its explanation.

The Mímáṃsa is classed sometimes as the Púrva or Prior, and the Uttara or Posterior. The object of the first was to support the authority of the Vedas, to maintain their ritual, and interpret their true meaning. The second is the Vedánta or supplement of the Vedas, and was formed at a later date based on the synonymous term Upanishads, or the mystic teaching of the Vedas. The Upanishads are called Vedántas, and their philosophy is known as the Vedántic System. The former deals with the ritual section of the Vedas, the latter treats them in their scientific aspect. V. Dr. Fitz E. J. Hall, Gough's Philosoph of the Upan. and Davies.

Jaimini's name occurs twice in the Vishnu Puráṇa. He is described as the pupil of Vyása, and as having divided the branches of the Sama-veda, but his date and history are altogether unknown. See Weber's Hist. of Indian Literature, p. 240. Of Kumárila Bhaṭṭa nothing is ascertained except that he is said to have flourished prior to ´Sankara-áchárya, the chief exponent of the Vedánta school, whose date is ascribed approximately to the 8th century A. D. According to Colebrooke, Kumárila-bhaṭṭa figures largely in the traditionary religious history of India, and he is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of Buddha, and to have instigated the persecution of that heresy. The analysis of the Mímáṃsa doctrines and its wearisome ceremonies may be studied in Colebrooke's disquisition. In Weber's opinion, the Sútras of Kaṇáda and Gotama appear to rank last, which does not prove that they are of later origin, but only in respect of their reduction to systematic treatmeut. According to Dr. Rájendralála Mitra, the various Sútras refer to each other indiscriminately. The Sánkhya quotes the Vaiseśhika by name in two places, and refutes the doctrine of the Vedánta Sútra. It recognises the Nyáya as well as the Sánkhya. The Nyáya refutes the Vedánta and the Sánkhya. The Mimáṃsa by implication recognises the pre-existence of all the others not excepting Buddhism. The Vedánta in turn refutes adverse doctrines of the other five, and admits their pre-existence. This state of facts can be reconciled, he continues, by supposing that the different dogmas, and the schools that cherished them, existed a long time before the dogmas were written down in their present aphoristic form. Oral transmission must have been the principal means of their preservation. There might have been previous text-books, but they were set aside by the complete systems produced by the new texts, and hence, the regulation of adverse opinions naturally included all the theories prevalent at the time when the books were compiled, and not those only of the time of the original dogmas. Professor Cowell's opinion is much the same. “The Sútras, as we have them, cannot be the original form of the doctrines of the several schools. They are rather a recapitulation, at a certain period, of preceding developments which had gone on in the works of successive teachers. The Sútras mutually refer to each other. Thus those of the Sánkhya school which in itself I should consider one of the earliest, distinctly refer to Vedánta tenets. They expressly mention the Vaiśeshika in 1. 25. v. 85: for the Nyáya cf. v. 27. 86, and for the Yoga. 1. 90.” Colebroke's Essays. I. 354. n.

This opinion is common to all the systems. The good and evil works of souls are the cause of the existence of the world and of, all effects therein. The Nyáya and Vaiśeshika make every effort, however trivial, the result of these. The movement of an atom though but four fingers breadth, directly or indirectly affects without fail some soul for good or evil in a greater or lesser degree. Fitz. E. Hall's. Refutation, p. 39.

I think this sentence should belong to the next paragraph.

Though they hold that the Veda is eternal and originated by none, yet the divinities named therein, are false and their mention made solely for the purpose of magnifying works. Their inconsistency does not end here. The Vedas state that heaven is obtained by sacrifice; these sacrifices consist in offerings in fire, clarified butter, flesh, &c., to Indra, Varuṇa, Agni and other deities whose existence they deny; nevertheless they believe the potency of the offerings gains them Elysium. See the excellent arguments of Pandit Nílakantha in Dr. Hall. pp. 67, 68.

See the Sarva Darśana. Sangr. Udayana tries to establish that although ether, the site of sound, is imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is perceptible. p. 194. For svarúpa. See p. 134 of this volume.

According to the Naiyáyikas, the non-intimate cause of the change effected in two or more atoms as regards the operation of counting, is called number. By non-intimate is meant the secondary cause, i. e., the conjunction of threads in cloth, the intimate cause being the thread itself. Numbers are produced by comprehending intellect which when destroyed, the numbers also are destroyed.

The Naiyáyikas deny this, asserting that it is non-eternal. The eternity of the Veda depends on the Mímámsa doctrine that sound is eternal. The arguments pro and con are stated at some length in the Jaimini Darśana. v. Sarva. Darśana-Sangraha.

This is more clearly put in the Vedánta Sara.

“In the cognition this is a jar, the modification of the internal organ (chittavṛitti) which assumes the shape of a jar, is directed towards the unknown object, jar, removes the ignorance which rests on it, and at the same time illuminates it, though insentient, with the light of its own indwelling intelligence. The internal organ (i. e., manas) and the light of intelligence abiding in it, both pervade the jar: then, the ignorance (covering the jar) disappears by means of the former, whilst the jar bursts forth by means of the latter. Just as the light of a lamp, directed towards a jar or other object standing in the dark, dispels the darkness enveloping it and by its own brilliance brings it to view.” Jacob pp. 97–98.

It should be remembered that with the Vedantists, intelligence always means Brahma. When appropriated to the internal organ, it is called the subject of right notion. “When an organ of sense, as the eye, impinges on an object, the internal organ is said to evolve, to be emitted through the eye, to betake itself to the object and to be transformed into its shape. When it reaches the object, the intelligence appropriated to that organ becomes one with the object-intelligence; and since the object is non-different from the object intelligence, it becomes one with the intelligence appropriated to the internal organ, which intelligence is the object of right notion.

This does not, however, take place in inference, for inasmuch as, there, the object does not come into contact with an organ of sense, the internal organ is not thought to be drawn out to that object through an organ of sense. Consequently the intelligence and the object-intelligence do not become one, nor does the object of inference become non-different from the subject of right notion. From this it is plain that a portion of Brahma, designated as the object-intelligence, is considered by the Vedántists to be external to the beholder, and to take up a determinate space: in which portion of Brahma, a jar for instance, is imagined through ignorance to exist. Non-difference from the subject of right notion does not mean oneness with it, but the non-possession of an existence distinct from that of such subject.” In inference this does not occur. See. Dr. Hall's Refutation, pp. 184–5.

In various passages the number of corporeal organs is differently stated. The precise number is eleven, the five senses, the five organs of action, mind or the internal faculty including intelligence, consciousness and sensation. The six commonly mentioned are the five senses with Manas, the internal organ.

Doubt is founded on the notion whether a thing is what it seems to be, as a man or the stump of a tree; misconception is incorrect notion, as the notion of silver in mother o' pearl.

That is, the assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard or proved. Colebrooke, I. 329.

According to Rájendralála Mitra the six are: perception (pratyaksha), presumption (arthápatti), proportion sambhava), privation (abháva), comprehension (pratibhá), and oral communication (aitihya). The word pramáṇa has a twofold meaning, liable to be confounded, that of right notion and the means of acquiring that notion. As a function of the thinking principle, it is right notion and not evidence. Aphorisms of Patanjali, p. 10.

The sophism anupalabdhi-sama is the trying to establish a fact from the impossibility of perceiving the non-perception of it. For the Nyáya on pratyaksha see Röer. p. 26.

Jacob in his translation of the Vedánta-Sara, illustrates “nitya” constant rites, such as the Sandhyá prayers and the like, (which) cause ruin if left undone, and Naimittika, occasional rites, as the birth-sacrifice following the birth of a son, &c The prohibited things are the slaying of a Brahman, &c., which result in hell: and the “things done with a desire of reward” (kámya) are such as are done to procure heaven.

I have no doubt that ‘casting into the fire () is a translation of the Sanskrit which exactly expresses this meaning, that is, the oblations such as butter, &c., which are part of the ceremonial of worship, and the ability to purchase these goods is one of the advantages of wealth. Abul Fazl appears to assume in his readers a general acquaintance with the subjects he expounds, and the half lights under which he displays them, mislead and perplex.

This synopsis of the Mímáṃsaka treatise is very imperfect and would be unintelligible without the aid of an exact and scientific summary of its contents. Fortunately this is furnished by the Sarva-Darśana Sangraha or review of the different systems of Hindu philosophy by Mádhava A´chárya, translated by Messrs. Cowell and Gough. This work was composed by the author in the 14th century, and it is not improbable that Abul Fazl may have been made acquainted with its purpose and utilised its information. I quote from it the order and contents of the twelve books. In the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (vidhi), “explanatory passage” (arthaváda), hymn (mantra), tradition (sṃṛiti), and ‘name.’ In the second, certain subsidiary discussions (as e. g., on apúrva) relating to the difference of various rites, refutation of erroneously alleged proofs, and difference of performance (as in “constant” and “voluntary” offerings.) In the third, ´Sruti “sign,” or “sense of the passage” (liṅnga), “context” (vákya), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent opposition to one another, the ceremonies called pratipatti-karmáni, things mentioned incidentally (anárabhyádhíta), things accessory to several main objects, as praydjas, &c., and the duties of the sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the juhú being made of the butea foudasa, &c., and the dice-playing &c., which form the subordinate parts of the rájasúya sacrifice. In the fifth, the relative order of different passages of ´Sruti, &c., the order of different parts of a sacrifice (as the seventeen animals at the vájapeya), the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words of ´Sruti, order of mention, &c., in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the sattra offerings, things proper to be given, and the different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic text, and then as inferred by ‘name’ or ‘sign.’ In the eighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed ‘sign,’ and cases were no transference takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (úha), the adaptation of sámans and mantras, and collateral questions. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where the non-performance of the primary rite, involves the ‘preclusion and non-performance of the dependent rites,’ and of occasions where rites are precluded because other rites produce their special result, discussions connected with the graha offerings, certain sámans and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention, and subsequently the fuller discussion of tantra (where several acts are combined into one,) and ávápa (or the performing an act more than once). In the twelfth, a discussion on prasaṅnga (where the rite is performed for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference), tantra, cumulation of concurrent rites (samuchchaya) and option.”

This legendary personage, known also as Veda-vyása or divider of the Vedas, is represented in the Vishṇu Puráṇa, as an incarnation of Vishṇu. In every Dwápara, or third age, Vishṇu, in the person of Vyása, divides the Vedas which are properly one, into several portions for the good of mankind. He makes it fourfold to adapt it to their capacities, and the bodily form he assumes is known as Veda-vyása. A nominal list of 28 of these Vedávyasas are given in Cap. III of the V. P. He is also the reputed author of the Mahábhárata, known to mortals as Kṛishna Dwaipáyana, and to the gods as the deity Náráyaṇa, for none else, but a deity was considered capable of the feat. The name of Bádaráyaṇa is also given to him. The principal tenets of the Vedánta are that God is the omniscient and omnimpotent cause of the existence, continuation, and dissolution of the universe. Creation is an act of His will. At the consummation all things are resolved into Him. He is sole existent, secondless, entire sempiternal, infinite, universal soul, truth, wisdom, intelligence and happiness. Individual souls emanate from Him like sparks from a fire and return to Him, being of the same essence. The soul is a portion of the divine substance. Colebrook Misc. Essays. Ed. Cowell. I. 394, The original Vedánta did not recognise the doctrine of Máyá or illusion, which is a later accretion. It maintains, says Davies, the doctrine of a-dvaita or non-dualism as decidedly as Schelling or Hegel. All things, visible and invisible, are only forms of the one eternal essence (). Its basis is therefore a pure Pantheism. I refer the reader to Colebrooke's Essays for an analysis of this as well as of the other schools of philosophy.

The nine persons alluded to, are supposed by the Hindus to be still living, and in the birth-day ceremony, they are still worshipped to obtain the gift of long life. Hanumant is Hanumán, or the monkey king, a conspicuous figure in the Rámáyana. Bali was a virtuous Daitya king whose devotion and austerities humbled the gods and won for him the authority over three worlds. Vishṇu became manifest in his avatára as a dwarf to rescue the gods and restrain Bali. He obtained from him as a boon, three steps of ground, in two of which he stepped over heaven and earth, and in pity left to his dupe, the infernal regions. Vibhíshaṇa was younger brother of Rávaṇa, the ravisher of Sítá. Paraśuráma or Ráma, with the axe, is the sixth avatára of Vishṇu; v. Dowson. Class Dict of Hind. Myth. for these names.

The power of envelopment is like a cloud obscuring the spectator's vision, and thus ignorance, though limited, veils the understanding and covers the Soul which is unlimited and unconnected with the universe. The power of projection makes a rope appear like a snake, and thus ignorance raises up on Soul, which is covered by it, ether and the whole universe from subtile bodies to the earth itself. Intelligence associated with ignorance, possessed of these two powers, is, when itself is chiefly concerned, the efficient cause, and when its associate is chiefly considered, the material cause, as a spider in itself is the efficient cause of its web. and in its body the material cause. v. Jacob's Vedántasara. pp. 52–53.

These guṇas are a mere hypothesis, according to Davies, invented to account for the manifest differences in the conditions of formal existences. A subtle or spiritual element, one of passion or force, and something which is contrary to both, an element of dullness and insensibility in, at least, all human beings, is supposed to exist, and are assumed by Kapila in the Sánkhya system to indicate a primary difference in the constituent elements of nature, an idea which may be traced in early Greek Philosophy. (cf. Aristotle Metaph, 1, 3.) In the Gnostic system of Valentinus, all men and substances are divided into the spiritual, vital and material (Hylic), a classification corresponding to the guṇas of Kapila and possibly borrowed from India, p. 37.

Literally “not becoming five by combination,” that is, rudimentary. It is thus explained in Jacob's Vedánta-Sára. “From Intelligence associated with Ignorance, attended by its projective power, in which the quality of insensibility (tamas) abounds, proceeds ether, from ether, air, from air heat, from heat, water and from water, earth. The prevalence of insensibility in the cause of these elements is inferred from observing the excess of inanimateness in them. Then in those elements, ether and the rest, arise the qualities of pleasure, pain and insensibility in the proportion in which they exist in their cause.” These are subtile, rudimentary on non-quintuplicated elements. “The gross elements are those made from combining the five (subtile elements).

…. Then in ether, sound is manifested, in air, sound and touch, in heat, sound touch and form, in water sound, touch, form and taste, in earth, sound, touch, form, taste and smell.” The process of quintuplication is described later by Abul Fazl.

Colebrooke observes that the notion of ether and wind as distinct elements, seems to originate in the assumption of mobility for the essential character of the one. Hence air in motion has been distinguished from the aerial fluid at rest, ether, which is said to be all-pervading, and by an easy transition wind and motion come to be identified, like ether and space.

The organs of action are the mouth, hand, foot, arms and organ of generation, the five organ of sense are the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin.

This air is supposed to surround the stomach which is the seat of the fire, supplying the heat of the body and consuming the food. This fire is surrounded and retained in place by the air called Samána. It is called by this name because surrounding the navel it permeates everywhere (samantánnayanát). v. Rajendralala Mitrá's Patanjali, p. 153, where these airs are described in detail. These are not properly air or wind, but vital functions.

The soul whose desire is fruition is invested with a subtile person, towards the formation of which the evolution of principles proceeds no further than the elementary rudiments (non-quintuplicated), and according to the Sánkhya system as referred to (without name) by Abul Fazl lower down, has seventeen principles. The grosser body with which a soul clad in its subtile person, is invested for the purposes of fruition, is composed of the five elements, or of four, and even of only one (earth), according to some authorities. The body is propagated by generation and is perishable. The subtile person is more durable, and capable of transmigration through successive bodies which it assumes as a mimic shifts his disguises. It is primeval, produced by original nature at the initial development of principles, and is of atomic size. v. Colebrooke, I, 257–58.

This is the name given to Brahmá (in the masculine gender) the intelligent spirit whose birth was in the Golden mundane egg from which he is thus named. Máyá or the cosmical illusion, is fictitiously associated with Brahma from all-eternity In the series of æons without beginning or end, the forms of life have at the beginning of each æon emanated in, first I´śvara, the unreal figment of the cosmic fiction, unreal to the philosopher, real to the ignorant multitude; secondly Hiraṇyagarbha, the golden germ, or Práṇa, the breath of life, or Sutrátman, the Thread-spirit, which is the totality of migrating souls in the state of dreaming sleep. His body is the sum of invisible bodies, the tenuous involucra in which the soul passes from body to body in eternal palingenesia. The invisible bodies are made up of the cognitional, sensorial, and the aerial garments of the soul. Within these as its first garment, the soul is clad in the beatific vesture of the first principle of emanations, and the fifth is the tangible body of the world of sense. Three of these five wrappers clothe Hiraṇyagarbha. The third emanation is Viráj Vaiśvánara, Prajápati or Purusha who is identified with the totality of waking consciousness, with the sum of souls in their waking state and their gross visible environments. See Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads pp. 53–55.

Omitted in text. The proportion is four-eighths of the predominant element with one-eighth of each of the other four. The wonder is how it was discovered.

These lokas or worlds are Bhúr, terrestrial; Bhuvar, the atmospheric sphere from the earth to the sun; Svar-loka, heaven; ten million leagnes above is Maharloka, the inhabitants of which dwell in it through a day of Brahmá: at twice that distance is Jana-loka where Sanandana and other pure-minded sons of Brahmá reside: at four times the distance is Tapo-loka, the sphere of penance inhabited by deities called Vaibhrájas, who are unconsumable by fire. At six times the distance is Satya-loka the sphere of truth, the inhabitants of which never again know death. Vishṇu Puráṇa, 213. The remaining seven are the nether worlds. v. p. 32 of this volume.

“Intelligence associated with the collective aggregate is called Vaiśvánara (spirit of humanity) or Viráṭ: the former because of the conceit that it is in the whole of humanity, and the latter because it appears in various forms. Vedánta-sára. Jacob, 65. The generation of this emanation of the Supreme Being which directs the aggregate of bodies and exists in them as a form of intelligence, is described in Manu's Ordinances, I. 32. “Having divided his own body into two, he became a man by half, by half a female—on her that Lord begot Viráj.” See the note in Wilson's Vishṇu Puráṇa which treats at length of this complicated generation and office.

This order of successive destruction is described at length in the last book of the Vishṇu Puráṇa Chap. VI. with a different conclusion. The primary element of egotism is said to devour the ether, which is itself taken up by intellect, which is seized upon by Nature (Prakṛiti).

The destruction of creatures, not of the substance of the world. The incidental or occasional dissolution is termed naimittika (see p. 147) of this Vol. It is called incidental as occasioned by the interval of Brahmá's days, the destruction occurring during the night. The elemental occurs at the end of Brahmá's life, and the absolute or final, is individual annihilation and exemption from future existence. V. P. 630. Dainandina-pralaya is the destruction of the world after 15 years of Brahmá's age. Monier Williams, Sansk. Dict.

Goodness, foulness and darkness.

Sankarshaṇa is Balaráma, brother of Kṛishṇa, and one of the incarnations of Vishṇu. Vasudeva, who is Vishṇu, is identified by the Bhágavata sect, with Bhágavat the Supreme Being, who divided himself and became four persons by successive production, viz., Sankarshaṇa, who sprang from him direct, from whom came Pradyumna, and from the latter came Aniruddha. Sankarshaṇa is identified with the living soul (jíva): Pradyumna, with, mind (manas) and Aniruddha with Ahankára, consciousness. Colebrooke, I, 440.

I extract from Pandit Nilakantha's clear and well-ordered refutation of this system, which, if any, is the only scheme of theology apart from mere caste ceremonial, accredited among the Hindus, the following precis of its inconsistent theories to illustrate the somewhat technical exposition of Abul Fazl.

The Vedántins argue three sorts of existence, the true or transcendental (páramárthika), practical or conventional (vyávahárika), and apparent (prátibhásika). True existence is that of Brahmá exclusively. The second does not veritably exist, only the ignorant or misapprehensive mistake it for existent and so transact practical life, whence the name; and as the things are supposed not to be veritably existent, so is it with the use made of them as a necessary consequence. The third kind resembles the practical in that it is false, but by mistake seems to be true and differs from the practical in that (1st), men do not constantly, but only now and then mistake for veritable the apparent objects to which it appertains, as nacre for silver and matters of dreams, &c. 2nd, there is no practical dealings with such things, as nacre offered for sale will not be bought for silver; 3rd, it is because of ignorance that the practical seem to be veritable, but it is through other causes as distance, &c., called defects, in addition to ignorance, that the apparent seems to be veritable. Monism or non-duality is essential to the Vedánta philosophy. The soul is Brahma, and the world is false; hence Brahma is solely true and nought but it exists, or has existed, or will exist. And the world is false not because it is perishable, but truly false, as nacrine silver. Further, the ignorance that creates the imaginary world, is itself ignorance-imagined and hence false, and consistently, else non-duality would be impeached. Thus they establish Brahma to be true and all else illusory, and two classes of objects to exist, the true and untrue, and both really existent, only that an object of the first class is really real, and an object of the second, unreally real. A combination of two contradictories, existence and non-existence, is thus predicated of their practical existence. The Vedántin explains it thus:—Conceive true existence and practical existence as two stations with a station intermediate. A person located at practical existence does not style its objects unreally real, for to his eye there is only one sort of existence, that in which he is. This is the position of the ignorant or misapprehensive. Again, a person located at true existence would not designate its object, Brahma, as really real, for with him also there is but one kind of existence. This is the standing-point of the Vedántin's Brahma, if it but possessed the cognition which it lacks. A person located at the intermediate station sees both existences, and is alone able to judge of them as they really are—the one really real, the other unreally so. This is the Vedantin who affects to understand Brahma better than Brahma understands himself. They aver that Brahma is universally diffused and over portions of him, the unreal world is actually produced. Brahma is its substrate and illusory material cause, and ignorance its material cause. Hence the world is both false, and yet identical with Brahma, and this is explained by the analogy of nacre being mistaken for silver, a false silver being actually produced over the nacre. The latter is the substrate of the silver, and its illusory material cause, while ignorance is said to be its material cause. But it is not explained how a man mistaking nacre for silver, or a rope for a snake, has a false form before his eye and not nacre nor a rope. Therefore if the ignorant mistake Brahma for the world, it must be believed that this world visible, tangible, unintelligent, changeable is Brahma, or in other words that it has these qualities. Granted that the name of the world is false, how can its form be so? But to concede this would be to give up non-duality. The conception of Brahma itself is equally bewildering. It apprehends no one, and nought, and is apprehended of no one, for all apprehension is a modifica- of the internal organ, and Brahma never comes within its cognizance. It has no qualities. It is neither the efficient nor the material cause of the world. It is constitutively cognition, yet cognizes nothing, for cognition according to them, is a modification of the internal organ and Brahma's constitutive cognition is not such. The object abstracted, cognition is impossible, for as Coleridge observes “Truth is correlative to being, and knowledge without a correspondent reality is no knowledge.” Again, when they say it is inapprehensible and ineffable, their meaning is not like ours when we use such language regarding God. We mean that God cannot wholly, they that Brahma cannot at all, be known, nor described. Nothing that comes within the scope of apprehension is in any wise Brahma. This is as accurate an idea of absolute non-entity as language can express. Again they maintain that the soul has been from all eternity in the bondage of illusion. They do not say that illusion or ignorance came into being at some particular period and took the soul captive. For if it thus had an origin, it would be necessary to assign a cause, and even after emancipation it might incur the danger of being again made captive in consequence of the production of some new form of ignorance. On this ground they allege that illusion has existed from all time, and co-eternally with it the soul has been enthralled and will so continue till emancipated, but this cannot be reconciled with the position that besides Brahma nothing has ever been, is, or is to be. Again Brahma, is in its nature, eternally, pure, intelligent and free. But the soul is Brahma, and yet having been in bondage to illusion must be impure and unintelligent. To obviate this difficulty, illusion is said to have the peculiar character of existing and not existing. It cannot be said to be, inasmuch as it does not possess true existence. On the other hand it cannot be said not to be, inasmuch as it possesses apparent existence. But though it has apparent existence, it has no real existence, therefore the doctrine of monism suffers no injury. At the same time possessing apparent existence, it is capable of taking the soul captive, but as Illusion is only apparent, so the soul's bondage is practical; that is, as illusion is false, so is the soul's bondage false. Therefore neither was it ever actually fettered, nor is it now so, nor has it to be emancipated. It has been attempted to demonstrate the accordance of this doctrine with the immaterialism of Berkely; but Berkely maintains that objects of sense are only ideas, having no existence in themselves apart from perception. He does not hold that they are false. The perception of them constitutes their existence, whereas the ordinary view is that they exist independently of perception. He does not say they are imaginations of eternal ignorance, nor suppose that on the attainment of right apprehension, the whole scheme of created things will disappear. Moreover in the Vedánta system, not only are objects of cognition, imaginations of ignorance and false, but cognition itself is so, for cognition is a modification of the internal organ and not being Brahma, is to be regarded among falsities and imaginations of ignorance. Their objects and their cognition are alike false. Similarly, though they call Brahma appropriated to illusion, I´śvara, they declare, that the contact of illusion with Brahma, is not true but merely imagined; therefore I´śvara is imaginary. Thus deep calls to deep, and one absurdity requires another to support it. The Vedánta system professes to be a theism, but its Brahma is neither creator of the world, nor its preserver, nor its lord, and has no attributes. It is intelligence that cognizes nothing, and is bliss without fruition of happiness. A Supreme Being without the realities of omnipotence, omniscience and providential rule over his creation, is not God. It cannot reward as he cannot punish. Sin and virtue are in a sense acknowledged from the stand-point of practical existence, but they count for nothing. The ignorant man may avoid sin and practice virtue, but right apprehension spurns both, having no reason to fear the one, nor motive for pursuing the other. In what does this differ from atheism?