Aḫlāq-i Jalālī (=Lavami' al-Ishrāq fi makārim al-Aḫlāq) - Practical Philosophy of the Muhammedan People

THE course to be observed by men in general in their intercourse with kings and persons in authority is this. They should entertain for them in the heart, affection, — on the tongue, eulogy and praise; they should attend upon the ministers of such persons with obsequious service; and as long as the orders they receive from them are not at variance with those of God, they must exert themselves as far as possible to carry these into effect; whether as to do or to leave undone. The fiscal dues of tribute and the like they should discharge with cheerfulness, never even in thought desiring to withhold such; never admitting the minutest neglect, apparent or concealed,² of that reverence which is their due, and being prepared, in case of exigence, to sacrifice life and property for their sakes; seeing that on their sublime destinies the maintenance of religion and the prosperity of family and home is staked.³

Persons not actually numbered among their attendants ought never to allow themselves to aim at a closer proximity. For the companionship of princes has been compared to entering into a conflagration, or associating with a tiger. In truth, it is an arduous matter to observe the proprieties of attendance upon kings; neither has every one the power to discipline himself thereto. Certain elders of the faith have declared that none could walk the way of religion who had not lived in attendance upon, and in connexion with, earthly potentates: since, agreeably to the saying “The Sultan is the shadow of God,”⁴ to observe the duties of a presence-chamber will form a man’s spirit to observe those of religion.

For him who is already advanced in their regard, let him occupy himself in the business entrusted to him, and not officiously press into other departments. In his attendance he should be persevering, in such wise that whenever summoned he may be ready to proceed to the presence; and yet he must beware of urging his services, for that engenders distaste. Whatever they do he must be ready to commend, and this with sincerity, not in adulation. For nothing passes but has some bright side: this he is to bring forward and make the ground of his eulogy.

For him who has risen to the dignity of advising, he should make his remarks in the most general and polite form. For even according to the Institute, individuals have no title to use reproach or vehemence towards kings, whether in urging them to right or restraining them from wrong:⁵ their office extending no farther than to general advice and exhortation of a courteous sort. Thus, in his book of Miracles, the Almighty says to Moses and Aaron with regard to Pharaoh, “Speak to him in soft phrases: perchance he may remember, or perchance he may apprehend!”

If he is a vizier or minister, and any proceeding of theirs occur repugnant to expedience, in the first instance let him go along with it, and concur in it, and afterwards let him get it out of their inclinations by some humorous remark. Writers observe that kings and potentates are like a torrent flowing from a mountain’s brow. He perishes who seeks to turn it aside in an instant. But he who lets it alone in its outbreak, and gradually encroaches on one of its margins, may turn it easily enough with a little earth and rubbish. Their secrets he should on no account allow himself to divulge:⁶ the method of preventing which is to conceal their outward particulars, forasmuch as may be reconciled with attention to their orders, and then, this habit being well established, the concealment of their secrets will become easy. For inward matters may be deduced from outward ones, by reason of that connexion and complication which universally prevails in all human affairs. He must always bear in mind that the feelings of kings are very lofty, and therefore that all other orders ought to remain in submission towards them.⁷ Faults or omissions he must never impute to them in any affair, or to any degree, how near so ever the place they may have raised him to. And whenever an uncertainty prevails whether an error attaches to them or to him, he must take it solely on himself; preserving their dignity unsullied by the least blemish or imperfection. That done, he may afterwards take occasion to exonerate his proceedings in their esteem. His endeavour to please them cannot be too great. He must put his own interests entirely out of sight: For in clientelage no progress can be made till the interest of self is entirely disregarded; and in pursuance of this principle, on all occasions which involve either his interests or theirs, let theirs be all he aims at, and then along with theirs he will be promoting his own likewise.

For the purpose of obtaining any object he may have in view, he should approach them with agreeable devices, and not by importunity and super-solicitation. Of all things he must eschew covetousness, and strive after content. For the world turns to him that looks another way, and to him who wooes its countenance it only shows its back. Or as we have it among the dicta, “Abandon the world, and it will be eager to come to you;” and in the Touriat we are told the Almighty gave his world these directions: “O world, be servant unto him that is servant unto me, not unto him that is servant unto you.” The sources of emolument and wealth he is to reserve for his masters, and through them only to acquire any for himself. Let him have no designs upon their private property, as he would live secure from the degradation of being called to account, as he would amplify his own profit, as he would stand in their esteem and approbation. His bearing towards them should show as if, at their slightest signal, he were ready to sacrifice all his treasures and possessions. For if he evince reluctance, according to the saying “Men are eager after that which is withheld,” he does but provoke their covetings. It is a maxim with the wise, “The interdicted is the coveted, and the freely given is the soon abandoned.”⁸ Rank and riches he should desire for their aggrandizement, and not for his own; and of all things he must avoid participating in any particular of dress or equipage which is appropriated to their use; or else the breach of etiquette may lead to his being deprived both of privilege and life. In no matter, however trifling, must he arrogate an independent seeming. Be the circumstances what they may, to acquiesce in his superior’s orders must be the symbol of his conduct.⁹ It is written in the book of Solomon, (peace be with him!) that he addressed his soul as follows: “O my soul, despise not kings, but submit to all their sayings, and in no case be urged to utter in their presence aught involving censure either of thyself or others. For if it regard thyself, thou art brought within the scope of the temporal king’s displeasure; and if it regard others, thou becomest food for the displeasure of the King Eternal.”¹⁰ Ibn Mukanna says, in his work on Manners, “If the king call thee brother, call thou him my Lord; and the closer thy familiarity becomes, the greater the reverence thou must pay him.¹¹ Yet when thy intimacy is well established, thou must not overload thy speech with terms of flattery and obsequiousness; for that betokens fear and alienation. Neither say to him in any case, Such is my right or the due of my previous service; rather will he hold thy previous service to carry forward his existing claims: so that the past lives only by the present. That right whose end is broken from its beginning, kings, and indeed all men, are ready to forget.”

There is no more dangerous undertaking than the viziership of kings. The vizier’s only safeguard is in his integrity. He that is marked for this high office must not be hurt at vituperation or abuse, nor allow it to press for a moment on his mind. If he finds his detractors busy with their intrigues, he must not be disturbed at it, nor show them any marks of antipathy and malice; for that would infallibly confirm their machinations. If the matter comes to verbal recrimination, let him not overpass the outworks of his stateliness; let his answers be always cool, for “With the cool is victory.”

Among other etiquette of royal and noble society one point is this, never to dispute in their presence; and when they put a question to another, never to prevent his answer by our own. This, in fact, is to prove at once the folly of the speaker, and his gross disregard both of questioner and questioned. Supposing the questioner to say, “It is not of you I ask,” he has no answer to make, but must bear the shame of his own inconsiderateness. If their question be addressed to the company at large, he is not to be emulously hasty in reply; for, besides being disagreeable to all, they are likely to find fault with the opinion. If he waits till others answer, and the merits of the subject are ascertained, and, after that, should the discussion be prolonged, gives his own opinion, he will show his breeding and his wit together.¹²

Over those who are more nearly favoured than himself he must never seek to be preferred; nor hold his feelings hurt at finding another and less deserving person surpass him in rank and favour. For the most elevated individual may have a natural affinity towards another of the lowliest order. This affinity it is which gives rise to all affection,¹³ and to acquire it [when not created to us] is beyond the range of possibility. It is useless, therefore, to distress himself on any such account. And then, it may chance that such person has prior claims, with which the other is unacquainted; in which case a difference with him would alienate the king’s regard. In a word, he is to pass altogether away from his own liking, and make his wishes conform with those of the king. For, as has already been sufficiently explained,¹⁴ until two persons become as one, the bond of affection can never be cemented; but as soon as either of the two ceases to stand upon his claims, discrepance, nay, severance, is removed, and their common interests adjust themselves in the sacred form of unity.

As it has already² been laid down that to man’s maturity in his appropriate perfection it is necessary for him to seek assistance from his fellow creatures, and the foundations of such a course can only be laid in union and affection, it follows that the more intimates a man may have, the easier the attainment of his perfection will become. Now, friendship being the highest order of affection, it is by means of this that man’s efforts after perfection may be most successfully ordered.³

It happens, however, that genuine friends cannot be numerous; for it is to rare jewels only that value is attached.⁴ The generality of mankind are in search of mere animal gratification, and the delights of passion, and with these we are only to mingle in the measure of our necessities. This class moralists have compared to condiments, which we are to employ in our dishes just as they are needed, and of which the too sparing or the too abundant use leads alike to disorder.

Aristotle says men have need of friends in all circumstances: in opulence, to enjoy themselves in their society and intimacy; in hardships, to benefit by their succour and assistance. And, in truth, princes, who are the most independent of mankind, have as much occasion for persons having claims on their regard, — nay, for poor and destitute ones, of all mankind the most necessitous, — as these have for the rich and bounteous.⁵ Ifsikar Atlias⁶ says, “Were a man to have possession and management of the universe, and be debarred from friendship, his life would be a burden, or rather its continuance impossible. Yet if any one holds this relation easy of attainment, his opinion is erroneous. A genuine friendship, that will stand the test of trial, is one of the richest gems the world affords. When calamity arrives, or some advantage fails us, store or treasure, nay, the whole world and all that it contains, avail us nothing in comparison with friendship for lightening the burden, or aiding us to recover our lost composure. Thrice fortunate he, though having nothing else, who holds a full portion of this surpassing blessing.” And yet more fortunate he who can combine this happiness with the elevation of a throne: for a king must be familiar with all things, both summary and minute, the concerns of his dominions and the interests of all classes among his subjects. For such multifarious purposes a single eye, a single heart, and a single tongue, are insufficient; but when, in virtue of friendship, he obtains management of the eyes, ears, hearts, and tongues of others, seeing with the eyes of all, hearing with the ears of all, and speaking with the tongues of all, then indeed the interests of his dominions may be easily attended to.

It is said that when desirous of selecting an object for our friendship, our first inquiry concerning him should be into his behaviour towards his parents during his youthful state; and if noted for contravention of their claims, he is not to be trusted or taken for a friend: for good can never come of him who requites the claims of his parents with disobedience. Next to that, the manner of his intercourse and behaviour with his intimates should be ascertained. Next to that, we must inform ourselves how he is affected towards his benefactors; if disposed to ingratitude, no advance should be desired in his acquaintance. For of all vile qualities, none is more culpable than ingratitude; as, among good ones, there is no virtue more laudable than thankfulness. The intent of gratitude is not merely requital, (for this it may happen from poverty that a person is unable to effect,) but that in his heart he entertain for him affection, and by his tongue express towards him eulogy and praise. As long as he does this, such person is guilty of no omission. Next, we are to notice how he is affected towards enjoyments, and the treasuring up of properties and effects. If ruled by covetousness, he is unfit for friendship. Next, we should examine his inclination for aggrandizement and predominance. If he exceeds here, he must likewise be rejected: for to this predominance equity will be sacrificed. He will seek more than his due, and the refusal to concede it will terminate his regard. Another subject of consideration it should be made, whether a passion for amusement and diversion — the listening to music and intimacy of musicians — interferes with his feeling for a genuine friend; and if so, no wish should be entertained for his attachment. When he has passed through the analytic process of these several tests, and come forth at the end in standard purity, he should be hailed for the truly genuine and eminently attached friend, and his affection locked away with the soul’s choicest valuables in the treasure-chambers of the heart.⁷ “For there is no glory like a faithful friend.” It has even been said by the wise, “How do I envy him who is in trouble, and hath a devoted friend!”

Such a person, however, is rarer than the philosopher’s stone. Onē true friend, if he can be met with, is as much as we ought to look for; it being hardly conceivable that we could satisfy the expectations of many. In all probability the dictates of their several circumstances will be adverse each to each. For instance, to harmonize with one we must appear open and joyous; to harmonize with another, reserved and dejected.⁸ Besides, as enmity generally proceeds from previous intimacy and acquaintance, (for with a person previously unknown hostility seems out of the question,) and enmity is always more injurious when preceded by extreme familiarity and consequent knowledge of our minutest affairs, we ought to proceed very cautiously in establishing such intimate acquaintance, and content ourselves with the measure of our need for it.⁹

When we have met with a friend we should be careful to acknowledge his claims. The troubles that befall him we should rectify. On seeing him we should testify our pleasure, and be easily satisfied with his approval and praise, without being eager for obsequiousness or adulation.¹⁰ Neither, on our parts, are we to content ourselves with sincerity of feeling and proofs that lie within us; for on what food our hearts may feed is discoverable only by him who discovers all things. Trifling failings and partial faults, whether relative to friends or foes, we are not to dwell on: it is but fair to wink at them; for from these no mortal can be exempt. A rigid scrutiny on this score would lead to a life of savage solitude and exclusion from the merits of friendship.¹¹ On this point it is of great service to us to contemplate our own imperfections. As we have it in the dicta of the Prophet, “Happy he whose own faults recall his observation from the faults of others.” By the discharge of these obligations not only may attachment be purified and corroborated, but an attraction may be exercised on indifferent parties, and persons previously unknown.

Another of the obligations of friendship it is to make friends participate with us in our affluence and dignity, and to be careful in avoiding the least appearance of exclusiveness in these matters; keeping our attentions unsullied by any affectation of favour; consoling them under the incidence of calamity with our sympathy and our wealth, and bearing them fellowship to the utmost length in all things. Indeed, fellowship in suffering has a greater value and a greater grace than participation in enjoyment.

In paying such attentions to our friends we are not to wait for any application on their part: we must ascertain their feelings by signs and tokens; and if we perceive in a friend symptoms of offence, we are not to treat it negligently, but rather be doubly urgent in our instances and offers. For if he too let the subject drop, the bond of affection would be severed: nay, it might be that the breach widened till it terminated in renunciation and irreparable rupture. The proper course is to state without hesitation, in frank purity of heart, the cause of uneasiness, whatever it may be, in the hope of its yielding to the hallowed influence of truth.¹³

These observances must also be unintermitting; for if we undertake the management of house, or dress, or beast of burden, and neglect its critical junctures, ruin must supervene. With what reason then can we neglect the management of a relation from which we may look for blessings in this world and the next?¹⁴ And then there is great risk that the friendship which terminates may revert to open hostility. The evils of enmity are more intolerable when they follow upon previous affection.¹⁵ A quarrelsome habit, though it is always culpable, is still more odious in the case of friends. It leads indeed to discord, and discord leads to repugnance; which is the root of all evil.¹⁶

In communicating to a friend any knowledge or accomplishment we may possess, no reserve must be permitted to have place. To compete with friends in the goods of this life, which is a state of competition, is abominable enough; how much more then in knowledge, which by participation is promoted, and by selfishness is decreased!¹⁷

When we perceive any fault in a friend, we ought to apprise him of it in some method carrying with it a graceful admonition. Points like these we are not at liberty to treat with indulgence or profession; for this would be no better than treachery.¹⁸ The method of such graceful admonition is this: First to apprise him of it by some fable or anecdote of another person;¹⁹ if that does not avail, to intimate it by allusion and metaphor, and if it is necessary to be explicit, to perform the unpleasant duty in private; prefacing it by a statement of the circumstances that entitle you to his confidence, and taking care to conceal the matter from all others, even from the friends of both.

Lastly, we are to give no access to tale-bearers. The firmer the foundations of our affection may be, the more will detraction exert itself to perforate and subvert. Moralists have likened the detractor to one who scratches with his nails at a solid wall, till he somewhere finds room for the insertion of his finger-top. Once master of a fissure, he constantly enlarges it, until at last he subverts the structure. In the preservation of affection no caution can be too great; for, as we have repeatedly stated, it is the centre of adjustment in the affairs of life, and of maintenance in the powers of the universe.²⁰

LET any one compare his own situation with that of mankind in general, and theirs must have one of three characters, — superior, equal, or inferior. His intercourse with the first division has been determined in Sect. V. In the second division, intercourse is of three kinds, — with friends, with foes, and with those who are neither.²

I. Friends are of two sorts, — genuine and not genuine. With the genuine the mode of intercourse has just been ascertained: for the other, if peradventure by cultivation and courtesy they may be brought to bear a semblance of the genuine, we should take every opportunity to pay them attention, and make every endeavour to improve their feelings: possibly they may attain to the distinction of genuine friendship. Our secrets, however, our enterprises, our faults, and the measure of our property, we should not let them know. We must not punish them for their faults, nor rebuke them for inattention to our claims. Their projects we should support, as far as we can, with cheerfulness, either real or complimentary; and should the honors of advance to rank or property become theirs, we must not appear to regard them the more or visit them the oftener.

II. Foes are of two sorts, — the far and the near; and each of two kinds, — the hidden and the open. Potential foes are of the open, invidious ones of the hidden, description. A near foe is the most formidable one; being more acquainted with our minute circumstances. Wherever we eat or drink, wheresoever we arrive or set out from, we must be mindful of his vicinity and our own safeguard.³

The main point in the treatment of foes is by courteous and conciliating demeanour to remove, if possible, the blemish from their hearts; and the best of all expedients is to cut off the supply of animosity and hatred. When this project is hopeless, as long as we can behave with exterior civility we should never give openness to our variance. For to overwhelm evil with good is good, and to resist evil by evil is evil. We must pay no regard then to the folly of our enemies, but let our war-cry⁴ be patience and politeness. Indeed, dissension and animosity cannot be too much avoided; leading as they do to loss of property, ruin of fortune, endless regret, and overwhelming anxiety; — nay, to loss of life as well as property they may lead, and innumerable calamities besides. Life is too precious a jewel to be thrown away upon a spite against our foes.

Among other essential precautions it is one to inquire into an enemy’s concerns, and take the greatest pains to ascertain them; being equally careful, however, to conceal them when ascertained, and not divulge them till the proper time. For to publish an enemy’s fault is to put him upon perceiving it, and avoiding its range; or perchance he may labour in secret to avert the injurious operation, reserving its discovery till the expedient moment; and victory may fall to him in consequence. Part of it, however, we may bring forward as opportunity demands, that, knowing our consciousness of his defects, his spirit may be broken and mortified, and thus grow weary of the contest. On no account are we to disgrace him with imputations of our own: for falsehood will redound to the strength and superiority of the opposite party. Complaints against him we may lay, however, before the chiefs and functionaries, in order to possess them with a right view of our situation; and then, if similar attempts are made on his side, they shall not be believed, but imputed to his further misbehaviour. We ought to make ourselves acquainted with the habit and tendency of his every quality, so as to prepare an appropriate defence for each. All that may lead to his embarrassment and disquiet we ought likewise to ascertain, and make use of upon suitable occasion. Plato says the best way of providing against the practices of our foes is to render ourselves superior to them in those arts which are common to the two: thus at the same time ourselves attaining the honors of perfection, averting the enemies’ molestation, and consigning them to humiliation and embarrassment. To give vent to expressions of abuse, abhorrence, malediction, and censure, is the trait of weak women, and far removed from the practice of men of sense and ability. Not only indeed do we assume thereby the characteristics of the foolish, without detriment to the enemy’s cause, but we incite him to attack our reputation in return.⁵ We are told that when a person appeared before Abú Muslim, at the instigation of a court parasite, and entered into charges against Nasar Sayār, (the previous governor of Khorāsan on the Marwānite party), Abú Muslim was displeased, and put a stop to the proceeding, saying, that if he for his own purposes should choose to embrue his hands in the blood of that party, it could answer none to attack their reputations.

When an enemy is visited by any calamity from which we are not ourselves secure, we should not exult in it or display any satisfaction; for the calamity having an application to us, we should in fact be exulting over ourselves.

Should an enemy ever turn to us for refuge, or repose on us any reliance, we must beware of deceiving or betraying him. We must discharge all obligations of honor and humanity, and so contrive as to convince every one of our good feeling and integrity, and retort upon him the turpitude of wrong. On this point we ought to proceed by the example of the Prophet, of whom we are told in the most authentic accounts, that when Kaab bin Zohair, who passed among the Arabs for a master in composition, had defiled his tongue (before he was honored by conversion) by satirizing certain servants⁶ of the Prophetic port, and in consequence the refuge of revelation had put the ban⁷ upon his life, Kaab, being informed of the fact, and knowing that his only resource lay in an appeal to that unfailing mercy which embraces all in both worlds (We sent thee not but in mercy to the worlds), composed a splendid elegy, all sparkling with rich encomiums on his highness’s excellence, and mounting (as was the Arab custom) on a swift-paced camel, crossed the deserts, and presented himself at that threshold where angels were fain to nestle. Thus safely ensconced, he fell to reciting his elegy, in the course of which he had taken care to introduce the grounds of his apology and deprecation. As soon as his holiness heard it he cancelled the catalogue of Kaab’s offences, and bestowed upon him a tunic drawn from his own pure and spiritual person, as the most sacred pledge of impetrated safety. From that time forward the poet was ranked with the most favoured attendants.⁸

For averting their malice, there are three courses to follow. 1. To ameliorate their natures, or, if that is impracticable, to ameliorate their regard. 2. To avoid it by choosing a residence at some distance, or undertaking travel. 3. To attack and destroy it. This is the last of expedients, and one which we are only to adopt when the enemy is malicious in se; when we cannot avoid the harm by any other means; when we are of opinion, that in case of the enemy’s prevailing over us, some evil still more serious will result; when we can be sure that no further ill consequences will follow, either in this world or the next. And this, withal, we are still to except against deceit and treachery; and if it be practicable to attack his power by the hand of another foe, that is to be preferred.

As to the invidious, we must harass them by setting forth our advantages, and by displaying our virtues, or other such means of good fortune, internal or external, as may tend to irritate their mental malady, and in time excite other and fresh ones. Their pretexts we must tear aside, that men may be aware of their odious propensities, and prepared to condemn their further displays. There is a proverb —

III. As to intercourse with those who are neither friends nor foes, it will differ with the different classes to which they belong. With the ingenuous, who occupy towards the public a cordial and sincere position, we should affect warmth, and meet them with unaffected cheerfulness. We must not, however, be too hasty in admitting the professions of every one: we must not be deceived by circumstances of appearance. By observation we must acquaint ourselves with peoples’ real intentions, and be guided accordingly. The good (or those engaged in promoting general concord)⁹ we should treat with reverence and respect. The foolish we should entertain with coolness; not dwelling on their follies nor seeking access to revenge, but trusting to be rid of them by calmness, benignity, and mutual avoidance. With the haughty we should be haughty, that they may be corrected and rebuked by our demeanour: we have it in one of the dicta, “With the haughty it is friendly to be haughty.” For courtesy towards this class only serves to confirm them in their error; while a haughty bearing in return would be likely to awaken them to a sense of it. To men of eminence we should show respect, for a high privilege is theirs. We should bear with the ill-nature of our neighbours and friends. There is a saying, “The mild forbear in body, and the generous forbear in soul.”

With regard to those beneath us, if docile, we should tender them as our own children; searching into their natures and dispositions for the bent of their abilities, and employing them accordingly; holding ourselves bound to assist them to the utmost of our power. The dull we should encourage in whatever may be most adapted to their capacities, and discourage from aiming at scientific attainment. Interrogators, if importunate, we should rebuke and disregard; not however when such importunity proceeds from excess of exigence. We must carefully distinguish between him that wants and him that desires. For the first, we should expedite his want, or even supply it, if without detriment we may; the second we should restrict from pursuing his cupidity any further. To the weak we should extend our hand, and to the oppressed our succour; and, as far as in us lies, endeavour a resemblance to that absolute good, the source of every blessing, the well-spring of every excellence, — the Almighty and All-hallowed, whose mercy and munificence watered — whose heavenly inspirations expanded — the blossoms of celestial perfection now teeming on creation’s favourite plant — mankind: and this without expectation of advantage, or forecast of purpose or design; his exaltation is beyond it. This then is the course which the aspirant after virtue must pursue; making absolute good the ultimate end of all his other acquisitions, — till at length he achieves the elevation of becoming the Vice-regent of God:¹⁰

LET it be the object of your constant endeavour to instruct both others and yourself. Ask nothing from the Supreme, the advantage of which is open to the inroads of decay; but let your petition be for the good that endureth. Be ever on the watch; evil hath many causes. That which you ought not to accomplish, forbear even to desire. God’s punishment of his servants is not in course of anger, but in course of discipline and culture. Be content to aspire to the life you suit, lest the duration of that which suits you be contracted: neither consider any life a suitable one, but that which will satisfy the appetite for knowledge. Turn not to repose in sleep till thou hast taken account with thy soul of three things: — 1. whether thou hast that day committed any wrong; 2. whether that day thou hast gained any advantage; 3. whether any previous achievement has perished by neglect. Remember! before thy life what wert thou; and after it, what wilt thou be? Molest none; for the affairs of life lie in the channel of mutation and decay. Make not thy capital of aught external to thyself. Count not any for wise who rejoiceth at earthly pleasure, or is disturbed at earthly misfortune. To the tales of a tale-bearer, who divulges them unasked, thou mayest listen, and be sure, that he who wisheth evil to another hath already in his own soul admitted evil to himself. Think often before thou speakest: having spoken, perform. The need that thou feelest cast not upon to-morrow: how knowest thou to-morrow what may befall? In word only be not wise, but in word and deed likewise. Wisdom in words may endure in this world, wisdom in deed reacheth to the next, and endureth there. If for good thou bearest pain, the pain endureth not, the good endureth: if for ill thou enjoyest pleasure, the pleasure endureth not, the ill endureth. Remember that the day will come when men shall call upon thee, and thou shalt be bereft of organs wherewith to answer or to listen; hearing not, speaking not, unable to remember. Reflect not whilst thou art here upon any for their wants; thou shalt be where master and slave are alike. Know that of all the gifts of God nothing is better than wisdom, and that he only can be wise whose thoughts, words, and actions correspond together. Requite a good act, and let a bad one pass. Weary not at the offices pertaining to the next world, for they are great. Bruise not a single bosom in thy pursuit of excellence. Abandon not permanent for transitory eminence, for in so doing thou turnest from him who is the source of both. Neither be overweening in thy affluence; nor in thy calamities give way to despondence and self-abasement. Be rude to none, be courteous to all, and beware how thou contemnest another for being courteous to thee. What thou excusest in thyself, revile not in thy brother.

When Aristotle, who was minister as well as tutor to Alexander, was compelled by age and infirmity to retire from his service, what time Alexander was conquering the country of Ajam, and this was found to abound with persons of intellect and talent — with men of eminence and bravery — whom it seemed as prejudicial to the safety of his empire to spare, as it was repugnant to the principles of equity to exterminate, the prince became perplexed upon the subject, and wrote Aristotle a letter replete with warm and gracious expressions of his regard and favour, in the course of which he stated, that by reason of the distance that divided him from the advantage of his preceptor’s society, he found his judgment exposed to much agitation upon public affairs in general; upon which account, as well as of the particular difficulty he just then found in seeing his way through the anxieties of his position, unassisted by the bright expedients of the sage’s luminous mind, he was to oblige him by endeavouring, by whatever means he might best accomplish it, to arrange the method of their meeting. Aristotle’s reply was in this sort:

“My glorious pupil and enterprising prince must be well aware that my retirement is occasioned by no want of eagerness to accompany him; but by old age, the debility of my constitution, and the exhaustion of my powers. Our meeting being thus impracticable, I have in this epistle explained to you a system to which you can conform upon all matters of detail, and which will indeed render you independent of my actual presence.² As to the question of Ajam and its men of eminence, be assured that were you to destroy these, you could never alter the climate that bred them, so that others of the same description will necessarily rise in their place. Endeavour therefore to enslave them by obligations, and you will render them sincere in their adherence, nay, the most submissive of all your vassals.”

He then goes on to say, “Kings are of four classes: the first, liberal to self and subjects both; the second, liberal to self and niggard to subjects; the third, niggard to self and liberal to subjects; the fourth, niggard both to self and subjects. The first by general consent is praiseworthy; the second and fourth by general consent culpable; as to the third, opinions differ, the Hindy school holding it praiseworthy, and the Persian school holding it culpable. Now to be liberal is to supply those entitled to it according to their need; and whoever exceeds this degree deviates pro tanto into profusion. The king who indulges in generosity beyond his resources will infallibly find it productive of ruin to his empire. Often I have told you, Alexander, that of munificence and liberality the main point is, not to covet other men’s possessions, and not to bear in remembrance the favours you have already bestowed. * * * * * * The king that holds religion at his disposal, and slights the law of God, him shall the law of God destroy. * * * * * * The merchants who resort from distant parts to his dominions let him make a point of protecting; and in so doing he will be diffusing his own good name, winning men’s affections, and promoting the resort of traders, and, with it, the prosperity of his dominions. Neither in return for a little indulgence extended to them should he seek to derive inordinate profit. * * *

“O Alexander, often have I enjoined thee, and again I repeat my injunctions, be not over bold to shed blood; for the destruction of things living is peculiarly the right of God. With the truth of circumstances none is acquainted but he who is acquainted with all things. Perchance by reason of some accusation of which he is innocent, or at least excusable as to the committal, thou mayest see fit to put a person to death undeservedly; than which what crime can be more aggravated? It has been told me for a saying of Hermes Trismegistus (who is Esdras), that when one created thing deprives another of its life, the angels³ of heaven bewail in the presence of the Creator, saying, ‘Thy servant such-an-one hath made himself like to thee in destroying another of thy servants.’ If the death be one of retribution, the Lord answers, — ‘By my command he hath killed him in right of retribution.’ But if it be without justice, he replies, — ‘By my splendour and my glory, the blood of the slayer I permit others to shed.’ Upon this the angels, in all their halleluiahs and intercessions, imprecate destruction upon him, till the time of retribution comes. And this is the best that can befall him. If he dies in the course of nature, it is a sign of the Almighty’s anger, which has summoned him to punishment more protracted and severe.

“Incite thy subjects to cultivate science; and him that is eminent in science be careful to distinguish with unusual patronage and favour: by this practice thou wilt be promoting thine own popularity and the kingdom’s good together. * * * Take no food from hands on which thou hast not reason to rely. Be not inattentive to thy safety: and forget not the circumstance of the presents sent thee by the King of Hind; wherein, among other rarities, was a maiden who had been fed on poison from her infancy, till her constitution was become viperish:⁴ and it was their design by her means to destroy thee, but that I foresaw and warned thee of the danger. * * * The men of Hind have a saying, ‘Better justice in the sovereign than plenty in the season;’ and on certain stones there is an inscription in Syriac —

Now that our disquisitions have led us to touch on this subject, it seems desirable to give a fuller explanation of its leading points. To do this in a manner befitting the present occasion we must begin by observing, that a tone is a sound with an assignable duration. When this is repeated with the requisite degree of sharpness and flatness without producing that effect which is the property of harmony, it does not come within the scope of the science of music; such scope being limited to tones of such a character that their interval in regard to sharpness and flatness, or the interval of the periods recurring between them in regard to duration, contributes to a harmonious or discordant relation; the first of which divisions is termed harmony, and the second of which is termed melody. Now when two tones are taken which differ in sharpness and flatness, the difference between them will necessarily be constituent of a relation either harmonious or discordant. For if the difference be referable either to like in fact or like in effect, it is harmony; and if not, it is discord. The meaning of like in fact is this, that the measure of the interval is equal to the less; which may happen when one is double of the other, like 4 and 2, 6 and 3; and this is termed the Diapason interval. The meaning of like in effect is this, that what is not like in fact may by duplication be rendered so: which is of two sorts; one, where this property resides in the difference, as with 6 and 4, which differ by 2, which by duplication becomes 4; and this is termed the Progressional proportion: the other, where this property resides in one of the differents, as with 6 and 2, which differ by 4; whereas 2, which is one of the differents, by duplication becomes 4; and this is termed the Multiple proportion. Every proportion which proceeds on these conditions, or is capable of being reduced to them, is harmony; and every one repugnant to them is discord. Thus all couples of tones not having a numeral ratio, that is, tones whose ratio is an involved one with peculiar properties for which numbers are not to be found, are discordant; such as the tone produced by the whole string, and that produced by such part of it as bears to the whole the ratio of a square’s side to its diagonal. And even if it be a numeral proportion, but the smaller number divide not the greater, or the difference between the two is not by a part having the power of the greater, and it is not capable of being reduced to the harmonious proportions by any of the methods presently explained, it must still be discordant. For instance, two tones of which one is greater than the other by 4/7ths, as when one is 7 and the other 11, with a difference between them of 4/7ths, neither 7 the lesser will halve 11, nor will 4, which is the measure of the difference. But where the less will divide the greater, the measure of the difference must be either equal to the lesser, or greater than it. If equal, it is the ratio of double and half, or, as it is termed, the Diapason interval; if greater, it is the Multiple relation.

Again, when the difference is by a part which divides the greater number, if that part makes up a half or near to half to one of the numbers, as a half or third, they call it the proportion of middle intervals, which is reducible to the same two; for if the difference is between 4 and 6, the differential part forms half; and if it is between 7 and 5, it makes what is near to half. Of these middle intervals, the first sort is termed the Diapente interval, such as 2 and 3; and the second sort the Diatessara interval, such as 3 and 4. And if the difference is by a part which makes not the number half or near it, it is termed the proportion of Minor intervals, or Hypertessara.

Now these different descriptions of harmony, which are all either the involution of one number in another, or else their differing by a part being a divisor of the greater number, are contemplated only as far as the difference can be perceived, and the human frame possesses the power of putting it forth. If the difference be of such sort that it is not the subject of sensation, or be excessively trifling, or such as the human frame cannot enunciate, it comes not within the limits of this science. For on the supposition of its escaping the perception, or having only an exceedingly minute expression in it, that agreeable sensation which is the object of joining sounds together does not result therefrom; and in the latter case, though it be possible to bring it forth from other instruments, yet being not on a scale with the physical demands of man, that is, with his own organic intonations, the human system finds no attraction in them, neither do they attain the height of being agreeable; whereas the science of music being placed in following out the highest, this is no part of its scope. It appears, then, that a proportion not formed on the scale of man’s organic intonations is no subject for our consideration. The limit of combination in organic tones (as actually effected) in the class of major intervals is that one should be double of the other’s double, as 4 and 1: in the class of minors, that one should be greater than the other by one thirty-sixth part, that is, one being 36 and the other 37: all beyond this is not had in contemplation.

Now to apply this to the present subject, the proportion of doubles, which they call the like proportion, is the primary and most pure of all. One instance of its exceeding purity and closeness to unity is this, that either side may be substituted for the other without prejudice to its harmony; that is to say, whether we employ the tone duplicate or the reverse, the thread of connexion is not broken, nor the tie of concord dissolved. For instance, the tone represented by 8 being double that represented by 4, if we substitute 8 for 4, and place it in union with the tone represented by 3, a harmonious interval is obtained from 8 and 3, although there is no primary concord between them: their harmony being in this wise, that 4, which is the half of 8, is in harmony with 3; or if, looking to the 3, we say 3 is half of 6, between which and 8 there is harmony, the same principle is educed; and on either supposition it resolves itself into the Diatessara interval. Or else, combining 5 with 3, a harmony is obtained which reduces itself to the Minor interval; for this reason, that by the minor interval there is a harmonious relation between 5 and 6, and 3 is the representative of 6. Or we might say it has the relation of Minor intervals with 21/2, and 5 is the representative of 21/2; all which species they call concordant by the secondary concordance. And here the intelligent reader will perceive that the Diapente interval is capable of being reduced to the Multiple, or interval of 4; as likewise, the Diatessara to the Diapente. For if, in the first way, we take 2 as a representative of 4, it (the Multiple) falls into the Diatessara; and if, in the second way, we take 3 as the representative of 6, it falls into the Diapente.

Another instance of pure and radical properties in the Diapason interval (the compartment of like in fact) is that both the intervals by which it is divided are means as well of arithmetical as of harmonical proportion. Now the meaning of arithmetical mean is that it is intermediary between two numbers, so that its ratio to both extremes, in respect of proximity and distance, is alike; like 4, which is intermediary between 6 and 2. And the meaning of harmonical mean is that it is a number, the ratio of whose excess over the lesser term is to the excess of the greater term over it, as is the ratio of the lesser term to the greater term; such as 4, which is harmonic mean between 3 and 6; for the excess of 4 over 3 is 1, and the excess of 6 over 4 is 2, and the ratio between 1 and 2 is as the ratio between 3 and 6.

The application of the first is this: the ratio of 4 to 2 is the Diapason interval; and when 3, which is the numeral mean, is introduced, two ratios arise; one between 2 and 3, which is the Diapente interval; the other between 3 and 4, which is the Diatessara interval. The application of the second is this: the ratio of 6 to 3 is the Diapason interval, and when 4, which is the harmonic mean, is introduced, two ratios arise, one the ratio of 4 to 3, which is the Diatessara interval, the other that of 4 to 6, which is the Diapente interval. From which particulars it is that we discover the reason of naming the duplicate ratio a Diapason [or all-pervading] interval; and that of naming the other two concordant ratios as above.

From these preliminaries it is clear that all the harmonious intervals come back to the proportion of similar ratios. For in the like in fact the measure of difference is like in reality; and in the like in effect it is like in operation, either through the properties of one of the two differing numbers, or by nature, or by mediary connexion, as has been explained. The element of harmony then is similarity, which is an image of unity.

Called; Diapason (through all) because the interval is equal in all the terms, or because all the other ratios are involved in this one; Progressional, because the difference the lesser term and the greater term are in Arithmetical progression (2 : 4 : 6); Multiple, because the lesser term is contained in the greater one more than twice (2+2+2=6); Diapente, because a distribution of five (2+3=5); Diatessara, because 4 is the ruling number; Hypertessara, because the interval becomes smaller than can be expressed by a fourth, &c.

IN consequence of the Translator having been obliged to use a system of orthography to which he was unaccustomed, the following inaccuracies have sometimes occurred in the spelling of Eastern names. E has been written for A, as Muhammedan for Muhammadan (passim), Alf Leil for Alf Lail. The long ū has been written oo, as Mansoor for Mansūr, Māmoon for Māmūn; í has been written ee, as Neeshāpor, and a few others.

P. 1, n. 1, add “The usual ejaculation (Bismillah, &c.) is intended to precede the first line, though omitted in both MSS. in the translator’s use.”

P. 6, n. 15. The person here intended is Ugurlú, the elder brother of Khalíl. He died at the same time with his father. (D’Herbelôt in Uzun.) Correct accordingly.

P. 8, n. 17, for “introduced the divisions” read “made constant use of the terms.”

P. 9, n. 19, after the words “physics and logic,” insert “with Euclid in geometry, with Ptolemy in astronomy,” and with, &c.

P. 11, n. 24. There are a few other instances of books similarly entitled, but all the rest are of a secondary class — Luāmi-u-Damshak, Lamaāt-u-Tahirín, Lamaāt-u-Núrāniāt.

P. 13, n. 25, add Ecclesiasticus xxxix. 21, “He hath made all things for their uses.”

Ibid. n. 26, cf. Psalm viii. 6.

P. 14, n. 27, add “In some of their traditions the jins or genii are represented as the civilizers of mankind, and their proceedings for this purpose described much in the same way as those of Prometheus in Æschylus. (Prom. Vinct.) Cf. Akhwān-u-Safā, chapter on the Enmity of Jins and Men.”

P. 15, n. 31, add Plato’s definition of the sun, “having life and soul eternal.” , P. 1.

P. 23, n. 43, erase the first two lines of this note, and substitute — “The words of Plato in his Theætetus, : also in his Phædrus, ,” &c.

Ib. n. 44, add “cf. p. 232, n. 112. Christians have been supplied with a practicable substitute. Thomas-à-Kempis’ work on Virtue is called ‘The Imitation of Christ.’”

P. 26, line 8, for “vitalized” read “revived.” Ib. 1. 13, note on perception: he alludes to the great question whether qualities originate in the process of sensation, or whether they really exist in the thing perceived.

P. 36, n. 71, add Jerem. xiii. 23, “Can the Æthiopian change his skin,” &c.

P. 37, n. 73, add the lines —

It was only on New Year’s Day, and after the performance of religious rites, that this virtue could be found in it.

P. 42, n. 79, add “Eternity of production is a standard point in the Peripatetic philosophy — hinted by Aristotle, and affirmed by Plato before him: . Laws, B. vi. ad fin.”

P. 43, n. 84, add “According to Gillie, Analysis c. ii. n. O, the doctrine of detrition and deposit was clearly expounded by Aristotle, Meteor. l. I. c. xiv. Cf. Wisd. of Sol. xix. 18—21.”

P. 44, n. 87, add “Aristotle: . Metaphys. iii. last chapter on Generation. (Grotius.)”

P. 46. Transpose note 90 to the end of the paragraph after n. 91. Quote Grotius De Ver. l. I. c. vii. ad fin. “Præterea, non ab æterno extitisse hominum genus, sed a certo tempore communem stirpi sumsisse originem, evincunt inter alia artium progressus. ” He quotes Lucretius, lib. v.

P. 61, n. 16, l. 3, print specific in italics (other essence not being contemplated). After the word “properly” (l. 10), insert — “the sources and so far” the subject, &c.

P. 67, n. 3, prefix Cic. Off. i. 6. “Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit.”

P. 72, n. 9, add Job xxxiv. 14, 15. “If he gather unto himself his spirit and his breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again into dust.”

P. 73, l. 2, note a reference to p. 276, n. 6.

P. 99, n. 2, add “Aristotle, again, took up the theory only as a department of the great Pythagorean doctrine, which referred all being to a contest of contraries: .” Metaphys. i. 5. p. 846. (Gillie.)

P. 102, l. 19. To the words, “Hell is a circle,” note Plato’s description of Hades from the vision of Er, Rep. x. ad fin.; to which all passages of the Kurān on similar subjects bear great resemblance. Among other things he describes the souls as wearing symbols of their sentences: .

P. 103, n. 8, add “Dante too begins his allegory as having missed his path.”

P. 118, l. 2, for “as” read “since.”

P. 121, n. 16, add Wisd. of Sol. xix. 18. “For the elements were changed in themselves by a kind of harmony, like as in a psaltery notes change the name of a tune, and yet are always sounds.”

P. 124, n. 21. This law of being may be collected from Locke on Uneasiness, Ess. B. II. c. xxi. ss. 31—40; and Butler on Habits, Anal. Part I. c. v. s. 2.

P. 128, l. 2, note: “In Akhlāk-i-Nāsiry iii. 3. this aphorism is attributed to Ardshír Bābak. Cf. in Conclusion ad fin.”

Ib. n. 26, for “a human assertion,” read “human and more limited assertion. Written and unwritten law are commonly known as law and morals.”

Ib. n. 27, add reference to Herodotus, iii. 8.

P. 136, n. 41, add “see in n. 20, p. 324.”

P. 140, n. 47, add “This was the opinion of the primitive fathers, and particularly of Justin Martyr. Exhort. ad Græc. (Dr. Ad. Clarke’s Succession.)”

P. 141, l. 1, add “See in Introduction, p. 12, &c. Cf. Jer. Taylor, Holy Liv. I. i. 2. ‘God is pleased to esteem it for part of his service, if we eat and drink, so it be done temperately, and as may best preserve our health; that our health may enable our services to him: and there is not one minute of our lives but we are or may be doing the work of God, even then when we most of all serve ourselves.’”

P. 152, n. 11, add “Kurān c. xlii. v. 52.”

P. 156, n. 4, add “Fāriāby in the 4th century, (Hij.) was an accomplished musician; but then he was notoriously indifferent to forms of religion.”

P. 167, n. 21, cf. Proverbs xxvii. 5, 6.

P. 180, n. 19, cf. Proverbs xxvi. 12.

P. 192, n. 33, cf. Proverbs xi. 2. Ecclesiasticus x. 9, et seq.

P. 200, n. 50, cf. Ecclesiastes iii. 11.

P. 201, n. 51, cf. Proverbs xvi. 32.

P. 220, n. 89, cf. Ecclesiasticus xli. 3, 4.

P. 221, l. 9, for “his” read “our.”

P. 229, n. 107, add “For in the text, perhaps we should read — and then instead of ‘any matter (as of food,)’ we should have ‘any of their perceptions,’ in the version.”

P. 252, n. 3, “lay at a distance” are the words of Gillie.

P. 253, n. 7, add “Ecclesiasticus xxvi. 29.”

P. 255, n. 11, add “Proverbs xi. 26.”

P. 257, n. 16, add “Cf. Proverbs xviii. 16. xix. 6.”

P. 271, n. 18, cf. Ecclesiasticus xxv. 25.

P. 273, n. 21, before “separation” insert “temporary.”

P. 287, n. 23, cf. Ecclesiasticus xlii. 9, 11.

P. 305, n. 2, cf. Ecclesiasticus xxxiii. 30, 31.

P. 312, n. 2, add, “After Aristotle, Natural. Auscult. l. VIII. c. x. p. 422 — ‘The heavenly bodies appear to perform their motions exempt from the vicissitudes of renovation and decay.’”

P. 361, n. 47, add Nizāmy’s poetical application of this doctrine to the fortunes of Darius:

P. 370, n. 9, add “Plato, Ep. vii. .”

P. 380, l. 5, note reference to Job vi. 15, 17.

P. 382, n. 6, add Job xxxviii. 14, “It is turned as clay to the seal.”

P. 394, l. 20, insert this note between ns. 19 and 20: “Prevention of wrong is recognised as the proper end of punishment. Among other wrongs, however, they would include private violations of morality and ritual; uniting, if not identifying, the civil and ecclesiastical theories.”

P. 395, l. 4, insert next to the above — “Truncation of the right hand, for instance, is the legal punishment for theft, which a person so punished can commit no more. See an ancient vestige of the idea in Job xxxi. 22. The practice may be combated on its own grounds, as it renders a man useless to the community, and incapable of retrieving his offence. As a bonâ fide substitute for capital punishment, its propriety is only to be questioned on the ground of its influence on society — its tendency to harden and deprave men’s feelings, or prevent their amelioration. On the other hand, among a ferocious and improvident people no salutary impression is to be made except by these appalling means. Hence the barbarity of early punishment, such as stoning among the Hebrews, Arabs, and Greeks — hurling from a precipice at Rome, &c. &c. With the progress of refinement it ought to disappear, for a twofold reason: 1. As the requisite impression may now be produced by milder means. 2. As the feelings are more likely to be injured by such exhibitions.”

P. 396, l. 15, insert the following note: “The foundation of private rights we had at p. 124, (n. 21,) here we have their limitation. — Rights exist before society, but are mutually compressed, as soon as society commences, in order to make room for each other. In return for this privation, others are bestowed of greater value; namely, public and political rights. This is not all the benefit of society; for it immeasurably multiplies the number of recipients. The population of the British isles is now 25,000,000; before they were civilized it could not have been a quarter of a million. Thus 99 out of every 100 persons owe existence itself, as well as the quality of existence, to the social state.”

P. 401, l. 3, note: “It appears from Exodus v. 1, 6, 15, that the communication between Pharaoh and the Hebrews was indeed much more direct and open than the Eastern people of a later age were accustomed to see it, as regarded their own princes; and this may have given rise to the impression as above; though the fact would be owing, not to the disposition of the prince, but the habits of the empire: government then exhibiting more resemblance to its primitive or patriarchal state.”

ABSENCE of mind, 190.

Abstinence, enforced, 224; how to be acquired, ibid.; excessive, to be avoided, 29, 172.

Abuse, condemned, 442; punishable, 397.

Access to princes, its importance, 399; its difficulty, 400, n., 269, n., 401.

Acid, its hostility to minerals, 332.

Action, essential to wisdom, 21, — to virtue, 66. (See Practice.) Rules for, in speaking, 290.

Active, see Power and School.

Adulation, to be avoided — towards princes, 419—424, — towards friends, 433.

Affection, source of creation, 145. (See Love and Mercy.) By some identified with consistence, 330; held to circulate, 331; necessary where unity subsists, 330; not without mind, 331; human, twofold, 332; spontaneous, of four sorts, 333; from natural affinity, 425; supersedes equity, 144, 329; a wider term than friendship, 334, 352; perfect, what, 336; for good, the only permanent, 333, 339, 345, 349, 355; between parties, (see Relation.) May terminate at different times, 343.

Affinity, spiritual, 81, 303; relative, 426; magical, 229; source of spontaneous affection, 426.

Age, respect to, 281.

Agriculture, its importance, 254, 389; a source of income, 252; compared with other sources, 253, n.

Air, its functions, 389.

Alacrity, what, — recommended, 158.

Alms-giving, a part of ritual, 257, n.; its efficacy, 259.

Ambition, its effect on character, 431.

Amputation, metaphorical, 249, 395; literal, 395; considered, Addenda ad fin.

Amulets, their use, how ancient, 230, n.

Ancient (writers), what, 8, n.

Angels, immaterial, 15; compared with man, 19, 234; worship him, 316; outposts of, 338; witness creation, 259; converse with God, ibid., 456.

Anger, (see Power, vindictive.) Seated in the heart, 201, n.; ineradicable, 157, 184, 206; entire suppression of, not desirable, 184, n., 205; defined, described, cured, 181, et seq.; causes and consequences of, 184; most formidable in the gentle, 183; a sort of madness, 185, 201; bars adjudication, 183, et seq.; different degrees of, liability to, 182, — of kings, long-lived, 209.

Animals, how far homogeneous with men, 79, 80, 160; how far heterogeneous, 85, 93, 79, 176; their place in being, 118, 316; their natural perfection, 178; provision for procreation of, 146; gregarious or otherwise, 317; appearance of, why uniform, 85.

Appearance, on what it depends, 85.

Application, in excess, a vice of reason, 171.

Aptitude, innate, 284, 285, n.; how and why determined, ib., 320, n.; to be always consulted, ib., 307, 310, 448.

Art, a derivative of nature, 147; its processes, ib.

Artfulness, what, and whence, 171.

Arts, inventions (under revelation), 45; from what faculty, 54; how to be acquired, 152; all comprised in that of government, 328.

Arrogance, description and cure of, 192.

Assault, a public wrong, 397.

Astrology, practice and rationale of, 285, n., 361.

Astronomy, æras in Muhammedan, 6, 11, n., 219, n.

Attack, public, rules for, see War; private, 445.

Attraction, of cohesion, 233, 234, n.; of affinity, 330, 332, 426; of temperament, 229, 426.

Attributes, divine, 2, 116, 306; human, defined, 38.

Audience, public, 399. See Access.

Authority, (see Prince, Government.) Twin of right, 457; wears out, 196; how to be exercised, 399.

Avarice, 143; destructive to the character, 282.

Balance, a sacred symbol of equity, 128, n.; of powers, see Equipoise.

Ban, of the Arabs, 444.

Banishment, what, and for what purpose, 394.

Barrenness in wives, to be avoided, 263.

Barter, see Interchange.

Battery, a public wrong, 397.

Beauty, on what depending, 117, 122, 232; an advantage, 306; how perishable, 187; in a wife, 264, — dangerous, ib.; of truth, 237, — of the Persians’ God, 306.

Being, its two processes, 363, 364, n.

Benedictions, how and when used, 50, n.

Benefits, political, three species of, 396; limitation to, 408.

Bigotry, a vice of reason, 171.

Birds, Arab fables concerning, 28, n.

Blood, the vehicle of life, 181.

Body, no essential part of being, 212, 2, n., — but of nature, 408. (See Soul.) Composed of discordant elements, 335; how, 216, 315. (See Temperament, Humours, Life.) Influence of on mind, 157, 173, 338; influenced by mind, ib., 207; may be practically discarded, 337. (See Death.) Not entirely, ib.

Boldness, a species of courage, 71.

Bounty, 408. See Charity, Benefaction.

Bridge of good works, 103.

Brotherhood, a species of equity, 81.

Brothers, regard of, precarious, 348.

Cadence, on what depending, 117.

Calamity of enemies, no subject for joy, 443.

Caliphat, properly or loosely, what, 5, n., 378, n.; powers of, how distributed, 136.

Caliphs, four first, 379, n.

Capital, insecure, 253.

Caste, traces of, 37, n., 238, 374, n.

Censure, its use, 248, 277; its danger, 278.

Chamberlain (Hajāb), his office and influence, 134, 269.

Character, unalterable, 38, 46, 48, — how formed, 155, 381, 454.

Charity, (see Alms.) Its relation to equity, 143, — only from our own goods, 144.

Cheerfulness, 158; how placed, 238.

Children, their procreation provided for, 150; value of, 6, 263, n.; when humanized, 151; rules for the education of, 275; often disappoint us, 216; to be early settled, 286; care less for their parents than these for them, 347.

Christianity, unconsciously defended, 23, 144, 232, 357.

Chronology, Asiatic, 404, n.

City, how meant, 321; depends on territory, 408. See State.

Classes, of mankind, 367, et seq. (See State, Pests.) Of the good but one, of the bad infinite, 365.

Clay, habit of eating, 382, n. See Addenda.

Clearness of understanding, a species of wisdom, 69.

Clumsiness, 171.

Collectedness, a species of courage, 70.

Commendable, a term for proper and right, 52, 71, et passim.

Commendation, when and why bestowed, 67, — as an instrument of guidance, 248, 277.

Commerce, its importance, 389.

Companions of Muhammad, 4.

Company, its influence, 155, 381.

Complaisance towards wives, how and why to be observed, 265.

Concealment of offences, not to be calculated on, 211, 278, 280.

Conceit, dangers of, 160; cure of, 186.

Condescension, a species of courage, 72.

Conjecture, the characteristic of secondary intellects, 369; Hindus noted for, 311.

Conscience, 215, n.

Consequences, general — law of, applied, 191, 396, 436, 447, n.; particular, to be well considered, 445.

Contemplation, one of the roads to wisdom, 14, 159. See Absence.

Contemporaries, their influence, 381.

Content, a species of temperance, 74, 238.

Contentiousness, a vice of reason, 171; its misehief, 191, 386. See Disagreement.

Continence, a species of temperance, 73.

Contraries, pass into each other, 17, 116; irreconcilable, 175; how virtues of each other. (See Excess and Deficiency.) How virtues of the vices, 99, 170.

Coolness, a species of courage, 71; its value, 425.

Co-operation, of means, with natural processes, 313, — of three sorts, ib., — of every thing with man, 315, — of men with each other, 318.

Cordiality, a species of equity, 82, 157.

Corporeality, 338. See Body.

Counterfeit virtues, 88, et seq.

Courage, how derived, 55, 57, 151, 164; defined, 65; its species, 69; necessitates liberality, 77; counterfeits of, 93.

Court, its decorum, 134, — etiquette, 270, 417, 419, — favour, 426; use of attendance on, 419; dangers of, 418, 425.

Courteousness, 452.

Covetousness, in private persons, 283, 422, 431, — in princes, 200, 383, 455.

Cowardice, a generic vice, 109.

Creation, its object, 415, — process, 358, et seq.

Crimes and misdemeanours, distinction between, 398.

Culture (moral), subject of, (see Powers); object of, (see Vice-regence); course of, 148, et seq.; should imitate production, ib.; details of, (see Proprieties); when commences, 276.

Cup of Jamshíd, 38, n. See Addenda.

Cure, different modes of, 174; mental, details of, 169, et seq.