24. Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General, Hyder­abad,

Sir Charles Napier’s explanation and defence.

July, 3rd, 1843:— . . . . “Another charge against me I find to be that my ‘continued march upon Hyderabad, in spite of the advice of Major Outram, was that which forced the Ameers to war.’ I certainly did reject Major Outram’s advice, because I soon saw that he was grossly deceived by the Ameers. I had several proofs of this, one or two of which I now feel it right to state to your Lordship:—1. Major Outram, being at Hyderabad, sent me two or three despatches by express on the 12th to assure me that the Ameers had not any armed men except their usual personal attendants, and that these were not more numerous than Indian priuces of their rank would move with in time of profound peace. At that moment the army of the Ameers was assembled at Meeanee, only 6 miles from Hyderabad, and were preparing their position! At the moment he was writing these despatches to me, his house was surrounded by 8000 Beloochees (who had 8 pieces of cannon) preparing for their attack on him, on the 15th of February. 2. Major Outram wrote to ask me to go to Hyderabad alone to meet the Ameers. 3. He proposed my sending my troops to Meerpore. Had 1 allowed myself to be guided by Major Outram, my own throat and his, and the throats of all with us, would probably have been cut, and the army left without a leader at Meerpore, 40 miles from the river, which formed our line of communication by steamers with Sukkur and Bombay, and with the friendly territory of H. H. Ali Moorad, which extended south as far as Now­shera; when thus isolated, the army would have been attacked by 60,000 men, pushed back upon the Desert, and there have miserably perished. As Major Outram had lived many years at the court of Hyderabad and every one spoke of his “great local knowledge of the Ameers and of this country,” while I was a perfect stranger to both, I might well have been excused, had I allowed myself to have been guided by Major Outram; and his advice was pressed upon me with all the zeal inspired by honesty of purpose, added to an ardent disposition. But my spies brought intelligence that 30000 men were in my front; some said 40000. I concluded that these spies exaggerated numbers, but it was clear to my mind that the Beloochees were above 20000 men, and in sufficient numbers to make them believe that their victory would be certain. Therefore I argued that Major Outram’s report was wrong, that he was deceived and ignorant of what was passing about him. His proposal to march the troops to Meerpore made me think that he understood very little of war; I therefore paid no attention to his suggestions. I put all my sick and treasure on board a steamer and resolved to attack the enemy. If we were beaten, we had plenty of provisions, and with our backs to the river (for retreat would have been disastrous) and the steamers, I could have entrenched myself till reinforcements arrived. I had full confidence in the troops and little feared an undisciplined multitude; but still the game was not an easy one, and I have shown that, had I taken Outram’s advice, as I was reproached for not having done, a second Cabool massacre would probably have taken place. One would have imagined that the attack on the Residency would have, at least, opened Outram’s eyes to the treachery of the characters he had to deal with. Not a bit; he joined me on the 16th at Muttaree and still wanted me to delay my attack for a day! Yet, six hours delay would have added 24,000 men to the forces of the Ameers at Meeanee. It is true that I had no positive information of this at the moment; but I was sure of it from the letter I found on the Murree Chief Hyat Khan, whom I had seized. In this letter the Ameers pressed the Murrees to join on the 9th. Now, I knew that these barbarians would not leave their villages while the feast of the Moharram lasted. It was to finish on the 11th; therefore I guessed how fast they would gather after that day, and I sesolved not to lose an hour. If my conduct be attacked in the House of Commons, I think the foregoing statement will be a sufficient defence. I am not conscious of having erred in rejecting Major Outram’s advice. Outram’s answer will be “there would not have been war.” The Ameers answered this on the 15th; but suppose not; was I to place the army at their mercy to spare or destroy, as they pleased? Their mercy! I have it in proof that about the time Major Outram kept assuring me of their pacific feelings and disposition towards us, they had sent orders along both banks of the Indus to their people “to kill every Englishman, woman and child they could lay their hands upon.” We should have received the tender mercies of the Afghans in the Tezeen Pass. The mercy which Outram would have received himself, but for my forebodings and sending him the light company of the 22nd Regiment.”

Evidence in fovour of Sir Charles Napier’s line of conduct.

25. Evidence given by Peer Budroodeen, confidential servant of the ex-Ameer Sobdar Khan of Hyderabad:—

“Q.—On what date did the army of the Ameers leave Hyderabad?

A.—On the 6th of February 1843, the troop under the command of Gholam Mahomed Komriewalla and Mir Khan Mahomed Talpoor (Khananie) went out and encamped in the Babool Jungle near Meer Futteh Ali Kebah. The two chiefs then returned to Hyderabad and told Meer Nusseer Khan to get all in readiness for battle. Afterwards the force collected there, and chiefs as they arrived remained there. On the evening of the 14th February 1843, Meer Nusseer Khan moved out and joined their force. In the morning, an order was issued to plunder Major Outram’s dwelling.

Q.—Who commanded this party?

A.—Meer Shadad commanded the party and by him was given the order to plunder the agency; and Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore, Meer Jehan Mahomed, Meer Khan Mahomed, Gholam Mahomed Komriewalla, a Nizamanee chief, whose name I forget, Ahmed Khan Lugharee, Meerza Bakur, and other inferior chiefs accompanied him.

Q.—When Major Outram quitted the agency, what did the troops (Sinde) do?

A.—They plundered all the property left and burnt all the buildings. They then joined Meer Nusseer Khan at the garden and Meer Shadad Khan and the aforenamed chiefs said “we have gained a victory; Major Outram has fled, and we have plun­dered his property. Our party have behaved most bravely.” Meer Shadad sent a man to give the news of his victory to Meer Sobdar Khan in the fort, and to inform him that Major Outram had fled. Meer Sobdar, on hearing this, answered “you have done ill. If with 8000 men you have been unable to destroy 100 men, what will you be able to do in front of the General’s army?” On the evening of the 15th of February Meer Nusseer Khan moved from his garden and took up a position at Noonar, half a coss from it; and on the evening of the 16th he reached Meeanee; next morning the battle took place.

Q.—Was Meer Sobdar in the battle (of Meeanee) and what Ameers were there?

A.—Meers Sobdar and Mahomed Khan were not in the battle. Except these two, all Ameers of Upper and Lower Sinde were there. . . . .

Q.—Did Meer Sobdar Khan send information to the General that troops were collecting at Hyderabad?

A.—On the night of the day on which the General reached Sukkurund (10th February) Meer Sobdar called me and said ‘Take two days’ food and drink and proceed by the jungle to the General’s camp; and tell him, if he comes quickly, it is well; but if he delays, the force here will very greatly increase.’ Jamadar Coura said ‘Budroodeen is a great man. If he goes it will be well-known, and you will get a bad name; it will be better if some one else is sent.’ I after­wards heard that orders were given to Syad Abbas Ali Shah and a Cazee to proceed to the General’s camp and to beg of him to come on quickly. . . . .

Q.—When did the Ameers commence collecting troops?

A.—When Meerza Khoosroo returned from the General they commenced doing so. Meerza Khoosroo wrote from Now­shera to the Ameers: ‘The General is bent upon war, so get ready’ When the Meerza returned to Hyderabad, the order for collecting troops was given. . . . E. J. Brown.”

26. The Governor-General in Council to the Secret

Monthly allowances for the ex-Amírs at Poona and of their ladies at Haidarabad.

Committee, August, 14, 1843:— . . . . “We transmit for your consideration certain memorials which the ex-Ameers have addressed to us from Sinde; but we consider it unnecessary to make any observations upon them. Sir C. Napier’s indignant refutation of the calumnious charges brought against himself and the gallant troops whom he commands will be sufficient to satisfy you that the Ameers are without truth. The ladies of the Zenana in Sinde have consented to receive a monthly allowance of Rs. 4,500 for their maintenance and we have temporarily fixed the allowance of the ex-Ameers at Sassoor at Rs. 15,000 per mensem, subject to future revision.”