YOUR letter, dated the last day [or 29th] of Extra Ahmedy,* has passed under our view, and its purport is duly understood. An answer has been written, on all points, in our Hindivy letter, to which you are referred for particulars.

The villainy and bad faith which they* have manifested, in spite of the most solemn engagements, is abundantly well known. Upon what grounds then, [or, with what confidence,] can we, all at once, send thither a large sum of money? Noor Mahommed Khân has been sent for by us, merely for the purpose of our ascertaining [through him] their treaties and engagements, and with no other view. You must state this matter distinctly to Râo Râsta, and, removing all suspicions of a different ten­dency from his mind, dispatch Noor Mahommed Khân to the Presence; and if [at the same time] they should [think proper to] be very urgent for your departure also, assuredly you, too, must repair hither.

You write, “that Râo Râsta observed to you, on occasion of the “siege of Nergûnd having been raised, that if the orders for that mea­sure had been previously communicated to his government, according “to his suggestion, such a proceeding would have had the best effect, as “it would have tended to strengthen his hands in the management of “the negociation; but as things had happened, they bore a very ungra­cious appearance, inasmuch as he had been led to declare repeatedly “to the minister,* in the most positive manner, that if the Mahrattah “army ventured to meet ours they would inevitably be put to shame; “whereas, in fact, the very reverse of all this had taken place, to his “great disturbance and confusion.”

It is known. We have not deviated a hair’s breadth from the sugges­tions of Râo Râsta: nor, though we have raised the siege [of Nergûnd,] has there been any deficiency,* on our part, in chastising the enemy’s army. This is a fact of such abundant notoriety as not to require any other evidence. What more?

It is not easy to conceive, what motive the Sultan could have for addressing his agents on any occasion in the Hindivy, rather than in the Persian language; in which last, it may be safely presumed that he usually conveyed his written orders to such of his servants as understood it. It could not be with a view to secrecy; since a Hindivy letter, supposing it to fall into improper hands, would at least be as generally intelligible as a Persian one. Possibly the Hindivy letter, referred to in the present instance, might have been dispatched, for the express purpose of being communicated to Râo Râsta; though, in this case, some intimation of that design would, it may be thought, have been given in the Persian letter. But whatever the reason of the proceeding under consideration might be, it is proper to observe, that it was not confined to the present occasion, or to the persons of the envoys at Poonah; since other examples of the practise in question will be met with in the course of this work.

It would seem, by the second paragraph of the foregoing letter, that some sinister interpretation had been put by the court of Poonah, or at least by Râo Râsta, upon the desire expressed by the Sultan for the return of Noor Mahommed Khân. What the particular nature of the suspicions entertained on this occasion by the Mahrattahs was, does not appear; but it is not improbable, that, they may have apprehended the real object of the envoy’s recal to be connected with some secret intrigue of the Sultan’s at Poonah: nor is it likely, that the latter’s disavowal of any improper view in the matter would have the effect of removing those doubts or fears; especially, as the two states were now at open war. Be this as it may, it is certain that Noor Mahommed Khân did not, at this time, obtain leave to obey the summons of his master; and that, both he and his colleague, were detained at Poonah, till the month of May in the following year.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with the details of this war, to be enabled to decide between the opposite pretensions of Râo Râsta and of Tippoo Sultan, re­specting the success of the earlier operations of it. It is clear, however, that the Sultan had, at this period, been compelled to relinquish the siege of Nergûnd, by the menacing position of the Mahrattah army, and that Râo Râsta was not to be persuaded, that the measure had been adopted purely at his instance. The truth, indeed, would appear to be, that, hitherto, no material advantage had been obtained by either side.