LETTER CXXXVII.
To the same; dated from SERINGAPATAM, 6th ZUBURJUDY. (15th October.)

YOUR two letters, of the 2d and 5th of Zuburjudy,* have been re­ceived, and their contents are duly understood. We enclose two Pur­wânehs, one for the Aumil of Hybutpoor, the other for the Aumil of Koondnoor, directing them each to dispatch a thousand goonies of grain* to that person of mighty degree.* You will forward these Purwânehs to their address; and, on receiving the two thousand goonies of grain, dispatch the same to Zuferâbâd. Your wounded you are to send to Hy­butpoor, the Aumil of which place has been written to respecting them. Of the two surgeons with you, one must accompany the wounded to Hybutpoor: the other will remain with you.

A hundred Clashies* have been sent to you from the Presence: a thousand bundles of cartridges have likewise been dispatched. Your detachment took with it, in their cartridge-boxes, forty-eight thousand musket-cartridges, besides fifteen thousand spare cartridges, making together sixty-three thousand cartridges. You write, “that you have “not remaining more than from fifteen to twenty cartridges in each “cartouch-box:” at this rate, the expenditure of cartridges has been very great. We are curious to know, and desire you will inform us, how many of the enemy have been sent to hell, by the expenditure of such a number of cartridges. We also desire to be informed of the amount of the rebel force. One hundred of your men being wounded, no doubt great numbers of the enemy must have been killed and wounded.

It is truly wonderful, that you, whose pen was employed in describing, in the Futhûl’ Mûjâhideen, the mode of making war in a close and woody country, should, at the moment of your being yourself engaged in conducting a similar warfare, have forgotten the rules there laid down. If you had carried on your operations according to those rules, you would never have sustained the loss you have done.*

With respect to your reiterated representations of the expediency of our repairing, in person, to that quarter, we answer, that (God willing) we shall shortly arrive there with an inconsiderable force, with which we trust we shall be enabled utterly to kill and destroy the enemy.

Now that you are about to proceed with grain, and other supplies, to Zuferâbâd, be mindful to regulate your march according to the rules laid down in the Futhûl’ Mûjâhideen for operations in a close country; and to conduct the convoy, with circumspection, to its destination.

OBSERVATIONS.

It may be inferred, from the foregoing dispatch, that Zynûl Aabideen had received rather a serious check from the Koorgs. This conjecture derives the more support, from the circumstance of the Sultan’s judging it necessary to pro­ceed in person against the insurgents. I have, at this time, no means of ascertain­ing what force he actually took with him on this occasion; but though he affected to make so light of the business, it is not probable that he would put any thing to hazard, by proceeding against such a determined enemy with a very inconsider­able force. I am ignorant of the sequel of Zynûl Aabideen’s history. It is, however, probable, that the Sultan did not again entrust him with the management of the sword, but confined him, for the future, to the exercise of his pen.

It seems impossible, that any thing, like that nice sense of honour which usually distinguishes persons of a liberal education, and particularly those of the military profession, should have existed in an army (or indeed in any other branch of a government) the superior officers of which were accustomed to be addressed by their sovereign in such coarse and degrading language, as that adopted by Tippoo Sultan in expressing his occasional disapprobation of their conduct; accordingly, few, if any, men of superior birth or elevated sentiments were ever known to have appeared amongst the higher classes of his subjects. These classes, in fact, were almost exclusively composed of persons of humble origin, and mere adven­turers; who having been trained in implicit submission to the will of a cruel and unprincipled tyrant, could not be expected to exhibit any portion of that loftiness of spirit or generosity of disposition, which still adorn many of the genuine descendants of the ancient nobility of the Moghul empire; and would still make them spurn at any action, by whomsoever commanded, which they thought incompatible with their habitual notions of honour, or with the obligations of family pride. It was not so with the nobles (if nobles they might be called) of Tippoo Sultan’s court. They were, on all occasions, the passive instruments of the irmaster; at whose nod they were used to murder, betray, and pillage, cer­tainly without remonstrance, and, most probably, equally without repugnance.

But however deficient this order of men may have been in the species of spirit and honor which we have been considering, they would not appear to have been wanting in fidelity to his government, not to say attachment to his person. With this last sentiment, it was not, perhaps, in the nature of things, that a man of his harsh and unconciliating disposition should he capable of inspiring them:* but their general character of loyalty must be allowed to have been unimpeachable. To what degree this adherence to him might proceed from a real sense of duty and gratitude, is a question not easy of decision. No doubt, some of his principal servants might have been, and probably were, influenced by such motives: yet, I confess, I am of opinion, that it was owing less to considerations of this kind, than to the precautions adopted by the Sultan for its prevention, that so few instances of defection occurred among them, during the different wars in which he was engaged. It was his practice to oblige all the chief officers of state, and others holding employments of material trust, to fix the residence of their families permanently in Seringapatam; from whence their removal, without his knowledge and concurrence, became impossible. This expedient may be easily conceived to have had the effect of confirming the fidelity of many, who might otherwise have been prompted, by discontent, or other reasons, to quit Mysore. But if this miserable policy answered the Sultan’s immediate purpose, it also promoted one, which he little contemplated at the period of its adoption. The final conquest and settlement of Tippoo Sultan’s dominions by the English, was facilitated by nothing so much, as the circumstance of the families of most of the principal men of the country having fallen into their hands, along with the fortress of Seringapatam.