§ XV.—RECAPITULATION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE DABISTAN.

Thus I have indicated the principal contents of the Dabistán. Considering the philosophic opinions touched upon, we may remark that truth, although in different times and places variously colored, veiled, sometimes mutilated, often running into falsehood, is nevertheless widely diffused, inasmuch as it reappears in the concurring declarations of the great­est thinkers of all times. Thus, among the notions of the Asiatics, we find implied the sense of the <Greek> (entelechia) of Aristotle, this untranslatable word,* which however can but signify “some con­tinued and perennial motion,* activity, moving force, perfection, principle of things”* —we find time and space, the necessary substrata of all our notions, as taught by the Kantians—the want of substantial reality in the objects of senses, main­tained by the sceptics in general—the prototypes and ideas of the Pythagoreans and Platonists—the necessary connections of all things of the Stoics— the atomic doctrine of Moschus, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles, etc.—the universality of sensa­tion and life of the Hermetites—the preformation and pre-existence of the soul, alleged by Synesius, Leibnitz, and others—the successive transformation, transmigration, gradual perfection of beings; the periodical renovation of the world professed by many Greek schools—the palingenesis of Bonnet—the one and the all of Parmenides, Plotinus, Synesius, Spi­noza, not to omit the refined Egoismus of Fichte, etc., etc. I shall not proceed further in the enu­meration of opinions ascribed in the Dabistán to different sects, and reproduced in the doctrine of celebrated ancient and modern philosophers of Europe. Who will realize that criterion of true phi­losophy indicated by the great Leibnitz, namely, that which would at once collect and explain the fragments of truth scattered through all, and apparently the most incongruous, systems?

This is perhaps the prize to be gained, not by one mortal, but by a series of generations, in a laborious task, so often interrupted and recommenced, but never abandoned. The struggle of the human mind is without term, but not without aim. We see two principal movers of human intellect—PHILOSO­PHY and RELIGION. The one employs reason as a sufficient power for the solution of a solvable problem, which comprehends knowledge, morality, and civilisation. The other distrusts reason, and relies upon a supernatural power for the revelation of a secret, or for the word of an enigma, which relates to a destination beyond the bounds of this world. The philosopher, self-confident, is liable to error for various reasons; but always capable of correction and improvement, in the only possible way, that of self-activity, the virtuous exertions of his faculties towards attainable perfection in his whole condition. The religionist is exposed to deception by his gratuitous faith in superhuman guidance, and, if mistaken, is precluded from regress and improvement by his essential virtue, fidelity; that is, the pious surrender of his soul to a spiritual and mystical sovereignty. The Dabistán shows us more religionists than philosophers; it is the school of sects, or rather that of inveterate superstition, with which, in spite of the correctives which human nature affords to its errors, the general character of the Asiatics remains stamped, from time immemorial to the present day.

Although the twelve chapters of the Dabistán bear the titles of as many religions, the author says himself, at the end of his work, that there are only five great religions—those of the Hindus, Persians, Jews, Nazareans, and Muselmans. He no where mentions the Egyptians nor the Chinese, apparently because, in his times and long before, no trace of the Egyptian religion existed, although it certainly had once occupied a great circle of influence, and because the Chinese creed was known to be Bud­dhism.

The five religions mentioned constitute indeed so many bases, upon which the whole creed of mankind has been, and remains founded. They comprise, in general, polytheism and monotheism. In all times and places, the religion of the “Enlightened” was distin­guished from that of the “Vulgar;” the first as interior, being the product of universal reason, was every where nearly uniform; the second, as exte­rior, being composed of particular and arbitrary rites and ceremonies, varied according to the influ­ence of the climate, and the character, history, and civilisation of a people. But, in the course of time, no religion remained entirely the same, either in principle or form. Polytheism, by mere simplifi­cation, tended to monotheism; this itself, in its awful incomprehensibility, was modified according as it originated, or assumed its notions, from anthro­pomorphism, hylozoism, spiritualism, or pantheism, Nor did any religion remain simple and pure, as proceeding from only one principle; all religious ideas, elemental, sidereal, allegorical, symbolical, mystical, philosophical, and others were mixed, as well as all sorts of worship interwoven. It is now impossible to range in chronological order their rise and transition into different forms. Still the one or the other of these kinds predominated: thus physiolatry, or “the adoration of personified nature,” in India; astrolatry, or “the worship of stars,” in Arabia and Iran; none of the religions entirely dis­claimed monotheism, which was positively and exclu­sively professed in Judaism, Christianity, and Muhammedanism.

Magism and the three last-named religions were founded or modified by holy personages, or prophets, that is, by individuals whose historical existence in more or less remote times is positively fixed; Hinduism alone acknowledges Manu as an ideal or mythological person, whose laws are however derived from Brahma himself. This may perhaps be assumed as a proof of its remotest antiquity; and India, having been less disturbed by invasions, and conquered in much later times by foreign nations, preserved its institutes complete in their originality. There is scarcely a tenet to be found in any other creed which does not, at least in its germ, exist in the Hindu religion.

It is most remarkable that, although men revered as divine messengers of religion have existed, still the works containing the heaven-sent doctrine are, either not at all or not incontestably, ascribed to them; and in any case devolved upon posterity in a more or less corrupted and mutilated state; so as to entail for ever an inexhaustible subject of dispute, a heavy task for belief, and severe trial of faith. If the Vedas are the best preserved, it is to no general purpose, inasmuch as they are the least known and most obscure. These facts the author of the Dabistán has set in full light, and says,* as it were to tranquillise mankind with regard to the multifarious inheritance of their prophets: “The varieties and multitudes of the rules of prophets proceed only from the plurality of names; and as in names there is no mutual opposition or contra­diction, the superiority in rank among them is only the predominance of a name. To this I sub­join another passage, although it occurs in connec­tion with another subject:* The time of a prophet is a universal one, having neither priority nor posteriority—neither morning nor evening:” that is, if I understand these words: As the same sun ever shines upon us, so shines the same wisdom of all times, incorruptible in its divine source.

If we take a rapid comparative view of the princi­pal features of the five religions mentioned, we find emanation of all beings, intellectual and material, from one great source, to be the fundamental and charac­teristic dogma of Hinduism, established and developed in the most explicit and positive manner. The division of supernatural beings in good and bad is adopted in the five religions, but in Magism it is of a somewhat different origin: for Ahriman and his host are not rebellious or fallen good genii; they are an original creation. A primitive innocence and posterior corruption is generally believed; but by the Hindus as coming from riches and abundance, by the other nations as caused by seduction of the bad spirits. The destruction of mankind by a deluge is no part of the Persian creed; it occurs in the Indian as one of the past periodical renovations of the world, which are to be followed by others, and is also admitted by the Persians, whilst the Jews, Christians, and Muhammedans believe a deluge not very ancient, as a punishment of human depravity. Incarnations of the Deity for the benefit of mankind, are believed only by Hindus and Christians; to the latter belongs exclusively the dogma of a propitiatory sacrifice. Human souls, immaterial, have pre-existence according to the Vedas and the Zand-Avesta; in the first, as parts of the Divinity; in the latter, as created in their fervers, or “pre-established ideals” at the beginning of the world. Transmigration is taught in the sacred books of the Hindus and Persians. The immortality of the soul, reserved to future beatitude or damnation, is maintained generally, less positively, by the ancient Jews; the righteous are cheered by the prospect of the same heaven, the wicked threat­ened by the same punishments, which are held to be eternal by Christians and Muhammedans; the Hindus and Persians place the future life in a long series of purifications or purgatories, leading, how­soever late, finally to heaven, to which, according to the first, the most perfect only are admitted immediately after their terrestrial life, and are not to be born again, except by their own choice. The resurrection with the same body, and the last judgment, are among the most essential tenets of the Magi, Christians, and Muhammedans; the other world is vaguely represented among the ancient Hebrews. It is just to attribute to the Persians exclusively one of the most beautiful personifications that was ever imagined:* the soul of the deceased meets at the bridge of eternity an apparition either of an attrac­tive or repulsive form; “Who art thou?” asks the uncertain spirit, and hears the answer: “I am thy life.”

Although the variety and multitude of human conceptions may appear boundless, yet they may perhaps be reduced to a few fundamental principles. In general, there is one object common to all sorts of religion: this is to detach man from gross sensual matters, and to accustom him to hold converse with holy supernatural beings, guides to salvation, omnipresent witnesses of all his actions, remunera­tors of good, punishers of bad deeds; the belief in such beings, one or more, is in fact the most essential support of morality, which, being fixed in each individual, insures the peace and happiness of all. In short, the most important object of all religion is to ennoble, refine, and sanctify man's inmost thoughts and feelings, as well as his exterior actions. No wonder, that the same virtues are recommended by all religions.

But, if these virtues be the same as to names, there is a great difference as to their practical appli­cation. Thus, the Hindus, tending excessively to the extinction of sensual propensities, and a con­templative life, destroy spontaneity, and produce apathy. The Persians recommend more practical virtues. Both nations, however, as well as the Jews and Muhammedans, are subject to a great number of dietetical and ritual observances, which divert them from useful activity, confine their prac­tical sense, and render inert the innate perfectibility, the most precious prerogative of mankind. Among all the Asiatic nations, considered in this work, theocracy, that is, the junction of the religious and civil laws, doubles the power of despotism, and commands equally the spiritual and material, the present and the future world. The Western Chris­tians were in the course of time fortunate enough to modify the Asiatic morals, to enlarge the circle of civilization, and to open to themselves a boundless prospect of progressive knowledge, morality, and happiness.

Finally, there is one idea common as an adjunct to the five religions of mankind. Common are their failings, common their sufferings, common is also their consolation—hope. Always regretting a purity, simplicity, and independence, supposed to have been lost in the past, because not to be found any where in the present, and never exempt from oppression, men look to the future, and listen gladly to the promise of universal reform and restoration to one rule, which each religionist says, will be his own, to be effected among the Hindus by Kalki, an incar­nation of Brahma* among the other nations by the reappearance of their respective prophet, Messiah, Mahdi.

“And then shall come,
“When the world's dissolution shall be ripe,
With glory and pow'r to judge both quick and dead,
To judge th' unfaithful dead, but to reward
His faithful, and receive them into bliss,
Whether in Heav'n or Earth, for then the Earth
Shall all be Paradise.”*