The founder of this school was the sage Jaimini. It is more ancient thau the two already described, and the chief exponents of its phillosophy are Kumárila Bhaṭṭa, Prabhákara Guru, and Murári Miśra. Its professors are said to reject the notion of a Supreme Being, while some accept it, but do not allow of a Creator, attributing the production of existing things to merit and demerit.* When an assembly of the learned was convened with a view to ascertain the truth as to their creed, it was discovered that they were all of this latter opinion, but in deference to the variable character of minds, they are silent as to the nature of the Divinity, and lay the principal stress in discussion on the diversities of works. But men from ignorance and captiousness lay this opinion to their charge. Quantity is not accounted by them as attributable to God.* Parimáṇa, quantity, which the Nyáya school places among qualities, is not predicated by them of the Deity, and they do not allow that Brahmá, Vishṇu and Mahádeva are divine manifestations, affirming that human souls attain that eminence through good deeds. They hold mystic hymns in the place of particular deities whose potency they ascribe to the subtile spells of sound.* They allow no beginning, nor end to the world, and believe the four elements, the mountains, and the great seas to be eternal. They believe that bodies are produced from an aggregate of minute atoms, and not from one substance; manas and átman are all pervading, and a man's actions are the result of his own free will and initiative, and while granting the states of hell and heaven, and transmigration into lower and higher forms of being, and final emancipation, they do not believe that the latter is attainable by all men but is the result of the union of perfected understanding and action, and a sublime knowledge and an ineffable repose will be the eternal portion of that state.
The perception of sound by the ear, they believe to be one of the qualities of air. The Nyáya places it in ether. The second of the two philosophers above-named teaches that samaváya, co-inherence, exists as eternal in things eternal and as non-eternal in things non-eternal, and everywhere separate, and they interpret it by the term tádátmya (identity of nature). They reject viśesha. According to Kumárila Bhaṭṭa and Murári Miśra, there are ten predicaments (padártha): (1) substance, (2) quality, (3) action, (4) community, (5) identity of nature, and (6) negation. (7) Vaiśishṭya (endowment with attributes), is the term applied to the connection of non-existence* which they regard as a separate <Greek>, as the Nyáya regards Svarúpa (true nature) and ´Sabda. (8). ´Sakti (energy) is a characteristic imperceptible to sight but efficient in action, like the property of burning in fire, and quenching of thirst in water. This they affirm to be two-fold; essential (játi) as has been exemplified, and accidental, such as may be produced by incantation and the like. The Nyáya school recognises the properties of burning and quenching of thirst as inherent in fire and water. (9). Sádṛiśya, similarity between two objects. (10) Sankhyá, number,* is not regarded as a quality but as a distinct substance. Prabhákara Guru reckons nine predicaments and excludes abháva (negation) from the notion of things.
Kumárila Bhaṭṭa acknowledges eleven substances, the nine already given and (10) andhakára, darkness. The Naiyáyikas, with the Guru and Murári Miśra recognise the negation of light, but this school makes it a separate object of knowledge, which casts its shade over everything. Colour quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, and posteriority, are qualities appertaining to it. (11) ´Sabda (sound) is considered eternal* and all-pervading. Letters are substance and possess the same qualities as darkness, except colour. Qualities are twenty-two in number. Prabhákara Guru and Murári Miśra do not hold sound to be substance, but acknowledge its eternity. According to Kumárila Bhaṭṭa, intelligence operates like cognition arising from inferential reasoning. The Guru teaches that its own (indwelling) illumination proceeds from intelligence, as a lamp illumines itself while revealing other objects.* The Miśra holds with the Nyáya that it proceeds from the manas. This school does not accept the four kinds of proof (pramáṇa) but only the two first, perception and inference.
The Naiyáyikas say that gold has its origin in fire, the Mímámsakas, in earth. The notion of time with the former, is apprehended by the reason, with the latter, by the senses, who also consider colour, among qualities, to be eternal, and each of the five colours in all diversities of position, to be one. Generality is innate in substance. They do not accept the notion of Vega Sanskára, (velocity) and ascribe its effect to karman (action or motion).
According to Bhaṭṭa and Miśra, pramáṇa (proof) is of six kinds, four of which are the same as those of the Nyáya, and the senses are said to be seven,* as they add támasendriya by which the quality of darkness is cognized. They reject kevalánvayin, (con-comitancy of affirmative) and kevala vyatirekin (concomitancy of negatives); and the Guru, mithyájṅnána (erroneous opinion). Sanśaya (doubt)* and viparyaya (misconception), are recognised as two forms of veritable knowledge. The Naiyáyikas prove the existence of air from inference, the Mímáṃsakas from touch. The fifth kind of pramáṇa is arthápatti (presumption), discerning the subject and assuming the predicate.*
The sixth* kind is anupalabdhi, non-perception of things. They assert that perception of the non-existence of things arises from the non-knowledge of those things.* The Miśra like the Naiyáyikas includes this in pratyaksha.
The cardinal point of their system lies in works, which are of two kinds; vihita (enjoined), a work productive of good, and nishiddha (prohibited), resulting in pain. The first is again fourfold, (1) nitya (constant), that is, a daily duty, reprehensible to omit: (2) naimittaka (occasional rites)*, necessary duties at special times such as eclipses: (3) kámya (desirable), things done with desire of fruition: (4) práyaśchitta, expiatory acts. Of the nine schools, the first six recognize these obligations and carry them into practice to the prosperous ordering of their lives. A separate order of ceremonies is appointed to each of the four castes of men.
The questions comprised by this philosophy are set forth in twelve books. The first treats of the predicaments and of proof: the second, of various rites and certain elucidations of the Vaidic text: the third, of certain important ceremonies the results of rites which are revealed in that sacred volume and other minor points accessory to the main objects. The fourth, that the acquisition of worldy goods is twofold, personal comfort and (to procure oblations) for casting into the fire* (for sacrificial purposes). The fifth, of the order of various duties. The sixth, of the substitutes for various rites. The seventh, of the detail of the ceremonies to be performed which are only briefly described in the Vedas. The eighth is an exposition of dependent rites which are included in the performance of the primary. The ninth, a discussion of the mystic verses specified for a particular case in the sacred book, when quoted in a new connection, and hymns of praise. The tenth, the discussion of dependent rites which are precluded by non-performance of the primary rite. The eleventh discusses the occasion where one act suffices for the fulfilment of two (or more) acts. The twelfth, where the chief purpose of the rite is one only, but has a further reference without express assignment.*