1	Pramáṇa.	2	Prameya.	3	Sanśaya.	4	Prayojana.
5	Dṛishṭánta.	6	Siddhánta.	7	Avayava.	8	Tarka.
9	Nirṇaya.	10	Váda.	11	Jalpa.	12	Vitáṇḍá.
13	Hetvábhása.	14	Chhala.	15	Játi.	16	Nigraha-sthána.

The First Predicament, Pramáṇa, (proof) is of four kinds. 1 Pratyaksha, (perception) by the six perfect senses, viz., the five external senses together with manas which will be hereafter explained. 2 Anu­mána, inference. 3 Upamána, resemblance and analogy. 4 ´Sabda, tradi­tion of trustworthy and pious men. These four are held to embrace a considerable extent of knowledge.

The Second Predicament. Prameya signifies the objects of thought, and this which is beyond the reach of numeration, is yet classed under twelve heads. 1 A´tman. 2 Saríra. 3 Indriya. 4 Artha. 5 Buddhi. 6 Manas. 7 Pravṛitti. 8 Dosha. 9 Pretyabháva. 10 Phala. 11 Duḥkha. 12 Apavarga.

I. A´tman, soul, is a subtile, all-pervading substance which is the seat of the understanding, and it is of two kinds. The first kind is Jívátman (the vital principle), which vivifies human bodies and the animal and vegetable creation. Each body is supposed to be informed by a distinct spirit whose perceptions, through the senses and operations of the intel­lect, can be exercised only in conjunction with the substance manas* to be subsequently explained. The second kind is Paramátman, the Supreme Soul, which they hold to be One and from all eternity. Its intellectual cognitions are independent of the operation of manas.

II. Saríra, body, is also of two kinds. Yóni-ja (uterine), sexually produced. Ayoni-ja, that which is not so produced. The first mentioned has two further subdivisions, viz., jaráyu-ja, viviparous, and aṇḍa-ja, oviparous, and both are formed of the five elements.* The latter, ayoni-ja, has four subdivisions. 1. Párthiva, formed of earth; 2. A´pya, formed of water; 3. Taijasa of fire. 4. Váyavíya, of air.

III. Indriya,* signifies the five organs of sense together with Manas (the internal organ), a subtile substance intimately connected with the cone-shaped human heart. It is the source of perception, and it is by its action, they consider, that a man roams in imagination through distant countries. In contradistinction to A´tman, it is not considered to be all-pervading, but the Mimáṃsa School maintain that it possesses this quality.

IV. A´rtha (objects of sense.) Under this head are seven categories. 1. Dravya. 2. Guṇa. 3. Karman. 4. Sámánya. 5. Viśesha. 6. Sama­váya. 7. Abháva.

The first signifies substance,* which they conceive to be all-pervading and eternal, while with regard to the four elements, its indivisible atoms only are held to be eternal in duration. (It is subdivided into) A´tman: Manas: A´káśa: the four elements, kála and diś.

The first two have been already mentioned. The third is a subtile fluid, all-pervading, and has the quality of sound. The four elements are recog­nised after the system of the Greeks, but air is regarded as the highest in in order. Kála time,* is a substance impalpable and universal. Diś, space, has the same character.

Attributes are of the following six kinds. (1) Karman, action, the third category, is divided into five varieties, progressive action, upward and downward action, contraction and dilatation, and is non-eternal. (2) The fourth category is Sámánya,* community, and is one, expresses exis­tence, and denotes qualities. Its generic character is eternal, and it resides in substance, quality, and action. It is also called Játi Sámánya (generic community) and secondly* Upádhi (discriminative or specific) Sámánya; it has an objective existence, having qualities common to all objects.

(3) The fifth category Viśesha,* particularity, is an attribute, being of its own essence dissociated from everything, has a separate resting-place, and is based only upon eternal matter. Prithaktva, individuality, is, on the other hand, a quality, and although it implies disjunction, it does not do so to the same degree, and is not in the same manner distinguished.

(4) The sixth category, Samaváya, denotes the co-inherence of five entities with their correlatives, such as (1) movement and its author; (2) quality and substance; (3) matter and the thing made, as clay and the vessel of clay, yarn and its cloth; (4) the whole and its component parts; (5) particularity and eternal matter.

Strangely enough they regard Samaváya* as one and eternal. This school classes co-inherence under three heads. The first as mentioned above, and if it occurs between two substances, it is termed Saṃyoga, simple conjunction, as is stated in the mention of qualities, and they consider it to possess plurality. Secondly. the connection of the immaterial with the material, as the soul with the body. This they call Svarúpa, natural form.

(5) The seventh category is abháva, privation or negation, and is of two kinds. Saṃsargábháva universal, and anyonyábháva, mutual negation between two things, as one might say “this is not that.” This reciprocal negation must be one in time and place.

The first kind includes three species:* (1), prágabháva, antecedent negation; (2), pradhanasábháva, emergent negation; (3), atyantábháva, absolute negation, that is a negation of what is not one in place, while one in time as, “Zayd standing on the bank of the river, is lost in the desert.”

(6) Attributes that do not come under these last five categories are qualities* and termed guṇa, (second category) of which there are twenty-four varieties: (1), Rúpa, colour (or form) of which five are elementary, namely, red, yellow, blue, black, white, the other colours being com­pounded of these: (2), Rasa, savour. This is of six kinds; sweet, bitter, acid, saline pungent and astringent. (3), Gandha, odour. (4), Sparśa, tangibility, that is the perception of touch which is of three kinds, cold, hot, and temperate: (5), Sankhyá, number which is also of three kinds, unity, duality, and plurality: (6) Parimáṇa, quantity, which is of four kinds, (<Greek>) aṇu, atomic, (<Greek>) hrasvá,* the measure of two atoms, also called dvy-aṇuka, (<Greek>) dírgha, the measure of three or more atoms: (<Greek>), mahat, (vast) the measure of the ethereal firmament and the like. (7), Pṛi­thaktva, individuality, distinguishes one of two things from the other. It is in itself common to all, and is not defined in the same manner as viśesha. It is of three kinds, as for instance, “one is unlike that,” or “two or more are unlike it.” (8), Saṃyoga, is the conjunction of two substances, eternal and non-eternal, which are united by a mutual attraction. They do not consider it to be one, like samaváya: (9), Vibhága, disjunc­tion; (10), Púrvatva, priority in time and place. (11), Aparatva, pos­teriority: (12), Buddhi intellect. (13), Sukha, pleasure: (14), Duḥkha, pain: (15), Ichchhá, desire: (16), Dvesha, aversion: (17), Prayatna, volition or effort: (18), Gurutva, gravity. Lightness is not held to be quality, but the negation of gravity: (19), Dravatva, fluidity. (20), Sneha, viscidity: (21), Sanskára, reproduction (of thought) which is of three kinds. (<Greek>) Vega (Sanskára) (velocity) a quality which springs from mobility and produces motion, like the flight of an arrow from the bow,* for according to this school, motion is destroyed in the third moment after its production,* and hence this quality must of necessity be called into action and produce movement. (<Greek>) (Bhávaná) Sanskára thinking, is a special characteristic of the reasoning faculty, and since knowledge does not endure in the mind beyond the space of three moments of time, recourse to this quality is imperative, and through the operation of the intellect, analogy, induction or intuition becomes the effective cause of the recollection of what has passed from the mind. (<Greek>) Sthitisthápaka, elasticity, that is the resilience of what is bent to the contrary direction. (22), dharma,* merit, or the state of rectitude in the intelligent soul. (23), adharma, demerit. This school believes that souls through these two qualities, assume various bodily forms, and receive their due recompense in sorrow or joy. The first have their portion in Paradise: the second, in hell, and the world of death is the ultimate end of both. (24), śabda, sound.

The rational soul is distinguished by fourteen qualities: (1) intellect, (2) pleasure, (3) pain, (4) desire, (5) aversion, (6) effort, (7) merit, (8) demerit, (9) thinking, (10) number, (11) quantity, (12) individuality, (13) conjunction, (14) disjunction. The first nine are inseparable from it, while number (viz., unity), quantity, individuality conjunction, disjunction, and sound, are referrible to ether. Sound is its chief characteristic. With the exception of sound, these five are quali­ties of time and space, and the eight formed by these four together, with priority, posteriority and velocity are qualities of manas:—Tangibility, num­ber, quantity individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority and velocity are the nine accidents of air. Colour, tangibility, number, quan­tity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, fluidity, velocity, are the eleven qualities of light (fire), and motion and tangibility, are its characteristics. Colour, taste, tangibility, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, fluidity, viscidity and velocity are the fourteen qualities of water. Motion, viscidity, and tangibility are its characteristics. The same fourteen are likewise those of earth, substituting for viscidity odour which abides in earth alone.

Eternal qualities. Of these, six* characterise the deity, viz, intellect, desire, effort (one), number (i. e., unity), vastness of quantity (one), and individuality. Three qualities connote the vital principle, (jivátman), the mind (manas) and ether, time and space, viz., quantity (one), number (unity), individuality. Four belong to the indivisible atoms of air, tangibility (one), number, quantity (one), individuality. Five to atoms of light (fire), colour, tangibility (one), number, quantity (one), indi­viduality. Nine to those of water; viz., colour, savour, tangibility, viscidity (one), number, quantity (one), individuality, gravity, and fluidity. Four to those of earth, viz., number (unity), quantity (one), individuality, and gravity. They affirm that qualities, in their non-eternal (transitory aspects, including desire, effort, and intellect, are sited in other than the Deity, and pleasure, pain, aversion and sound are produced in one moment* of time, do not endure to the second, and are lost in the third, and the rest are not of great length of permanence.

Eight qualities are universal: number, quantity, individuality, con­junction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity. Four are incident to all substances: namely, conjunction, disjunction, number other than unity, and individuality likewise not single. Those that alone are united in manas, are held to be intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort. Such as are cognisable by inference are merit, demerit, thinking and gravity.

This much will suffice for example from among a multiplicity of division of these qualities.

Having now discussed the various categories of artha, I come to the fifth classification of Prameya, namely,

V. Buddhi.* (intellect). Although it has been mentioned under the second category (guṇa) of artha, a somewhat more extended explanation will be of service. It is two-fold; (1) anubhava, (notion or concept), which is produced by means of the four kinds of proof,* and (2) smṛiti,* recolection, which is effected through bhávaná sanskára, (present conscionsness of past ideas.) Anubhava is of two kinds a right notion or a wrong one. A wrong notion i. e. (one not derived from proof) is threefold, namely, sanśaya, doubt; viparyaya, error, and tarka, false premises. This last is a padártha (predicament) and will be explained in its place.

VI. Manas,* although referred to under substance, requires to be mentioned next in order.

VII. Pravṛitti, activity, or employing the mind, tongue and other organs in good and evil works. They maintain that four functions are necessary to an outward action, knowing, willing, resolving and bodily motion.

VIII. Dosha, (fault) they assert to be a cause of prayatna (effort),* and is of three kinds; rága, passion or extreme desire, dvesha, aversion; and moha, delusion of mind.

IX. Pretyabháva, (transmigration) signifies life, after death and the union of the soul with the body, followed by death after life and dissolu­tion succeeding connection.

X. Phala, (retribution) is the fruit of merit and demerit.

XI. Duḥkha, is the opposite of Sukha, joy, which is not here intro­duced, as the pleasures of this world are by them accounted misery.

XII. Apavarga, (emancipation) is eternal release from pain. There- are twenty-one varieties of pain, or evil, and these reside in the six organs of sense, the six objects (vishaya) of sensation, the six mental appre­hensions that proceed from them, the body which is the centre of evil, pleasure itself which is filled with pain, and pain. In short, pain signifies all that men are averse from and by which distress occurs. The attainment of that state where these effects disappear, is called mukti, or final emancipation, where the soul rests without per­ception or consciousness, is no longer connected with the body and is delivered from heaven and hell. They consider the union of the soul with body* which they call janman (birth), as the source of pain. Its existence is due to merit and demerit, and through its companionship with the soul, it receives the recompense of good and evil. The cause of this is karman, (action), from which proceeds befitting time, or unsuitable deed and pain or pleasure. Yatna (effort), which is synony­mous with prayatna, and pravṛitti, activity, produce these consequences, and this in turn results from rága or passion, which springs from mithyájṅnána,* erroneous opinion, originated by bhávanâ sanskára. By mortification of spirit and body and by good works, the means of perfect knowledge are secured, resulting in the attainment of perfected capacities.* Ignorance is destroyed, true knowledge acquired, and the flux and reflux of existence vanish for ever.

Some say that when the intelligence attains its highest illumination, error and ignorance are annihilated and with them rága and dvesha, that is passion and aversion depart, and hence pravṛitti, activity, is extirpated, and by its disappearance janman (birth), is no more, and pain and grief are dis­solved and mukti brings everlasting bliss. Another opinion is that tattva­jṅnána, true knowledge, dispels mithyájṅnána, or error, which causes the subver­sion of desire, which overwhelms prayatna. By its fall karman (action) is subverted and overturns with it dharma and adharma (merit and demerit). Janman (birth), thus, is swept away carrying with it duḥkha (pain) in its overthrow. The Nyáya school assert that when the material body perishes, knowledge dies with it. Perfect knowledge depends upon three conditions: (1) śravaṇa, hearing, and studying the Vedas and the existing traditions of the sages, and this cannot be attained except by the aid of one who has travelled this road: (2) manana, consideration, by which the sacred books and the precepts of the virtuous are when apprehended, studiously illumined by proofs that convince the mind. The effect of this study, according to one opinion, issues in a speculation as to the nature of the rational soul and whether it is not apart from all else;* (3) nididhyásana, profound contemplation; by frequent reflection and reiterated thought on the objects of contemplation in their entirety, the mind becomes habitually absorbed therein and advancing beyond the objective sensations of sight and deed, becomes the recipient of truth.*

It is asserted that the contemplation of the rational soul may be so continuous as not to be interrupted. When these three conditions are fulfilled with diligence and unwavering resolve, a sublime knowledge is attained and liberation secured from pain and pleasure and the fetters of the corporeal state. This school professes the doctrine of Káyavyúha, multiplication of bodies*.

They maintain that when any of the specially favoured are illu­mined by the light of this knowledge, and are cognisant of their past existences and future destiny, and know that a course of further transmigration awaits them, and desire to complete it, they receive a special power from the Supreme Being, and in a brief space receive these various forms and endure the pains and pleasures of life with the same spirit and the same intelligence, and when these forms pass away, attain eternal bliss. It is also said that all men will* arrive at final emancipation, and that though the world is without a beginning, birth and production will eventually cease.

The third predicament Sanśaya, doubt, is three-fold: (1). it may arise from the sight of objects with common qualities, as for example, an object may be seen from a distance, and not distinctly, known whether it be a tree or a man, and the like: (2). cause of doubt is likewise (a non-general or special attribute) in regard to a particular object which is sepa­rate from the notion of eternal or non-eternal, substance or quality, and the doubt arises whether it be eternal or non-eternal, substance or quality:* (3). Cause of doubt lies also in controversy when a subject may be the occasion of contradictory affirmation and denial between two learned disputants.

The fourth predicament, Prayojana, motive, is that which necessarily precedes and produces an effect and is termed causality. Of this there are not accounted more than three kinds: (1). the presence of efficient con­ditions and means is termed nimitta káraṇa, or instrumental causality: (2). the material cause is samaváyi káraṇa, intimate or direct causality: (3). the indirect or non-intimate causality is called asamaváyi káraṇa.* Cause is termed káraṇa and effect kárya, and sámagrí is total causality, (the aggregate of conditions necessary for the forming of either, a material product, or a physical state). This subject is treated in Sanskrit philosophy under the first predicament.

The fifth predicament is Dṛishṭánta, instance or example, showing invariable connection (between subject and predicate).

The sixth predicament, is Siddhánta, dogma or determinate truth.

The seventh predicament is Avayava, (members of a) syllogism. This consists of five members*. I. Pratijna., the proposition, as in the statement, “there is fire in this hill” II. Hetu, the concomitant reason supporting the proposition, “for it smokes,” by which the presence of fire is apprehended which is the ground for the inference, and this, in regard to the invariable connection (between subject and predicate), is threefold. If the necessary connection is affirmative, it is called kevalánvayin (concomitancy of affirmatives), and if negative, kevala-vyatirekin (concomitancy of negatives), and if both, anvaya-vyatirekin (affirmative and negative induction). Of this third kind five members are necessary for a complete syllogism. (1.) Paksha sattva* (subject of the conclusion) where the subject to be proved is supposed to be in a given place. (2.) Sapaksha sattva (similar instance, involving the major term) where the place of the subject and predicate are with certainty known or inferred as smoke aud fire in a kitchen hearth. (3.) Vipaksha sattva (negative instance) where the subject and predicate exclude each other as water (and fire). (4.) Abâdhita vishayatva, non-negation of the object of proof (by other proof).* (5.) Asatpratipakshatva, (non-equalisation,) where there is no counterbalancing reason proving the negation of what is to be proved.* In the first classification of Hetu, (kevalánvayin), the third of these five is absent. In the second, (kevala-vyatirekin), the second of the five is absent.

III. Udáharana, the instance or example. The subject of a propo­sition is called vyápya: the predicate is the vyápaka, and vyápti, per­vasion or invariable concomitance, is the mutual relation of the subject and predicate.

IV. Upanaya is the application of the reason to the subject in question.

Nigamana is the conclusion. Although it lies implicate in the major premiss, it forms the statement in the general proposition and becomes the consequent in the fifth.

The eighth predicament Tarka, is inadmissible conclusion at variance with proof, that is, the perception of a deduction from wrong premises.* By its statement the disputant removes the doubt in the relation of subject and predicate. For instance to one who denied the existence of fire (in the hill) he would rejoin that without it there could be no smoke, of which fire is the cause.

The ninth predicament is Nirṇaya, (ascertainment,) or a certainty of conclusion on the completion of proof.

The tenth Váda, (controversy,) is the expression of their respective views of a subject by two seekers after knowledge, supported by reasons brought forward with good feeling, and in the interests of truth, allowing neither their several convictions nor self-assertion to influence them. Verily such cour­teous* disputants, like the phœnix, move with steps that leave no trace.

The eleventh Jalpa, or wrangling, is the debate of disputants contend­ing for victory.

The twelfth is Vitanḍá, objection or cavilling: The object of one dis­putant being the advancement of what is true and reasonable, and of the other to dispute his statements.

The thirteenth is Hetvábhása, fallacy. This is a syllogism with the semblance of a reason, of which there are five kinds. If this predicament were placed in order above Váda, the tenth, or below the three following, it would be more in place.

The fourteenth is Chhala, perversion of an adversary's statement through malice, and disputing it.

The fifteenth is Játi, futility, or a reply both irrelevant and reprehensible, advanced with speciousness and cavilling. This is of twenty-four kinds.

The sixteenth predicament is Nigrahasthána, the confutation of an adversary, and is of twenty-two kinds.

Each of these sixteen subjects have numerous questions arising out of them, supported by a variety of opinions, arguments and instances.

It is believed that whosoever apprehends these sixteen in their integrity, is released from further birth and death, lives in freedom from pleasure and pain, and attains his final end by three degrees of knowledge: viz. (1), uddeśa, (enunciation), by which he distinguishes the name of each of these sixteen predicaments and bears them in memory; (2) lakshaṇa, (definition), by which he arrives at their essential truth; (3) paríkshá (investigation), by which he ascertains the sufficiency and perti­nence of their definition.

This school, though not acknowledging that the world had a begin­ning, yet believes in its final destruction. This they term pralaya, which is of two kinds.

In the first, Brahmá slumbers in the chamber of non-existence, and appears no more, and all created forms perish. His absolute cause is the divine will, the completion of a decreed period and the coming of an appointed time. When this time arrives, by the will of God, merit and demerit cease to exist, and by the same divine will, the indivisible atoms (of primordial matter) are set in agitation,* from which bhága,* (disjunc­tion), is brought into reality, and Saṃyoga (union from contiguity) is dissolved. First the globe of the earth, next fire, followed by air and water are successively destroyed and creation ceases to exist and all souls attain final emancipation. This is termed mahápralaya. In the second, is the final emancipation of Brahmá, which is called Khaṇḍa-pralaya (partial dissolution). In this, with the exception of merit and demerit, present consciousness, and action, all else perish. At the close of one hundred extraordinary years, of which mention has been made,* Brahmá attains this accomplishment of desire. After the lapse of this period, a succeed­ing Brahmá is born. Another opinion is that there are four dissolutions. Besides the above two, there is a third when right apprehension is taken up from mankind and this will happen at the close of a cycle of the four ages. The fourth is the dissolution of each particular thing which is called its pralaya, as when the manas first dissolves its connection with the rational soul, and following this, when the union of soul and body is then severed.*

The (renewed) creation of the world is called sṛishti. Through the volition of the Supreme Being, and after the lapse of ages and at the advent of a special time, merit and demerit recover their sway, and the indivisible atoms of matter are again moved. Two atoms first combine: this is called dvy-aṇuka;* then three dvy-aṇukas unite and are named try-aṇuka; the union of four dvy-aṇukas is termed chatur-aṇuka, and thus they gradually coalesce, till numerous forms are manifested, and contrariwise to their dissolution, they are produced in the following order: air, fire, water, earth, and subsequently, Brahmá, Vishnu and Mahádeva.* The three last are not apparent to the light of vision but assume shape and are beneficent in their operation. From air spring aerial forms which reside in Váyuloka, a sphere above the earth, and the sense of touch* and the blowing wind whose energising essence is called in Sanskrit, prána (vital breath), of which there are five kinds* as will be related.

From fire (light) spring fiery bodies dwelling in A´dityaloka* which is the sphere of the sun, and vision and the modes of heat. From water are the aqueous bodies dwelling in Varuṇaloka* which is said to be near the mountain Suméru, and the rudiment of taste and the seas and ice and hail. From earth, are earthly forms, and the rudiment of smell, minerals, plants and animals. Brahmá by his volition first brings into being all (immovable)* forms produced without generation, and wonderful are the details they give herein, and it is said that a single eternal volition of the Deity at their appointed times operates to create and destroy. The creative will is called Chikírshá (desire to act) and the destructive will Sanjihírshá (desire to take away).

Their works are in a five-fold series. (1) Sútra, a short technical sentence: (2) bháshya, commentary on a somewhat difficult sútra: (3) várttika, a critical annotation on the two: (4) ṭiká, commentary (properly of the original or of another commentary) on No. 3; (5) nibandha, an explanation of technical rules. Another opinions is that the series runs to twelve. Besides those enumerated, (6) vṛitti, a brief elucidation of some complicated subjects in the first-mentioned; (7) nirukta, etymological interpretation of a word. Sound is held to be of two kinds, (<Greek>) inarticulate, which is termed dhvani* (sound, noise), and (<Greek>) articulate, varna (a letter,) also called akshara. The junction of several letters is called pada, a word, and several words in connection form, vákya, a sentence, and a collection of these make a sútra, or aphorism, and several sútras are called prakaraṇa (article or section). These last again when connected are termed áhnika, and an aggregate of the latter, adhyáya, which combined together compose a śástra or didactic work. In some treatises, ambiguities are discussed regarding the definitions of pada which are therein resolved: (8) prakaraṇa, is a section treating of one or two topics: (9) áhnika, a short task sufficing for a diurnal lesson: (10) pariśishta, a supplement to a technical work: (11) paddhati, a manual of the texts relating to each of the six sciences in prescribed order: (12) sangraha, an epitome of the sciences. These classes of works are not confined to this school alone. Vrajyá is a compendium or homogeneous collection, and instead of the divisions into sections and chapters, the following ten words are used.

(1) aṅka (2) uchchhvása, (3) sarga, (4) viśráma, (5) ullása, (6) paṭala, (7) adhyáya, (8) uddesa, (9) adhína, (10) tantra.

The Nyáya philosophy is divided into five adhyáyas. The first gives a list of the sixteen subjects to be discussed, and a definition of each. The second deals with the detail of pramáṇa (proof or evidence) and accurate knowledge and the like. The third is on the six kinds of objects of thought, namely, soul; body; organs of sense; objects of sense; intellect and mind. The fourth treats of its remaining heads. The fifth is on játi (futility), and nigrahasthána (confutation of an adversary). Although the system of Kaṇáda is antecedent in date, yet since the Nyáya treats of a multiplicity of subjects, and is generally the first studied, I have given it priority of place.