When Pīr Muḥammad Khān heard of the enterprise of the Mīrzās he sent messengers to call for help, and at the same time sent an experienced ambassador to the Mīrzās and proposed an agreement. The ambassador declared that Pīr Muḥammad Khān would surrender Khulm and Aibak to the Mīrzās. They sent M. Beg Barlās, who was an old and confidential servant, on an embassy, and said that if Pīr Muḥammad Khān would give them Khulm and Aibak, and put peace on a firm foundation, there would be an end of disputes. When they themselves marched out of Badakh­shān they decided that for two reasons it would not be right to proceed against Balkh. First, because they had sent an ambassador. Second, because they would go and take along with them the Aimāqs* of Balkh, the hill-country* of which is towards Khurāsān, and get them into their power. Then the affair of Balkh would easily take shape. If they did not take this course, Pīr Muḥammad Khān would strengthen the fort, and collect troops from all sides. In pursuance of this design and in palpable oblivion of rectitude, they took their route by the foot of the hills, left Balkh behind them and proceeded towards Khurāsān, and brought under their control the Aimāqs who inhabited the wolds (ṣaḥarānishīn).

Meanwhile news came that M. Beg had been killed, and that Pīr Muḥammad Khān had collected an army and was preparing for war. The story of this catastrophe is that the Mīrzās had on their march to Khurāsān advanced to near the Cūl-i-Zardak (the brownish desert?) which is known by the name of Sān* Cārek, and had passed the Casma-i-Gāzarān, and were purposing to go on still fur­ther when the news came that M. Beg had left Pīr Muḥammad Khān's house after finishing* a great piece of work, when at a sign from Pīr Muḥammad Khān, Khusrū* had killed him with a sword. (Pīr Muḥammad's view was) “what weakness is there in us that we should give up our own territory,” and his whole intention in proposing peace was to procrastinate, and to collect his forces. Now that assistance had come he had marched across country and headed the Mīrzās. When the Mīrzās heard this news they took counsel among themselves. Men of experience said that the proper course was to bend round (urīb shuda) and make a rapid march to the shrine* (Ribā) of Mī Rūzadār. The Uzbegs would be left behind. If it should come to a fight that too would be advantageous. But to march on to meet them was in no way expedient. The Mīrzās did not accept this opinion and went on to meet the enemy. The Uzbegs with great dexterity struck the bank* of the Casma-i-Gāzarān, which has a winding course* and dug trenches, and constructed a wall in front of their position, and having lined them with musketeers and archers remained ready for battle. The Mīrzās quickly put their troops into fighting order and were approaching the spring (sar-i-casma) in ignorance of the fortification; M. Sulaimān coming by the low ground near the river, and M. Ibrāhīm by the upper route. M. Sulaimān advanced against the enemy but could make no impression. As he did not know what to do he retreated, and perceived that to go on towards Khurāsān and its neighbourhood would lead to nothing but his being captured. Then he turned round and by great manage­ment got out of the ravines* (jarhā), and passing the enemies' rear (arqa,—the back, the rear, Tūrkī) went on to the desert (dasht­cūl ) which is on the side of Badakhshān. Many of his men perished. M. Ibrāhīm came to the spring and attacked, but could make no impression. He drew bridle and stopped, and many of his men were killed by bullets and arrows. Muḥammad Qulī Shighālī* ran up to him and said, “What time for standing is this? Your father has got out.” The Mīrzā asked his own people what they advised. Many of his warriors said, “It will be very difficult to get out. The proper thing is to fight in this very place and see what the result will be.” Muḥammad Qulī spoke roughly and said, “It is a fixed principle with military men that whenever soldiers have gone a bowshot away from the enemy it is difficult to come to close quarters with him again. Why do you unnecessarily bring the Mīrzā into destruction.” After much talk the Mīrza came out from that place aud proceeded to retreat. He fell into the enemies' country and many of his men dispersed. He shaved his head and face and went on with a few men, thinking that in this way they might per­haps get out. When they had gone some way their horses became tired out. They took to their feet and marched for two days more. Then getting poines they came to a village in order to get something to eat. Meanwhile the brother of Kul Kāfir recognised the Mīrzā and arrested him with the aid of the villagers and took him before Pīr Muḥammad Khān. He confined him for some days and spoke of releasing him. The impure wretches of Transoxiana came in num­bers to visit the Mīrzā on account of a similarity of disposition. Pīr Muḥammad Khān grew suspicious and hastened to put him to death. The chronogram of this occurrence was Ḵūrāk kusht (Kūrāk killed, 967) Kūrāk was the name of an executioner. M. Sulaimān found the chronogram Ko nakhl-i-umed-i-pidr (“where is the sap­ling* of a father's hope,” 967). Two days before this event M. Ibrāhīm composed an ode (qaṣīda) of which the opening lines were—