Marching thence, I arranged the whole army in order of battle,* with right and left wing and centre, and after reviewing it, performed the vīm.** The custom of the vīm is, that, the whole army being mounted, the commander takes a bow or whip in his hand, and guesses at the number of the army, according to a fashion in use, and in conformity with which they affirm that the army may be so many.* The number that I guessed was greater than the army turned out to be.

Fortifies
his front.

At this station* I directed* that, according to the custom of Rūm,* the gun-carriages should be connected together with twisted bull-hides as with chains. Between every two gun-carriages* were six or seven tūras* or breast-works. The matchlockmen stood behind these guns and tūras, and discharged their matchlocks. I halted five or six days in this camp, for the purpose of getting this apparatus arranged. After every part of it was in order and ready, I called together all the Amīrs, and men of any experience and knowledge, and held a general council. It was settled, that as Pānipat was a considerable* city, it would cover one of our flanks by its buildings* and houses, while we might fortify our front by tūras, or covered defences, and cannon, and that the matchlockmen and infantry should be placed in the rear of the guns and tūras.* With this resolution we moved, and April 12.
Reaches
Pānipat.
in two marches, on Thursday, the 30th of the last Jumāda, reached Pānipat.* On our right were the town and suburbs. In my front I placed the guns and tūras which had been prepared. On the left, and in different other points, we drew ditches and made defences of the boughs of trees. At the distance of every bowshot, a space was left large enough for a hundred or a hundred and fifty men to issue forth. Many of the troops were in great terror and alarm. Trepida­tion and fear are always unbecoming. Whatsoever Almighty God has decreed from all eternity, cannot be reversed; though, at the same time, I cannot greatly blame them; they had some reason; for they had come two or three months’ journey from their own country; we had to engage in arms a strange nation, whose language we did not under­stand, and who did not understand ours;

(Persian)— We are all in difficulty, all in distraction,
Surrounded by a people; by a strange people.
Misconduct
of the
enemy.

The army of the enemy opposed to us was estimated at one hundred thousand men; the elephants of the emperor and his officers were said to amount to nearly a thousand. He possessed the accumulated treasures of his father and grandfather, in current coin, ready for use. It is an usage in Hindustān, in situations similar to that in which the enemy now were, to expend sums of money in bringing together troops who engage to serve for hire. These men are called bedhindi. Had he chosen to adopt this plan, he might have engaged one or two hundred thousand more troops. But God Almighty directed everything for the best. He had not the heart to satisfy even his own army; and would not part with any of his treasure. Indeed, how was it possible that he should satisfy his troops, when he was himself miserly to the last degree, and beyond measure avaricious in accumulating pelf? He was a young man of no experience. He was negligent in all his movements; he marched without order; retired or halted without plan, and engaged in battle without foresight. While the troops were fortifying their position in Pānipat and its vicinity, with guns,* branches of trees, and ditches, Derwīsh Muham­med Sarbān said to me, ‘You have fortified our ground in such a way that it is not possible he should ever think of coming here.’ I answered, ‘You judge of him by the Khans and Sultans of the Uzbeks. It is true that, the year in which we left Samarkand and came to Hissār, a body of the Uzbek Khans and Sultans having collected and united together, set out from Derbend* in order to fall upon us. I brought the families and property of all the Moghuls and soldiers into the town and suburbs, and closing up all the streets, put them in a defensible state. As these Khans and Sultans were perfectly versed in the proper times and seasons for attacking and retiring, they perceived that we were resolved to defend Hissār to the last drop of our blood, and had fortified it under that idea; and seeing no hopes of succeeding in their enterprise, fell back by Bundak Che­ghāniān.* But you must not judge of our present enemies by those who were then opposed to us. They have not ability to discriminate when it is proper to advance and when to retreat.’* God brought everything to pass favour­ably. April 19
or 20.
It happened as I foretold. During the seven or eight days that we remained in Pānipat, a very small party of my men, advancing close up to their encampment and to their vastly superior force, discharged arrows upon them.* They did not, however, move, or make any demonstration of sallying out. At length, induced by the persuasions of some Bābur
harasses
the enemy.
Hindustāni Amīrs, in my interest, I sent Mahdi Khwājeh, Muhammed Sultan Mirza, Ādil Sultan, Khosrou Shah, Mir Hūssain, Sultan Juneid Birlās, Abdal-azīz, the master of horse (Mir akhūr), Muhammed Ali Jeng-Jeng, Kūtluk Kadem, Wali Khāzin, Muhibb Ali Khalīfeh, Muhammed Bakhshi, Jān Beg, and Karakūzi, with four or five thousand men, on a night attack. They did not assemble properly in the first instance*, and as they marched out in confusion, did not get on well. The day dawned, yet they continued lingering near the enemy’s camp till it was broad daylight, when the enemy, on their side, beat their kettle-drums, got ready their elephants, and marched out upon them. Although our people did not effect anything, yet, in spite of the multitude of troops that hung upon them in their retreat, they returned safe and sound, without the loss of a man. Muhammed Ali Jeng-Jeng was wounded with an arrow,* and though the wound was not mortal, yet it disabled him from taking his place* on the day of battle. On learning what had occurred, I immediately detached Humāiūn with his division a kos or a kos and a half in advance, to cover their retreat, while I myself, remaining with the army, drew it out, and got it in readiness for action. The party which had marched to surprise the enemy fell in with Humāiūn, and returned with him. As none of the enemy came near us, I drew off the army, and led it back to the camp. In the course of the night we had a false alarm; for nearly* one ghari* the call to arms and the uproar continued. Such of the troops as had never before witnessed an alarm of the kind, were in great confusion and dismay. In a short time, how­ever, the alarm subsided.

The enemy
attacks
Bābur,
April 21.

By the time of early morning prayers, when the light was such that you could distinguish one object from another,* notice was brought from the advanced patrols that the enemy were advancing, drawn up in order of battle. We too immediately braced on our helmets and our armour, and mounted. The right division was led by Humāiūn, accom­panied by Khwājeh Kalān, Sultan Muhammed Duldāi, Hindu Beg, Wali Khāzin, and Pir Kuli Sīstāni; the left division was commanded by Muhammed Sultan Mirza, Mahdi Khwājeh, Ādil Sultan, Shah Mīr Hussain, Sultan Juneid Birlās, Kūtluk Kadem, Jān Beg, Muhammed Bakhshi, Shah Hussain Bargi, and Moghul Ghānchi. The right of the centre was commanded by Chin Taimūr Sultan,* Muham­medi Gokultāsh, Shah Mansūr Birlās, Yunis Ali, Derwīsh Muhammed Sārbān, and Abdallah Kitābdār; the left of the centre by Khalīfeh, Khwājeh Mīr Mīrān, Ahmedi Perwānchi, Terdi Beg, Kūch Beg, Muhibb Ali Khalīfeh, and Mirza Beg Terkhān. The advance was led by Khosrou Gokultāsh and Muhammed Ali Jeng-Jeng.* Abdal-azīz, master of horse, had the command of the reserve.* On the flank of the right division I stationed Wali Kizil, Malik Kāsim, Bāba Kashkeh, with their Moghuls, to act as a tulughmeh (or flanking party). On the extremity of the left division were stationed Kara-Kūzi, Abul Muhammed Nezehbāz, Sheikh Ali, Sheikh Jemāl Bārīn, Mahdi, Tengrī Kuli Moghul, to form the tulughmeh (or flankers), with instructions, that* as soon as the enemy approached sufficiently near, they should take a circuit and come round upon their rear.*