The reporters of the characteristics of celebrated Princes have related in their books of history and anecdote, that the deceased Sultan, Malik Shāh,* who passed in his day for the first of living poten­tates, at the time when the fortunes of kingdoms were guided by his touch — when the world sub­mitted its course to his direction, like a steed to the rider’s rein, and time crouched to his constraint, like a courser to his keeper’s scourge — had chanced, at the twenty-ninth day of the feast* of Ramzān, to fix on Neeshāpor for the spot where his victorious standards were to be planted, and where, of course, the dawn of religious enjoyment was to dissipate from his mind the mists of anxiety consequent on the interruption of his expeditions. Evening came, and king-like the sun departed to visit his dominions in the West. His snowy canopy was mirrored in the sources of living waters; while he himself, fatigued, it seemed, with the uproars of the past day, retired to the privacy of his subterranean palace. Wearily, as the eyes of Jacob for his son, were the glances of the fasters fixed in expectation of that light — to them more radiant than the day — the first faint streak of the new moon,* that was to rise, like Joseph, from the depths of darkness,* and usher in the festival of Eed.* The aspirations of their anxiety rose into the air, like incense from a burning censer: the cravings of hunger glowed within their bosoms, like heated iron in a black­smith’s forge. Not a soul, but suspense had brought him to the housetop to watch for the moon’s appearance: not an eye, whose eagerness did not ever and anon take the fringe-top of its own brow for the luminous streak it yearned to spy.

It chanced, that without any regard to the preliminaries required by the institute, or the essential requisites of the religion, the courtiers announced to his majesty, by reason of their longing for the festival, that the Moon of Eed was visible, and got him to give orders for issuing a proclamation, pur­porting that the morrow was the festival; and this was proclaimed accordingly. Now the throne of judicature and hierocracy* was honored, in those days, by the occupation of the Imām of both sanc­tuaries,* Abul Muāly Jobìny, one of the firmest votaries of the sect of Shāfei,* and preceptor to Abú Hāmid Ghazāly.* As soon as he was apprised of the occurrence, he forthwith ordered a proclama­tion to the effect that the morrow was still Ramzān, and whoever abided by his ordonnance was to con­tinue the fast. On learning this, the king’s attendants represented the fact in an ill aspect; stating that Abul Muāly had placed himself at issue with his sovereign; and, seeing that the people of that province were his adherents, they would unquestion­ably act upon his ordonnance, and not upon the king’s directions; which would unbeseem the dig­nity of so great a potentate. The king was greatly disturbed by this intelligence; but feeling, with his noble disposition and correct tenets, that it was part of his duty to consult the respectability of men of learning;* and estimating at its proper value the high worth and exalted station of an Imām of both sanctuaries; he merely despatched a party of his guards, with orders to use all courtesy and civility in bringing the Imām to the presence. To all their representations on the inconsistency of treating with respect a person who treated his orders with dis­respect, his answer invariably was, that without hearing his defence, it was impossible, on a mere report, to disgrace so eminent a man. The instant the summons reached the Imām he arose, and with nothing on him but the cincture of papyrus which he wore indoors, put on his shoes* and proceeded to the audience-room. The chamberlains, on seeing his condition, represented to the king, that the Imām, not content with open opposition, was about to outrage the decorum of the court by appearing before his majesty in his household costume. Aggravated as the Sultan’s displeasure was now become, he still ordered that every civility should be shown to him, merely sending the head chamber­lain to enquire, why he came in that guise, as it was notoriously a breach of decorum to appear in that manner in the presence of kings. The Imām answered in his loudest tone, that the Sultan must himself hear the reply, which was such as no one else could be trusted to report; and then, when ushered before his majesty, his words were these. “It is in this homely dress, O king, that I offer up my prayers; and there were nothing inappropriate in waiting on my Sultan as I wait upon my God. Still, as custom has prescribed that we should appear in other guise in the presence of kings, I was willing to comply with all propriety, and array myself in proper apparel; but, seated as I was in this dress when the mandate reached me, I was apprehensive that the delay occasioned by my changing it, might give thy messengers cause to set me down among the enemies and opponents of a king of the faith. Had I been sitting with a mere turband on my head, in the same guise should I have come before you, to prove, by the excess of my haste, how far I was from departing from obedience to my king.” “And if obedience to my commands,” asked the king, “is in your opinion so strict a duty, how is it that you proclaim an opposition to them?” “In all that is subject to the Sultan’s orders,” said Abul Muāly, “it is a duty to obey the Sultan; but in all that is subject to the ordonnance, it is the Sultan’s duty to consult us. For it is as much a maxim of our glorious institute and illustrious church, that the ordonnance is the right of the priesthood, as that the order is the right of the king. Now the main­tenance of the fast and the appointment of the festival is matter of ordonnance, and not of royal command.” Not more certainly is fire extinguished by water than the king’s anger was merged in appro­bation, and he sent the Imām home with marks of unusual favour and good-will.*

It is a remark of Aristotle’s,* that equity is not a division of virtue, but all the virtues; and iniquity, which is its opposite, is not a division of vice, but all vices. In which aspect it has to do, 1. with the nature and powers of the individual, as has already been explained; and, 2. with his intercourse with his fellows, and those of his house and city; and hence that dictum of the Prince of Prophets, “Each of you governs, and each of you will be questioned as to his charge:” which means, that every person is sovereign over the concerns of his members and powers of soul and body, so as to be governor over those parts and powers; and every one will be questioned on the day of account concerning the condition of these his subjects. And again, when he declared that the exact dividers (that is, the just,) would hereafter be exalted upon thrones of light, the Companions enquired of whom it was he spoke. “Of those,” he replied, “who, in all of which they have possession and use, observe exact equity as regards their own right and that of their children.”* Certain writers have said parabolically, How should you be a lamp, when you yield no light to what is close beside you? Which means to say, whoever is unable to regulate his own condition, and unequal to maintaining the equity of his body and faculties, from him we cannot expect the equity of denizen and citizen.* But when he shall first preserve equity in his body and faculties, standing aloof both from excess and deficiency, and afterwards pursue the same course towards his part­ners in residence and polity, he becomes the vice-regent of the Supreme Divinity.*

As to the division of equity, Aristotle has distributed it into three parts: 1. That which is practised in discharge of the Almighty’s right to our obe­dience — of him whose own bounty, without any pre­vious claim of ours, has raised all that is to the rank of existence, and supported all the corpuscules of being from the stores of divine favour and unbounded munificence; in return for which, equity demands that in all that lies between the servant and his Maker, the former should pursue the most unexcep­tionable course, and leave no particle unobserved of all which the canons of obedience require him to perform. 2. That which has to do with associating with his fellow men, as allegiance to princes, reverence to doctors and dignitaries of the faith, dis­charge of trusts and integrity in dealings. 3. That which is due to the rights of our predecessors; as the payment of their debts, the performance of their injunctions, and the like. Now it is well known to those versed in the ordinances of the institute, that our living compendium of the Commendable in Morals has in sundry passages embodied these uni­versal divisions of equity, in the most sublime lan­guage and in the most graceful form: as for instance, Reverence to the commands of God and kindness to the creatures of God; which comprehends all these parts of equity. For its observance is either in what lies between the worshipper and God, which is con­veyed in the first limb of the above sentence; or in what lies between him and his fellow creatures, which is the meaning of the last limb. The intelli­gent believer well knows, that to comprise so many and so extensive injunctions in so compendious an expression, and this with such significant sweetness — such pregnant elegance — such apt precision — is a task only to be executed by one who has studied in the school, Be thou, O Lord, my instructor: So he made my instruction full. And hence it is, that the modern school of philosophers,* being versed in the minutiæ of the Muhammedan institute, and being witness to its comprising all the particulars of the active science, withdrew entirely from all regard to the dogmas of (pagan) philosophers and their books.

And here we must say a few words explanatory of obedience to God. Each one of the powers and members* was created by the Almighty for a special end; so that by their collective means, we might attain to the true perfection, or end of all ends: in other words, might arrive at the height of vice-regence to God upon earth. In the application therefore of these powers and members to these ends, consists all devotion, all equity, and all grati­tude; as in their application otherwise, all presump­tion, all oppression, and all faithlessness. Now the attainment of this purpose being an extreme of diffi­culty, the class so conducted are noted for their paucity, in the words symbolic of truth: The grate­ful among my servants are few. The particular charges whereby to employ every one of these powers are set forth in the institutes in their com­pletest form; and the right of men in their transac­tions, their intermarriages and their usufructs, are no less distinguished and explained at large: from that institute, then, they are to be collected.

The most comprehensive form of equity is that of kings; for without the royal equity, no one would have power to observe his own; or at least would meet with interminable obstacles to so doing.* For the culture of morals and the management of homes may be said to depend on the regulation of states; while that mental leisure, which is the menstruum of all perfection, is hardly to be realized in defiance of fluctuating pretensions and conflicting aims. Hence that tradition which tells us, “If a Sultan conform to equity, he shares in every act of obedience that emanates from his subjects; and if he practise oppression, he partakes with them in the onus of every crime.” It was also declared by the refuge of revelation, that at the day of resurrection, a just king will be of all men the nearest in degree to the Almighty; and a tyrannous one the farthest. Another saying of the Sanctified is this: “An hour’s equity is better than seventy years of devotion.” And this because the influence of an hour’s equity extends to every subject throughout every depart­ment, and abides to a prolonged duration. Abdulla bin al Mubārak* observes, “Were I certain that one prayer and only one was to be granted to me, I would breathe it for the righteousness of the king, as the best means of reaching the interests of the world at large.” To these observations we shall at present confine ourselves; the particulars of this species of equity coming more appropriately under the head of political control.

Now on this subject a difficulty has been raised to the effect that charity, though unquestionably commendable, is not comprised under equity. For equity deals in equalities; whereas charity is an increment: yet it has been laid down that to out­step the limit of equipoise, whether by excess or deficiency, is the constituent of fault; according to which charity would be faulty. To this it is replied, that charity is a watchfulness over equity, to secure it from the occurrence of deficiency. The interme­diative so undoubtedly indispensable to all the vir­tues, is not, however, always of the same measure. For the observance of exactitude in liberality (which is a mean between prodigality and avarice) may incline to the greater side; and temperance (the mean between lasciviousness and indifference) may incline to the lesser. Neither can charity ever be realized till the conditions of equity have been pre­viously observed: and withal our first step is to the limit of obligation; after that, for further safeguard and support, an increment is included in it. Were we to spend all our property without an obligation for spending it, we should be not charitable, but wasteful. Charity then is an equity secured against disturbance; and the charitable person, an equitable one, watchful over his equity: its very excellence, indeed, lying in its extraneousness.

This is the answer that is generally given. The intelligent reader, however, on recalling to the present question that which was said on the subject of virtual intermediacy,* will perceive another and a clearer one. It is to be observed, too, that charity is then only a watchfulness over equity, when it goes to prejudice the right of self. In deciding between any other parties no charity can have place; here the equipoise and parity must be observed in its purest form.

There are philosophers who assert, that there would be no occasion for the strong links of equity, if the bond of love and ties of affection between manking were sufficiently stringent.* For all engaged in transaction being in a state of preference towards each other in virtue of affection, what grounds could there be for coveting the right of others? The reason of which lies in this, that affec­tion is a more perfect tie than equity; affection being unity in physical constitution, and equity a unity in the acquisitive power; and that a unity not attainable without some exertion. Affection then is the paramount sovereign, and equity is his vice-regent. Now the secret of this matter lies in affec­tion being the source of creation; as we learn from the text, I was as a treasure that is hid; so I loved that I might be known.* Hence permanence and order are likewise founded on the same.

The whole discussion of affection, however, (if it so please the Almighty,*) will come under the head of the domestic science.